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also foresaw that the Nazi collaborators and the Security Battalions
will be legally prosecuted and sent to prison.
The Treaty was betrayed and failed to be implemented as the Security
Battalions were not legally charged and amnesty was suspended. The
Leftist Guerrillas gave up their arms as the Treaty foresaw but the
Battalions imprisoned 80.000 left-wing partisans and the civil war
broke in 1946 until 1949. The Security Battalions were transferred
into the national army, Greek police and in administrative positions.
The authoritarian and ultranationalist regime establishes itself for
the next decade.
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Abstract
This thesis analyses the Holocaust in occupied Greece and its effects on Greek political life.
It is undertaken through a socio-political and historical interpretation of texts and archival
sources. It draws especially from the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt and her
understanding of totalitarianism, nationalism, statelessness and ‘evil’. I aim to understand
the changed position of Jews in Greek society from the fall of the empires, through the
emergence of nation-states, to the period of deportations and extermination. I do so to
comprehend the rise of nationalism in Greece. I examine a mix of primary and secondary
materials – histories, memoirs and unpublished archives of Nazi rule – to cast light on the
anti-Semitic laws implemented in Greece during the Nazi occupation and on the
relationship of the Holocaust to the political regime that emerged in Greece after the war. I
place particular emphasis on Jewish participation in the Greek Resistance, the political
conflicts that emerged within the larger resistance movement, and the sensitive issue of
collaboration, which was to shape much of the political agenda in Greece after the war.
Through the use of diplomatic papers and Foreign Office files, I show how democratic anti-
Nazi resistance movements were suppressed after the war by fascist forces and through the
reluctance of the Greek bourgeois politicians and British officials to intervene. The politics
of collaboration, underplayed in the current literature, also casts light on why perpetrators of
the Greek Holocaust generally escaped legal prosecution in Greece and why resistance
fighters were prosecuted through the implementation of martial laws and emergency
decrees. Finally this thesis explores the ties that bind repression of the memory of the Greek
Holocaust, to the development in post-war Greece of nationalist values.
Keywords: Arendt, Greek Holocaust, resistance, collaboration, nationalism, memory, crimes
against humanity
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Introduction
This thesis examines the Holocaust in Nazi Occupied Greece. The rise of
totalitarianism affected all the Jewish communities in Europe, but the Greek Holocaust has
been largely neglected in modern Greek and European historiography. I emphasize the
importance of Jews in Greek history, but also how after the fall of the Ottoman Empire Jews
were turned into a ‘stateless’ people through the introduction of nationalism and how these
nationalist trends continued after the war - not least by excluding the Holocaust from
national collective memory.
There are three key scholars who have investigated the Holocaust of Greek Jews;
Mark Mazower (1993), Hagen Fleischer (1995), and Steven Bowman (2006). They have
provided valuable collections of essays and books, which enable us to understand for the first
time the experience of Jews during Nazi Occupation in Greece. Mazower’s expertise on
Greek affairs in the 20th century not only covers the experience of occupation but also
reviews the Holocaust from the introduction of anti-Semitic measures until the final solution.
Hagen Fleischer addresses the experience of life in the mountains, resistance and
collaboration. Steven Bowman provides for the first time a comprehensive work on Jewish
resistance in the mountains of Free Greece and explains major socio-political events that led
to the destruction of the Greek Jewry, but he does not discuss “local politics” in the city of
Thessaloniki that contributed to the destruction of the Jewish community, including that of
local collaborators, central governors and quisling prime ministers that approved the Nazi
decisions. The contribution of this thesis to knowledge is that it addresses Greek
responsibility for approving the deportations as part of the political trends that shaped Greece
and Greek theory during the occupation.
Most chapters of this volume have a historical architecture, but the analysis is social
and political. I do not seek to explain simply why the Holocaust occurred in Greece or to
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identify who was responsible, but to understand the nature of a society that excluded and
discriminated against Jews. If the first is the work of the historian and the second is the work
of the sociologist, this thesis brings them together to unravel the multiple threads that led to
the most horrific event of the twentieth century. As Fine and Turner suggest,
“social theory’s licence to speak of sequences and epochs and inaugurating
events is much broader. The events which social theory might then allow itself
to be affected by include not only the framing of constitutions or social
revolutions, but events which are held to alter an entire mode of collective
perception or awareness” (Fine and Turner, 2000b:3).
Greece developed powerful resistance forces against the occupation. In this effort,
thousands of Jews joined their fellow Greeks in the country to fight against Italian fascism in
1940-1941, and against Nazi and Bulgarian Occupation in 1941-1944 (Bowman, 2006). The
participation of the Jews in the Greek resistance is a forgotten part of Greek history and
deserves further elaboration. We also need to consider how Greece developed socio-
politically after the war and the impact it had upon surviving Jews as well as on the memory
of the Holocaust. The movement of the people was suppressed and Greece entered a new
period of terrorism by right-wing forces, royalists and collaborators who aimed at integrating
nationalism and conformity with pre-war bourgeois values.1 The horrific events that marked
the decades of Cold War affected the memory of the Holocaust in Greece. The Jews, Greeks,
indeed everyone who fought against Nazism, were chased, murdered, exiled and imprisoned
due to their political convictions. In this context the Greek legal system failed to bring the
perpetrators to justice – a failure that had parallels elsewhere in Europe.
1 For example the come-back of monarchy and the value system of Metaxas Dictatorship.
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Organisation of the Thesis
Chapter 1
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part “Theoretical Perspectives”
introduces the reader to Hannah Arendt’s (1968) thought with particular emphasis on her
understanding of totalitarianism and the radical forces that led to the Holocaust. In The
Origins of Totalitarianism (1968) Arendt seeks to understand the origins of totalitarianism,
especially through the effects of the rise of nationalism on minorities. Her study helps us
grasp how Jews became ‘stateless’ people and lost their rights across Europe, a process
exemplified in the case of Greek Jews. Arendt saw the Holocaust as a case of ‘radical evil’,
but her efforts in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the Banality of Evil (2006) to
understand the perpetrators of the Holocaust in terms of ‘banality of evil’ emphasize that they
were ‘normal’ human beings, who yet committed unimaginable deeds. This problematic leads
me to investigate further issues of personal judgement, blind obedience and rational thinking.
Later it informs my analysis of how both Nazis and Greek collaborators tried to escape
justice and excuse their actions. Despite the controversy the surrounded the use of the term
‘banality of evil’, Robert Fine argues that it came out of a need to show that the
“unprecedented violence” was “not...a sign of something beyond human understanding”
(Fine, 2000c: 35).
Chapter 2
The second part of the thesis “Historical Perspectives” is divided into chapters 2, 3
and 4. Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the historical background of the Jewish community
in Greece. The Jewish community lived in Greece for more than four centuries, and the city
of Salonika was host to a great number of different religious communities, including Jews
(Mazower, 1993). I introduce the reader to the political and social changes that occurred in
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the twentieth century in the Balkans, which had a tremendous impact on Greek Jews who
came face to face with discrimination, anti-Semitism and finally deportation. With the fall of
the Ottoman Empire, the Hellenization of the city of Salonika brought significant changes to
Jews, who were constantly threatened as a result of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), World
War I (1914-18), the Dictatorship of Metaxas (1936), the Italian Occupation (1940-1941), the
Bulgarian Occupation in Greek Thrace (1941-1944), and the Nazi Occupation (1941-1944).
The fall of the Ottoman Empire signalled constant wars in the name of nationalist
irredentist movements that discriminated against Jews, who suddenly became ‘rootless’ and
deprived of political and civil rights. I show how on the eve of the Nazi Occupation of Greece
anti-Jewish propaganda paved the way for anti-Jewish policies and the destruction of Greek
Jewry in the death camps. I discuss the fate of Jews in different parts of Greece, the different
policies pursued against Jews in different occupation zones, and the political mechanisms that
led to either collaboration with or resistance to Nazi antisemitic laws. The emergence of a
left-wing resistance (EAM/ELAS) in Athens during the Italian and Nazi occupations proved
catalytic for saving almost the entire community of the capital. Finally, this chapter examines
an unknown aspect of Greek history, the heroic participation of Jews in the Guerrilla War in
the mountains of Free Greece against the Italian and Nazi occupations. This history is
underplayed in both the Greek and the wider European literature and shows how Jews and
Greeks fought side by side to eradicate fascism, anti-Semitism and Nazism (Chimbos, 1999:
259).
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 explores Auschwitz through the experiences of the Greek Jews in the
concentration camps. This chapter seeks to bring together the stories of Greek Jews with
those of other European communities inside the death camps. It tells the story of the
17
participation of Greek Jews in the crematoria of Birkenau, their strong sense of survival, and
how they fought together to remain alive by building a strong common cause.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 describes and narrates a massacre that occurred in 10 June 1944 in the small
village of Distomo, Central Greece. The massacre occurred in two hours of ‘door-to-door’
slaughter in which the Nazis killed 218 non-Jewish Greek people (Mazower, 1993: 212). This
chapter does not seek to compare Jewish and Greek experiences, but relate the destruction of
Jews to what occurred in the mountains of Greece as the war progressed. The divisions that
arose out of resistance, collaboration and political rivalry affected the 10,000 Jewish partisans
and 2000 Auschwitz survivors, and became central to the postwar memory of Jews who
stayed on in Greece (see Lewkowicz, 2000; see also Bourlas, 2000). My account of this
episode is based on primary and secondary data with 5 unstructured interviews, primary
documents and a collection of books and newspapers that reported on the massacre. Survivors
welcomed me in their houses – with the support of the former Mayor of Distomo, Athanasios
Panourgias – and I am grateful for their consent to be interviewed. In accordance with ethical
standards of academic research, I agreed that their names will not be published and I am
using pseudonyms. The interviews, which took place in a relaxed and friendly environment,
were based on unstructured and infrequent questions.
Chapter 5
Part III of this thesis is on “Political Perspectives” and includes chapters 5 and 6. This
chapter is about collaboration in Greece, the socio-political mechanisms that enabled
collaboration, and the forces that sought to destroy democratic resistance. Through the use of
diplomatic papers and files of the British Foreign Office, I explore political controversies that
developed between left and right wing resistance movements in occupied Greece, and how
they played out in postwar political developments. This chapter explains the “December
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Events 1944” and the Varkiza Agreement that helped collaborators destroy left-wing
resistance movements and rule the country in the postwar period with the support of British
policies designed to keep Greece in the western sphere of influence. At the same time I
provide comparative analysis as to analogous trends in Europe.
Chapter 6
This chapter entitled ‘The Legal Aftermath in Greece: The Parody of the Courts’,
aims at linking the socio-political consequences of Right-wing politics with legal decisions
not to prosecute Nazi collaborators. Greece was one of those countries that did not deliver
justice for the victims of the Holocaust and for those who fought against fascism. After the
war collaborators and right-wing bourgeois circles established an oppressive regime that
overshadowed Greece for decades suppressing democratic thought. Under the shadows of the
Cold War, the Greek government treated the major left-wing anti-Nazi resistance, including
many partisans who fought against Nazism, as enemies of the state and subjected them to
legal prosecution. I examine these events, to bring to light a legal system that went hand in
hand with nationalist politics – a failure to prosecute collaborators that was not unique to
Greece but which, as Tony Judt recognised, was especially marked in Greece (Judt, 2000:48;
see also Pendas, 2009). Forces of the far-Right employed dictatorial laws, torture and exile
not only to safeguard collaborators, but to enable their later participation in the political
arena, as was the case with former Dictator, Georgios Papadopoulos (Kostopoulos,
2005:146). Finally I examine a little known legal case concerning the Nazi criminal,
Maximilian Merten, who was one of the three main perpetrators in the destruction of Greek
Jewry in Salonika. This study is undertaken via exclusive investigation of diplomatic papers
of the Foreign Office that not only bring to light the case of Max Merten and the reasons he
was set free, but also the political mechanisms that led Greece and other European countries
to set free many Nazis for financial and political reasons (see FO 371/153018).
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Conclusion
In these concluding remarks I consider the stories of Jews who came back to the
cities, the important issue of restitution (namely how the modern Greek state failed to return
property to survivors), and collective memory.
Methodology
Taking off from Arendt’s (1968) analysis of the origins of totalitarianism, I link the
fate of Jews in Greek society to related developments at the European level. This approach
enables me to understand how the Jews were deprived of legal rights or moral personhood
prior to their extermination. The works of Mark Mazower (1993), Hagen Fleischer (1995)
and Steven Bowman (2006) have helped me present a comprehensive analysis of the fate of
Greek Jewry, to understand the dynamics of anti-Semitism, collaboration and nationalism,
and to see the importance of collective memory in post-war Greece. This exploration aims at
highlighting in particular the question of Greek responsibility for the Jewish deportations. In
addition, the use of archival materials has contributed valuable elements to the study of
collaboration and resistance: political documents of Greek and British politicians, files of the
UK Foreign Office, Cabinet papers from London, files of British Wartime Intelligence
(SOE), and old newspapers. I have been able to use primary books from British officials and
members of SOE who were responsible for Greek Affairs during the occupation, such as the
works of Brigadier Eddie Myers (1975; 1985), British agent Christopher Monty Woodhouse
(1976), agent Wallace (1982), agent Stevens (1982), memoirs of partisans and books of the
‘quisling’ Prime Ministers during Occupied Greece.
I need to inform the reader the conditions under which the archival as well as the
overall research in Greece took place. I must honestly admit that the time I spent in Athens
doing my research has been an adventure. Few things I need to mention which perhaps help
20
the reader to understand better the shape and logic of my thesis and why I decided to put the
historical events the way I did. First of all there is a severe poverty of archival materials
concerning Greek Jewry. If I exclude the library of the Jewish Museum of Athens, where
there is a serious but still small Jewish bibliography, the remaining research centres seem
outdated. Starting with the National Library of Greece, there is a medium size of bibliography
concerning the Jews of Greece, but new publications in the last decade are not on the shelves.
The library is independent but belongs to the Greek State University, is poor due to the
financial crisis, and its organisation is badly managed. This creates substantial obstacles to
the researcher. Surprisingly, the Archives of the Greek State (GAK) do not have any files on
Greek Jewry. A massive volume of archives was destroyed in 1953 under the Karamanlis
administration, part of a general ‘mashing’ of old documents. An example of this poor
archival availability concerns the postwar trials in Greece. John Laughland has pointed out
that the records of crucial trials (like those of the quisling PMs) disappeared six months after
convictions were issued and no one until now has studied them. Laughland rightly comments
that in the Law School of Athens (Nomiki Athinon) there is “not a single transcript… article
or book about the trial of these three prime ministers to be found anywhere in any of the court
libraries” (Laughland, 2008:161). Under these conditions, the primary and secondary
materials I collected are only available due to persistent research and personal funding.
The reason I decided to look at Foreign Office Files at the Academy of Athens was
because I was searching for primary archives concerning the issue of collaboration. The
biggest volume of the FO files was collected in Athens, while the rest were accessed online
through the portal of the Public Record Office. I was trying to find documents that would
reveal the collaboration of Greek authorities with the Nazis concerning Jewish deportations,
but I did not find anything. The Head of the archival collections at the Academy of Athens
informed me that there are no archives available of this kind and that collaboration as a single
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research topic can only be found in the FO files via the exclusive examination of resistance.
The files are poorly managed and the digital machine has not been renewed since the 1980s.2
Trying to read and take pictures through a half broken machine was a real struggle. The
materials I found do reveal collaboration among some resistance groups (i.e. the right wing
movement of EDES). However, I kept a distance between what I found and what I knew prior
to my research, since there is a lot of propaganda in the FO files. The FO files are
indispensable for the researcher, but many documents contradict one another as the same
events were written by different persons who viewed them in different ways. They can be
confusing and misleading for the researcher. By contrast, the political and historical analysis
present in the secondary material is far more serious, sophisticated and enlightening than the
FO files. There were politicians both in Greece and in Britain who were trying to shape
opinion in a heavily polarised society. I did not take seriously, for example, the files that
reveal collaboration between the left wing resistance and Nazis since they were written by
politicians who favoured fascism and established right-wing dictatorships after liberation.
To be able to tell whether a political file has validity or not, I had to dig deep into the
politics of Greece and how they impacted on attempts to save the Jews. Hagen Fleischer
(1995), for instance, declares that some files were ‘fabricated’, and many officials spread
accusations against the major resistance movement, ELAS, to shape opinion and influence
officials in Egypt and Britain (see chapter 5). I have drawn attention to similar events in other
European countries to see how resistance was understood after the war was over. This
analysis enabled me to examine the trials of collaborators in Greece, compare them with
2 The Greek State in the eighties bought all FO and SOE files from the Public Record Office (London). Until
today the archives are housed in the offices of Greek academics in the Academy of Athens (K. E. I. N.E
research centre). There is neither a building to house the archives separately, nor money to preserve the
condition of the archives and the micro-film machines. The archives are in a terrible condition and difficult to
read. There are only two micro-film machines for everyone who wishes to study the archives of FO and SOE.
The academics were extremely helpful to enable my research in their offices as there is no other space available.
That means that they also go and fetch the archives for everyone who wants to see the files.
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other countries of East and West Europe, and see that the failure of legal justice came along
with a parallel failure to address the memory of the Holocaust (see Pendas, 2009). The
methodology I used to explore the massacre of Distomo is through the use of unstructured
interviews of survivors. This approach enabled me to analyse this massacre in “depth” and let
the interviewees “lead” the discussion (see Gillham, 2000: 3). In the section on
“Methodological Design, Purpose and the Usefulness of the Survivor’s Voices” in chapter 4,
I pursue the purpose of this methodological choice.
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PART I: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
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Chapter 1. Hannah Arendt on Nationalism, Nation-States and Citizenship
Introduction
Hannah Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism focuses on the human consequences of
the disintegration of European polities, the death of values and the negation of rights. It is
above all her work that informs my study of the eradication of the Jews in the Greek
Holocaust. First, I draw from her monograph The Origins of Totalitarianism the changing
shape of Europe as it emerged from the collapse of multi-cultural empires and rise of nation
states, which closed borders, raised national flags and excluded those who were not part of
the new national rhetoric. Among the socio-political side effects of this transition Jews lost
their civil and political rights and became ‘stateless’. Second, this chapter discusses Arendt’s
analysis of the anti-Semitic agenda of Hitlerite doctrine as a point of theoretical departure for
my own study of antisemitism directed at Greek Jewry. Third, it explains Arendt’s notion of
‘radical evil’ to describe the sense of unlimited possibilities behind Nazi efforts to eradicate
European Jewry: “when the impossible was made possible” (Arendt, 1968:459). Fourth, it
focuses on Arendt’s use of the concept of ‘banality of evil’ (after witnessing the testimony of
Eichmann in Jerusalem) to argue that top Nazi bureaucrats who committed murders of
unprecedented scale did so without ‘thinking’ (Arendt, 2006:288). Finally, this chapter
emphasizes the influence of work of Kant in Arendt’s thought in setting the scene for a
secular conception of evil.
Nationalism, Minority Status and Statelessness
Arendt wrote in Origins of the “atmosphere of disintegration” (Arendt, 1968:268)
that accompanied the fall of multi-cultural empires over Europe: Russian, Austro-Hungarian
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and Ottoman. Hatred and racism spread rapidly; the rights of minorities were severely
threatened; a way was paved for the rise of totalitarianism:
“Denationalization became a powerful weapon of totalitarian politics, and the
constitutional inability of European nation-states to guarantee human rights to
those who had lost nationally guaranteed rights, made it possible for the
persecuting governments to impose their standard of values even upon their
opponents: those whom the persecutor had singled out as scum on earth – Jews,
Trotskyites, etc.” (Arendt, 1968: 269).
Once the empires evaporated, expansionism, irredentism and authoritarianism
prevailed, as new flags and borders were sketched all over the continent. As Robert Fine
writes, “everybody was against everybody else and most of all against their closest
neighbours: Slovaks against Czechs, Croats against Serbs, Ukrainians against Poles, all
against Jews” (Fine, 2001:117). No European government safeguarded the rights of
minorities, some of whom were recognised as such and some made stateless: “neither the
country of origin nor any other agreed to accept the stateless person” (Arendt, 1968:283). In
Origins, Arendt wrote that,
“... the loss of citizenship deprived people not only of protection, but also of all
clearly established, recognised identity, a fact for which their eternal feverish
efforts to obtain at least birth certificates from the country that denationalised
them was a very exact symbol; one of the problems was solved when they
achieved the degree of distinction that will rescue a man from the huge and
nameless crowd” (Arendt, 1968:287).
The “conquest of the state by the nation” (Arendt, 1968:230) was the marker of a new
nationalism in which all rights were guaranteed by the nation and only for those who were
deemed to belong to the nation:
“The secret conflict between state and nation came to light at the very birth of
the modern nation-state, when the French Revolution combined the declaration
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of the Rights of Man with the demand for national sovereignty. The same
essential rights were at once claimed as the inalienable heritage of all human
beings and as the specific heritage of specific nations, the same nation was at
once declared to be subject to laws, which supposedly would flow from the
Rights of Man, and sovereign, that is, bound by no universal law and
acknowledging nothing superior to itself. The practical outcome of this
contradiction was that from then on human rights were protected and enforced
only as national rights and that the very institution of a state, whose supreme
task was to protect and guarantee man his rights as man, as citizen and as
national, lost its legal, rational appearance [...]” (Arendt, 1968:230-231).
The aftermath of the First World War witnessed mass poverty and unemployment,
financial crisis and civil wars all over Europe. It also witnessed a new wave of terror and
insecurity for those who were not considered part of the new nation states: “once they had left
their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless;
once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth”
(Arendt, 1968:268). The efforts of those who sought peace failed as their efforts clashed with
the definition of the new nation-states: “homogeneity of population and rootedness in the soil”
(Arendt, 1968:270). Jews were treated either as ‘minorities’ or as entirely ‘stateless’ and
without any national representation:
“Both in the history of the ‘nation of minorities’ and in the formation of a
stateless people, Jews have played a significant role. They were at the head of
the so-called minority movement because of their great need for protection [...]
but above all because they formed a majority in no country and therefore could
be regarded as the minorité par excellence, i.e., the only minority whose
interests could be defended only by internationally guaranteed protection. The
special needs of the Jewish people were the best possible pretext for denying
that the Treaties were a compromise between the new nations’ tendency
forcefully to assimilate alien peoples and nationalities who for reasons of
expediency could not be granted the right to national self-determination”
(Arendt, 1968:289).
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Totalitarian Domination
Along with the loss of the rights of minorities, the rise of totalitarian regimes on the
continent enabled the creation of “state machines” that ruled in “absolute” terms (Arendt,
1968:389). Nazi ideology developed along with the collapse of moral and political values in
Europe and targeted first and foremost ‘the Jews’. It aimed at eradicating all aspects of a
pluralistic society, for this is the very essence of “total domination”. Everyone could be
“exchanged at random for any other”, because differentiation itself was stripped of value
(Arendt, 1968:438). As Adorno wrote in Negative Dialectics:
“[...] in the concentration camps it was no longer an individual who died, but a
specimen – this is a fact bound to affect the dying of those who escaped the
administrative measure. Genocide is the absolute integration. It is on its way
wherever men are levelled off- ‘polished off’ [...] until one exterminates them
literally, as deviations from the concept of their total nullity [...] What the sadists
in the camps foretold their victims, ‘Tomorrow you’ll be wiggling skyward as
smoke from this chimney,’ bespeaks the indifference of each individual life that
is the direction of history. Even in his formal freedom, the individual is as
fungible and replaceable as he will be under the liquidators’ boots” (Adorno,
1973:362).
Nazi terror was delivered with systematic efficiency and gave “credibility” to the
notion that everything was allowed; the motto “everything is possible” became a dreadful
reality (Villa, 1999:16). The socio-political changes that occurred in the twentieth century in
Europe brought about crises in all aspects of social and political life: “‘crisis of capitalism’,
the emergence of imperialism and the growth of race – thinking and anti-Semitism” (Hansen,
1993:142). They opened a new chapter of violence built upon ideology, terror and loss of “a
common world” (ibid). Totalitarianism sprung from these symptoms. Its doctrines were based
on a “ruthlessness” that “corrupts absolutely” because the only criterion is that of domination
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at all costs (Villa, 1999:14). Arendt wrote that there was nothing new in violence or terror or
even concentration camps:
“There have almost always been wars of aggression; the massacre of hostile
populations after a victory went unchecked until the Romans mitigated it by
introducing the parcere subjectis; through centuries the extermination of
native peoples went hand in hand with the colonization of the Americas,
Australian and Africa; slavery is one of the oldest institutions of mankind
and all empires of antiquity were based on the labor of state-owned slaves
who erected their public buildings. Not even concentration camps are an
invention of totalitarian movements. They emerge for the first time during
the Boer War, at the beginning of the century, and continued to be used in
South Africa as well as India for “undesirable elements”; here, too, we first
find the term “protective custody” which was later adopted by the Third
Reich. These camps correspond in many respects to the concentration
camps at the beginning of totalitarian rule; they were used for “suspects”
whose offences could not be proved and who could not be sentenced by
ordinary process of law” (Arendt, 1968:440).
What was new was the emergence of totalitarian methods of domination based on the
credo that “everything is possible” (Arendt, 1968: 440-441). The impossible occurred in the
concentration camps. What Arendt describes as “dwelling on horrors” meant facing up to the
reality of concentration camps as the most “consequential institution of totalitarian rule”
(Arendt, 1968: 441). What is difficult to understand, as Richard Bernstein argues, is that this
machinery of death was operated by “normal” human beings that “this demands a new
thinking about evil” (Bernstein, 2002:225-6).
The possibility of a totalitarian regime gaining power and creating “a new form of
government” has proven all too real (Adams, 1989:33). Totalitarian movements do not have
the characteristics of normal political parties; they grow within a rationale of the
homogenised masses teaching hostility towards a world of inherent differences and plurality
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(ibid). Multi-ethnicity and pluralism were not only negated but persecuted by means of terror:
it was the absolute negation of freedom and its “possibility” (Adams, 1989:33-34).
Radical and Banal Evil
In Origins Arendt identified radical evil with “total domination”, that is, an irrational
system of rule aimed at destroying cultural difference and spontaneity as indispensable
characteristics of human freedom (Arendt, 1968:438). Totalitarian terror took away these pre-
conditions of the human condition, isolated masses of people, degraded them, and finally
destroyed through a variety of means innocent human beings like the Jews (Arendt,
1968:438). Radical evil can be understood as indifference to the identity of the people in the
camps, as if they had no name or individual existence. Its practitioners treated people “as if
they had never existed” and aimed at erasing them “in the literal sense” (Arendt, 1968:442).
Robert Fine argues in Political Investigations: Hegel, Marx, Arendt,
“The camps were the laboratories in which the experiment of total
domination, impossible to accomplish under normal circumstances, could
be actualised. The process of admitting people into the camps was a process
of stripping people of any notion of personality or possession of right: first
rights of political participation, then rights of property, then even rights of
survival” (Fine, 2001:113).
The negation of one’s existence in its totality is what Arendt explains in Origins as
“uprootedness”, namely, the condition under which a man has “no place in the world,
recognized and guaranteed by others” (Arendt, 1968: 475). Radical evil can be understood if
one considers that death became not only a cruel numerical accomplishment for Nazis, but
something like a routine, blind, and impersonal, on the part of technical killers (Arendt, 1968:
443). The extermination camps signified something unprecedented, something not seen in the
past, something no previous set of moral beliefs could understand. At this point, we receive a
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clearer idea of what radical evil is; namely, “death at any price” (Arendt, 1968:443). Arendt
writes:
“It is the appearance of some radical evil, previously unknown to us, that
puts an end to the notion of developments and transformation of qualities.
Here, there are neither political nor historical nor simply moral standards
but, at the most, the realization that something seems to be involved in the
politics as we used to understand it, namely all or nothing –” (Arendt, 1968:
443).
Phillip Hansen argues that the enigma behind this form of evil was that of
totalitarianism as a “movement” (Hansen, 1993:144). This totalitarian regime was breeding a
mechanical world of hate and murder through propaganda; it constructed a new reality that
had nothing to do with the existing one: it had an “arbitrary existence” (ibid). This utopia
created a “bridge to normalcy’. Death became acceptable, technical and “normal” without
thinking or personal judgment, breeding anaesthesia and cynicism (Hansen, 1993:145).
Cynical behaviour on the part of the “leader”, as Hansen suggests, provided the basis
of avoiding “responsibility”, for killing masses of prisoners in the death camps was also
considered normal (Hansen, 1993:145- 146). Hansen describes the difficulty of understanding
the death camps, arguing that although they existed in real time, yet the very idea of it cannot
be explained in real time: it was a “surrealistic inferno” that could be comprehended only in a
“phantom” cosmos, a world outside our thinking (Hansen, 1993:148). Only in such a
phantom reality could death camps make their appearance, since all decisions of the Nazi
regime were outside “the normal penal system” and “judicial procedure”, and erased all sense
of responsibility (ibid).
The identification of Führer’s order as the only true and just law was meant to guide
not only the judgment of the Führer but also the actions of SS officials and indeed the whole
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German nation. In an essay “Organised Guilt and Universal Responsibility” written just after
the war in January 1945, Arendt criticised the totalitarian control of all human faculties that
Germans possessed by virtue of their “complicity in crimes” (Arendt, 1978:228). She argued
that it was almost impossible to tell who was a Nazi follower and who not, given apparent
popular support for the Nazi regime; an anti-Nazi personality could only be revealed “when
the Nazis have hanged him” (ibid). Most Germans, or so it seemed if one considers how
many served the Nazi bureaucracy, to a lesser or great extent contributed to the promotion of
this death machine (Arendt, 1978:229-230):
“There are many who share responsibility without any visible proof of guilt.
There are many more who have become guilty without being in the least
responsible. Among the responsible in a broader sense must be included all
those who continued sympathetic to Hitler as long as it was possible, who
aided his rise to power, and who applauded him in Germany and in other
European countries. Who would dare to brand all these ladies and gentlemen of
high society as war criminals?... That everyone, whether or not he is directly
active in a murder camp, is forced to take part in one way or another in the
workings of this machine of mass murder – that is the horrible thing” (Arendt,
1978:229-230).
Radical Evil in Origins describes the conditions under which innocent people were
systematically exterminated by technical means with “an apparent lack of purpose” (Arendt,
1968: 445). Arendt’s theory of evil was grounded, as Villa suggests, on the “normality” of
death, that is, on absence of thought and critical judgement on the part of the doers (Villa,
1999:44). It was the idea of a new era of human action guided by “thoughtlessness” that led
Arendt to make use of Karl Jaspers’ term, the ‘banality of evil’ (Villa, 1999:42). The idea of
radical evil lost its significance and became banal, but the latter term is not so different from
the former. As Bernstein argues in Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, radical evil for
Arendt meant “making human beings superfluous”, so the meaning of this evil was geared
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towards “eradicating the very conditions required for living a human life”, while banality of
evil focuses on “thoughtlessness”, the inability to think and judge, while attempting to ask in
what sense it was possible to account for the “monstrous deeds” practised by people who
were otherwise so “normal” and “ordinary” (Bernstein, 1996:152).
The idea of “radical evil” emphasized the horrible tragedy and suffering of people
through extreme violence and barbaric methods, denying human life. The idea “banality of
evil” was meant to highlight the inability of Eichmann to “think and to judge” what he was
doing while carrying out the Final Solution (Bernstein, 1996:152). It revealed that even such
murderous acts had “no motives” on the part of technical killers such as Eichmann
(Bernstein, 1996:152-153). Both terms explore “motives” behind the genocide, but Arendt
resists any attempt to explain totalitarian regimes in a closed system that will inevitably
“aestheticise” the whole problematic (Bernstein, 1996:152). Why? On the one hand, because
of the danger of being trapped in the logic of seeking “alternative” answers as to why the SS
officers behaved in such horrific ways; and on the other because of the danger of following
the path of theological explanation, that there was something “satanic” that led the Nazis to
behave in this way (Bernstein, 1996:150). The term “banality of evil” highlights the opposite
of anything satanic. Eichmann was in fact “human – all too human” (ibid).3 In Eichmann in
Jerusalem Arendt writes:
“Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking for his personal
advancement, he had no motives at all. And this diligence in itself was in no
way criminal; he certainly would never have murdered his superior in order to
inherit his post. He merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what
he was doing... He was not stupid. It was sheer thoughtlessness- something by
no means identical with stupidity- that predisposed him to become one of the
3 We will see later on how this rejection of “satanic greatness” can be fully understood in relation to the
rejection of the idea of ‘demonic will’ in both Arendtian and Kantian theory and how it is analyzed in Allison’s
(1996) chapter “Reflections on the Banality (radical) of Evil: A Kantian Analysis” in Idealism and Freedom .
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greatest criminals of that period. And if this is “banal” and even funny, if with
the best will in the world one cannot extract any diabolical or demonic
profundity from Eichmann, that is still far from calling it commonplace… That
such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc
than all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, are inherent in man –
that was, in fact, the lesson one could learn in Jerusalem” ( Arendt, 2006: 288).
Arendt drew her thinking on evil from Kant’s ethical and moral theory. Arendt shared
Kant’s effort to rationalise “radical evil” and ground it within society. Kant, as Bernstein
suggests, did not consider evil as a theological category but as the result of a “perverted ill
will” (Bernstein, 2002:12). In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant argued that
evil is to be found in society and Arendt agreed with Kant that evil comes out of a will that is
perverted and immoral. For Kant this meant that the will has abandoned the lawful way to
live and has incorporated into its own “maxims” evil thoughts (Kant, 1960:24). In other
words, for Kant evil is present when the human being deviates from laws and maxims that are
binding and universal and when this human being is aware of the fact that he is breaking the
law (Kant, 1960:27). In other words, the human being has the “capacity for respect for the
moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the will” (Kant, 1960:22-23). Kant maintains
that the relation between will and action is given freely too (Kant, 1960:23). Action and will
are interrelated, guided always by laws and rational maxims that man has embodied within
him. This idea of man’s relation to the moral law is provided in Kant’s definition of the
“categorical imperative” in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The categorical
imperative for Kant, is an absolute and binding condition for the actions of one who is driven
by a will that is free and has autonomy; it presupposes that the will agrees with the “universal
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laws” (Kant, 1964:98). As he explains: “A will which by all its maxims enacts universal
laws” (Kant, 1964:28). 4
Arendt’s logic behind “banality of evil” resembles Kant’s problematic, for as Allison
suggests, she shared Kant’s theory of the social foundations of evil. She saw Eichmann as “a
product of a society in which mendacity had become an ingredient of the national character”
(Allison, 2001:95), and in which cruelty signified orthodox reasoning for any Nazi member
as long as they thought they were doing the right thing. The emphasis of both Arendt and
Kant on social pathologies seem to reject the possibility of a diabolical force ( “a diabolical
will”) as an explanation behind evil (Allison, 2001:94-95). For Kant, the existence of a
“diabolical will” denies rationality of the will; for Arendt, Eichmann seemed to have “no
motives” at all (Allison, 1996:174, 176). Kant’s thesis, as Allison suggests, was rejected by
Arendt, for rationalising evil and attributing to it “comprehensible motives” deriving from
“self-interest” (Allison, 1996:176).
4 Paul Guyer in Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom argues that what Kant sees in the categorical imperative
is that the “universal laws” are actually the evidence that man has actualized (i.e. put in praxis) his will
accordingly, and his will has been identified with the laws of universality. According to Kant, man needs always
to be aware of his binding commitment to the categorical imperative. Furthermore, this “universal practical
principle cannot be depended upon any contingent object of the will”- and this constitutes the very essence of a
“good will”; a will in other words that must always seek to minimize his or her own “contingent effects of
inclination” (Guyer, 2005:150-151). Given the fact that Kant understands action within a system of laws that are
morally embedded in man’s will, so too, he understands a man who is evil and has withdrawn from society’s
let’s say expectations and moral laws. Therefore he simultaneously seeks to “trace the causes of evil”, and he
searches within society (Kant, 1960:27). The tendency to become evil (i.e. “the propensity to evil”) as he names
it, cannot be found anywhere but within the social reality. It is to be found within the “free-acting being” that
has become degenerated and it is he, who is responsible for escaping from laws, and becomes “accountable as
the offender”, because man is acting always freely (Kant, 1960:30). Analytically in part IV. Concerning the
Origin of Evil in Human Nature, in Religion book, Kant emphatically writes that the root of radical evil is to be
found within the “laws of freedom” and within a framework that satisfies ironically freedom; it is an “origin in
reason or an origin in time” and it is grounded in “rational representation” (Kant, 1960:34, 35). Allen W. Wood,
in Kant’s Ethical Thought, echoes Kant’s need to find a rational basis to understand radical evil: it is when men
act in egotistic way and when human reason is guided by “human competitiveness”, “social comparisons” and
“antagonisms” (Wood, 1999:288). In other words, Kant gives an “anthropological” justification for evil action,
especially when people live and co-operate close to one another. It is there where feelings of resentment and
antagonism arise, for it is the “social condition” of men that breeds “corruption” in human mind and human
nature as a whole (ibid). Hence it is through “the use of its freedom” as Wood argues in Kant’s Moral Religion,
that man chooses between good and evil actions (Wood, 1970:211).
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Richard Bernstein has suggested that, despite the Kantian influence on Arendt’s
thesis on evil, she did not agree with Kant’s explanation that evil derives from human’s
“selfishness” and “self-love” (Bernstein, 2002:208). For Kant the most radical form of evil
action is when man abandons the categorical imperative and acts selfishly, and when man
exploits his fellow being’s need to have “dignity” and act spontaneously as a distinct person.
For Arendt, radical evil is something more significant: it is the death of spontaneity and what
makes “human beings superfluous” that is in question (Bernstein, 2002:208-209). Bernstein
suggests that Arendt’s thesis does not devalue Kantian notion of spontaneity as a necessary
ingredient for human freedom, but holds that totalitarianism’s objective was geared towards
eradicating “spontaneity” as the defining feature of human life (Bernstein, 2002:208-209).
There is another important reason why Arendt negates Kant’s view of “selfishness”,
inasmuch as he opposes morality to “self-interest” (Allison, 2001:93). In the case of
Eichmann, his actions were not even driven by personal interest and in this sense were
“motiveless” (Allison, 2001:93-94). Radical evil does seek to explain the brutality of the
camps, the “industrialized” methods of death, or the objectives of “extermination as such”,
but expresses the extent to which the death machinery “was irreducible to any set of
recognisable motivations” (Villa, 1999:32). On this issue, Arendt wrote to Karl Jaspers that
something new, an unknown type of evil, has emerged that had nothing to do with personal
interests or “selfishness”:
“Evil has proved to be more radical than expected. In objective terms,
modern crimes are not provided for in the Ten Commandments. Or: the
Western Tradition is suffering from the preconception that the most evil
things human beings can do arise from the vice of selfishness. Yet we know
that the greatest evils or radical evil has nothing to do anymore with such
humanly understandable motives. What radical evil is I don’t know but it
seems to me it somehow has to do with the following phenomenon: making
human beings as human beings superfluous (not using them as a means to
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an end, which leaves their essence as humans untouched and impinges only
on their human dignity; rather, making them superfluous as human beings).
This happens as soon as all unpredictability – which, in human beings, is
the equivalent of spontaneity - is eliminated. And all this in turn from - or
better, goes along with - the delusion of the omnipotence (not simply with
the lust for power) of an individual man. If an individual qua man were
omnipotent, then there is in fact no reason why men should exist at all...”
(Quoted in Villa, 1999: 32-33).
If Nazis were evil by nature however, then we would be in no position to criticize
Nazi ideology. As Bernstein suggests, Kant’s thesis that “man is evil by nature” may be
extreme, but his primary concern was to reasons human beings deviate from laws: there must
be something evil that is “innate” in man to act in an evil way. If the “radicalness of radical
evil” is so present in human freedom, as Rogozinski suggests, then in fact it cannot be
eradicated (Rogozinski, 1996:33). It is “sealed” and in our “fate”. Kant himself believed that
there is still a door open for overcoming evil (Rogozinski, 1996: 34, 35), but if evil is in our
destiny, there will be no reflexivity as to man’s evil actions and no responsibility, for such a
conclusive thesis would render “all ethical judgement impossible” (Rogozinski, 1996:35). 5
Categories such as judgement and thinking became central to Arendt’s analysis of evil
precisely to explain how these faculties affect one’s actions. Arendt poses important
questions as to how the faculty of thinking relates to evil actions, and whether Eichmann’s
inability to think had to do with his deeds. As she writes,
“Is evil-doing, not just the sins of omission but the sins of commission,
possible in the absence of not merely ‘base motives’ (as the law calls it)
but of any motives at all, any particular prompting of interest or
5 However we see that Kant’s moral theory does include criteria and presuppositions for judgment. He fully
explains these criteria by using the category of “taste” in his book Critique of Judgment. He writes that despite
any “cultural diversity” as to one’s taste, there must be “a claim to the necessary agreement of others with this
judgment” (Kant, 1952: 206).
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volition? Is wickedness, however we may define it, this being
‘determined to prove a villain’, not a necessary condition for evil doing?
Is our ability to judge, to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly,
dependent upon our faculty of thought? Do the inability to think and a
disastrous failure of what we commonly call conscience coincide?
(Arendt, 2003:160).
Arendt considers ‘thinking’ an important criterion for someone to act morally in any
given situation. She recognises that everyone can be thoughtless from time to time and this
inability to think does not necessarily mean “stupidity” (Arendt, 2003:164). Being unable to
think can be a symptom among even the most intelligent people, yet the question remains:
can the “faculty of thought” prevent evil? Arendt’s case is that this kind of reflection never
took place in Eichmann’s case. He never understood what he was doing (ibid).
D’ Entreves suggests that thinking creates the presuppositions for man to stand
outside himself and divorce himself from “fixed habits of thought”, in order to give room for
judgement, without the need for any outside aid (D’ Entreves, 1994:109). D’Entreves further
suggests, that Arendt uses “imagination” as a condition of judgement, for the Nazi regime
destroyed all “accepted standards of judgement” in the here and now (D’Entreves, 1994:106).
Imagination therefore, stands as an appropriate “distance” from mere facticity and creates a
“dialogue” between me and my understanding (ibid). This comes close to Kant’s thought of
“enlarged mentality”, for he too places criteria in order to judge. For Kant, “enlarged
mentality” is precisely the ability to distance yourself from certain beliefs and think in a
representative way, and when “representative thinking” takes place, it automatically means
that thinking and judgment are working together in times of “emergency” when all morals
and canons fall apart under totalitarian regimes (D’Entreves, 1994:111).
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Conclusion
In Essays in Understanding: 1930- 1954 Arendt argues that “Nazis were men like
ourselves” and that it was the totalitarian system that built the methods of destruction that
turned them into perpetrators (Arendt, 1994:134). Crimes of that scale revealed that human
beings are “capable of being cannibals”:
“It was not very pleasant even when we had to bury our false illusions about
the “noble savage”, having discovered that men are capable of being cannibals.
Since then people have learned to know one another better and learned more
and more about the evil potentialities in men. The result has been that they
have recoiled more and more from the idea of humanity and become more
susceptible to the doctrine of race, which denies the possibility of a common
humanity” (Arendt, 1994:131).
Arendt’s argument concerning the banality of evil does not seek to give a final
explanation on the problem of evil in the persona of Eichmann. It is a mistake, as Villa
argues, that many authors make, when they argue that Arendt reduced the problem of evil to
one factor (Villa, 1999:40). Some authors have tried to explain evil in terms of “economically
rational motivations”, or alternatively have taken Arendt’s idea of the ‘banality of evil’ as a
claim that a new type of murderer was coming out of the totalitarian system driven by
“extraordinary shallowness” (Villa, 1999:40-41). Elisabeth Young-Bruehl in Why Arendt
Matters argues that Eichmann was not the mirror image of all perpetrators during the Nazi
Era, and emphasized the “new form of criminal acting as the agent of a criminal state by
carrying out this new form of crime against humanity...” (Bruehl, 2006:108-109). However,
Arendt maintains that in using the term ‘banality of evil’ she does not wish to impose on the
empirical materials a new type of “theory” (Arendt, 2003:159).
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PART II: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
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Chapter 2. The Greek Holocaust 1: The Historical Background
Introduction
This chapter explores the horror and tragedy of the Jewish community during Nazi
occupation in Greece. It seeks to reveal and understand the memories of those who resisted,
suffered, died from famine and stagnation, those who were arrested and executed by a
totalitarian regime that left behind bitter memories but also an urge for socio-political thinking
and critique. I have addressed the Greek Jewish Holocaust in my research as I feel it is very
important not only to welcome the Greek Jewry within history but within a unified socio-
political and historical exegesis of the European Holocaust. Such an attempt will bring new
elements to the study of the Jewish population during the Nazi Occupation in Greece which is
still not widely known and very often neglected. The Jewish community of Salonika for
instance was considered as one of the oldest and biggest communities in Europe and it was
known for its long tradition, while for many it was widely known as the “Mother of Israel”
(Mazower, 1993). Greek Jewry deserves closer attention as it faced like the rest of European
Jewry the most barbaric monstrosities of the twentieth century, such as the anti-Jewish laws,
deportations, expulsions and extermination. The first section of this chapter focuses on the
history of the Jewish population in Greece and the difficulties it faced under the Nazi regime,
while the second and the third sections reveal stories of survivors of the deportations. The
remaining sections, examine the role of the resistance during wartime Greece, the anti-Nazi
sentiments of the majority of the Greek population and the guerrillas of EAM/ELAS in
particular, as well as the role of Jews in the Greek resistance.6 Steven Bowman in his book
Jewish Resistance in Wartime Greece provides first time systematic study of the role of the
Jews in the Greek “andartiko” (partisan activity) of ELAS as he provides accounts from many
Jewish partisans who fought the Germans in the mountains of Greece, revealing at the same
6 EAM stands for Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (National Liberation Front), while ELAS (which was the
armed band of EAM) stands for Ethnikos Laikos Apeftherotikos Stratos (Greek People’s Liberation Army).
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time the unity and solidarity between the members of EAM/ELAS and the Jews who escaped
the Nazi terror. It is a neglected aspect of Jewish history that has been neglected, which yet,
provides a more holistic view of the “Greek experience during the war” (Bowman, 2006:6).
As Bowman declares,
“To date no researcher has integrated the Jewish story into any aspect of the
general Greek experience during the war. Such an approach does not serve well
the Jews of Greece. Those who fought or went to serve with the andartiko did
so as Greeks. Those who sought refuge did so as Greeks, but most as Jews who
were being hunted by the Nazis to fuel their death factories, although too few
Jews were aware of the tragic fate awaiting them. As Kapetan Kitsos told me,
‘All men knew I was a Jew, and I was proud to let it be known that a Jew was
fighting for Greece’. He was responding to a long tradition of denigration of
the Jews by certain segments of the Greek military (both regular and irregular).
But then Greece was not alone in evidencing this attitude; most of the
European nationalist militaries were even more blatant if not overtly anti-
Semitic, and this attitude carried over into the many partisan movements in
Europe during the war” (Bowman, 2006:6).
This argument drives us to explore the reasons why the Jewish participation both in
the resistance and within Greek national consciousness remains unknown. Issues of memory
that were blocked by nationalism must be addressed to understand how post war Greece came
out of the war and in what ways this forgetfulness addresses also post war indifference and
exclusion of the Jewish community from the Greek experience.
In this chapter I first examine the changed position of the Jews from the fall of the
Ottoman Empire until the introduction of the nation-states in order to understand how the
Jewry lost socio-political representation as well as the right to be part of the Greek state by
becoming stateless. Certain aspects that are theoretically addressed in Hannah Arendt’s
(1968) critique of the nation-states and statelessness with special emphasis in The Origins of
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Totalitarianism in the first chapter are developed here in the Greek context and become
meaningful and fruitful for further discussion. The rise of anti-Semitism, propaganda and
exclusion from the Greek society are addressed in this chapter to see how anti-Jewish
sentiments cultivated in the first period of the formation of the Greek State evolved under
Nazi Occupation when anti-Semitic propaganda reached its zenith. I discuss the determination
of Jews both to survive and resist Nazi ferocity by becoming part of the resistance movement
in the mountains of Free Greece, as well as the mechanisms that enabled or disabled rescue
and assistance. In doing so, I am informing the reader as to the political trends of Greece
during Nazi occupation, the nature, scope and rivalries within resistance. Last but not least, I
discuss the nature and scope of the Greek elite and the politics of collaboration in Greece.
Although the latter issues are addressed in chapter 5 along with the legal aftermath in Greece
in chapter 6, here, we are giving the first hints of the ideological agenda behind the Quisling
Governments during the Axis Occupation, the role of the National Union of Greece (EEE),
the Greek Police, the Security Battalions and the ambivalent character of the
nationalist/monarchist guerrilla group of EDES under the leadership of Napoleon Zervas,
which led to many years of conflict with the EAM/ELAS and a civil war straight after the
Germans left the country.7 The latter is discussed peripherally in this chapter, but it will give
us a first solid prologue to comprehend the political controversies and antinomies behind the
most crucial decade of the twentieth century in Greece and of course Europe and the impact
on the fate of Greek Jewry (see Clogg, 1979: 133-165). This chapter in other words analyses
the historical, political and social developments of Greece during Nazi Occupation and how
these affected the Greek Jewry during and after the war was over. It is the last chapter of this
volume that these developments will be appreciated in order to see how post-war memory of
the Greek Jewry was pushed away from the Greek national consciousness.
7 EDES stands for Ethnikos Apeleutherotikos Ellinikos Syndesmos (National Republican Greek League), while
EEE stands for Ethniki Enosis Ellados (National Union of Greece).
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Salonika from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States
It is important to have a brief overview of the changes under which the city of
Salonika8 went through over the last two centuries in order to understand the fate of Salonikan
Jews. The Jewish population went through a number of socio-political changes over the last
two centuries; from the Ottoman Rule onwards. To view these alterations we need briefly to
go back in Greek history and see that the multicultural character of the city changed after the
fall of the Ottomans. As Steven Bowman argues, Salonika was the host of many different
populations; it had an especially cosmopolitan atmosphere. It started to change after the
Balkan Wars in 1912-1913, through the process of the so called “Hellenization” (during the
formation of the Greek State) that started to erase the rich cultural mosaic (Bowman,
2006:18). It was a “polyglot” hub that “routinely spoke six or seven languages: 70,000 Jews
as well as Greeks, Armenians, Turks, Albanians and Bulgarians”, sharing characteristics with
the city of Habsburg that allowed Germans, Ukrainians, Poles, communities of Rumania and
Hungary to co-exist (Mazower, 1998a:43). Despite similarities between the multi-ethnic
empires, Salonika unlike other European cities hosted also Muslims groups in concert with
Judeo-Christian communities. Nowhere else did the Ottoman Muslims survived for so many
centuries along with the Christians and Jews, when at the same time other European empires
were treating this trend with great scepticism and “fear” (Levy, 1994:13). Despite the national
antagonisms that prevailed during the Balkan Wars9, for let us not forget that Salonika and the
8 Salonika derives from the Greek sort name Saloniki. It was named Selanik during the Ottoman Empire (French
Salonique, English Salonika), and recovered its ancient Greek name Thessaloniki after the Balkan Wars (1912-
1913). The city was first named in the ancient times after the princess (Thessalonike), the daughter of the Greek
king Philip the Macedon. Thessaloniki literally means Nike of Thessaly, Victory of Thessaly (Mazower, 2005:
16).
9 To summarise in a couple of sentences the Balkan Wars, the two-year fast events went as follows: In the First
Balkan War (1912), the Ottomans were ready to collapse, thus the Balkan countries formed the “Balkan
League” to defeat them. The League under Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania destroyed the
territories of the Ottoman Empire. The result was that Bulgaria got the biggest piece in the pie, thus in 1913
(Second Balkan War) Greece, Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro were now against Bulgaria. They declared war
against the latter and took some of the territories it gained in the First Balkan War .Then all other countries
fought against each other to divide the new pieces. By the end of 1913 the war would end and the borders would
be finalised (MacMillan, 2013: 199, 462).
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entire Greek Macedonia was occupied by “six different armies” as Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria,
Serbia, Austria and Montenegro tried to claim the city, yet in 1913 and after the two Balkan
Wars, the city was still hosting 61,439 Jews, 45,364 Muslims, 39,956 Greeks, 6,263
Bulgarians, and “4.364” other smaller communities (Bowman, 2006:18; Halevi, 2012: xxviii).
Mark Mazower declares in Inside Hitler’s Greece, that the Jewish community in
Greece before the war was approximately 70,000 - 80,000 who came from many parts of the
country, and of mixed origin, such as the Romaniote10 Jews who were well integrated into
Greek life and spoke the language. These were very small communities who settled in the
Ionian Islands (Mazower, 1993:235). Romaniote Jews were also found in Athens as well as in
the province of Epirus especially in the city of Ioannina. These communities existed there
since the ages of Byzantine Empire speaking Judeo-Greek which was a “form of demotic
Greek, with few Hebrew and Aramaic words and phrases” (Wasserstein, 2013:240). On the
other hand, the Sephardic Jews who appear in Greece in the beginning of the Ottoman Period
were large populations that faced expulsion from Spain in 1492 and settled in the north
periphery of Greece and particularly in Thessalonica (Mazower, 1993:235). Along with the
Spanish Jews, Italian and Portuguese Jews followed them the same century (15th century) as
these populations faced constant persecution from the former countries. Two centuries later
(17th), Salonika hosted more Jews that faced persecution; this time from central Europe, while
the total number of Sephardic Jews that settled in Salonika was approximately 80,000 by the
18th century. It was however in the twentieth century that their numbers started to drop.
Certain socio-political reasons affected these changes, such as the birth of nationalism in
Greece and all over Europe, poverty and antisemitism. However, it was after the Greco-
Turkish war in the 20s that Greek Jews started to emigrate, especially the year 1923-1924.
10 The word Romaniotes derives from the word Romaioi or Romioi (Romans, Turkish Rum), meaning Greeks; it
was a word that was first introduced by the Romans to label the Greeks (Mazower, 2001:50). Hence, the
synonym of Byzantine Empire which was part of the Roman Empire was also called Eastern Romelia or
Rumelia. Central Greece is also historically known as Roumeli.
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From1912 until 1941, the number of Jews in Salonika fell from 80,000 to 49,000; 10,000 of
which died from hunger during the 1941 Great Famine (Hondros, 1981: 90-91, see also, Hall,
2000: 61). The total number of Jewish loss in Greece during the Nazi occupation was 59,000-
60,000 in a population of over 70,000 Jews11, while only 10,226 unfortunately survived the
destruction (Aksiopoulou, 1998: 16; Hondros, 1981:92; Hilberg, 1985:321).
The city continued to confront significant changes on the social and political level as
the First World War occurred, since the city of Thessaloniki was under occupation by “six
different armies” of the Balkan countries (Bowman, 2006:18). Although the process of
Hellenization started to change the composition of the city (especially after the Balkan Wars
in 1912-1913) and Salonika was gradually incorporated to the Greek State, however the
Prime Minister of Greece Eleftherios Venizelos in the beginning did not discriminate the
Jewish community. Rena Molho declares, that since Salonika was claimed by the Bulgarians,
the Austrians and the Turks, Venizelos feared that the Jews will support the Austrian12 plan
to open financial links with Salonika as an attempt to neutralise or internationalise the city.
For his own irredentist ends, the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos, supported their rights,
informing them that the Hellenization of the city will not affect their status in the city,
however his promise did not last (Molho, 1988:392-393). The Greek Government issued an
official statement via the Prefect of the town declaring that:
11 There is an inconsistency concerning the actual number of the Jews who lived in Greece before they faced the
Nazi laws. For example some authors argue that the total number was 73, 000, 75,477 or 77, 377. Fleischer
(1995b) declares that it is not certain whether the Jews of the Dodecanese Islands (numbered 2.000) were
included in these numbers. The official “census” of 1940 however numbered them 67,591 without the
Dodecanesean Jews, since this complex of islands in 1940 was still under Italian possession. If we include this
community in the official numbers, then there must have been “more than 70,000” (301-302). The Jewish
Central Board of Athens declared that the total number of Jews in Greece was 77,377 therefore we accept this
number as the official one (Bowman and Benmayor, 2002:170-171).
12 The Austrian Plan can be summarised as follows: “Concerning the future of Salonika, the internationalisation
or neutralisation of the city would best serve the interests of the Jews. However, it is too soon to take action
towards that end. When it becomes clear that Salonika is to be annexed to some particular state or that it is to be
neutralised and internationalized, it will be incumbent upon the Zionist Organization, in conjunction with other
Jewish organisations, to secure for the Jews full equal rights and consideration for their cultural claims” (see
Gelber, Florentin, Friedman and Korot, 1955:110).
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“I am trying with all my heart to prevent all anti-Semitic incidents that
unfortunately blackened our glorious entry to Salonika. The Jews can rest
assured that in me they will find a firm protector. I also declare, even at the
risk of being criticized, that, were discrimination to be operated, it should be
done in favour of Israelites, and should it be necessary for their benefit to
commit an injustice, I would do it because I feel that we owe them sort of
indemnity” (quoted in Molho, 1988:393-394).
Molho argues that both Jewish and Greek communities managed to sustain their
national and religious identity after common agreements and “though it may seem strange”,
the integration “of the Jews into the Greek State was not accomplished until they themselves
reached the point of expressing and asserting their national differentiation” (Molho, 1988:
398). What seemed paradoxical in Greece before the Greco-Turkish War in the 20s was that
Salonika successfully managed to unite the Greek and Jewish communities without
abandoning their cultural and religious identities. The simultaneous growth of “Turkish
Nationalism” in the region united the Greek and Jewish communities against the former’s
expansion more than ever (Molho, 1988:398-399).13
However things started to change after the Greco-Turkish war as we shall see, and the
Jewish community undeniably was excluded and discriminated. The Jewish community
although felt certain with Venizelos’s decision to support their political, religious and civil
rights, however anti-Semitic sentiments increased in the city as the process of Hellenization
started to spread and Greek nationalism prevailed (Molho, 1988:394). An earlier catastrophe
in the city of Salonika which was caused by a fire in 1917, mainly affected the Jewish district
which was based in the centre of the town and was destroyed almost entirely. Along with this
dreadful disaster, the Greek expansion was moving rapidly especially after the end of WWI,
when the British encouraged the then Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos to enter
13 On the same issue, see also Molho, 1986: 113-123.
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Turkey and break the monopoly of the Ottoman Market. As a result, the Turks burned
Smyrna (Izmir since 1923) “and avenged Greek excesses with a slaughter of their own”. The
resulting peace treaty (known as the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, which was later replaced by the
Treaty of Lausanne14 in 1923) forced the two countries to make an “exchange” of
populations. In 1923, The Greeks of Smyrna and of Asia Minor moved to Greece, and the
Turks of Greece moved to Turkey (Bowman, 2006: 18, see also Aksakal, 2008:44). This
forced population exchange that resulted from the above treaty, caused approximately two
million people to uproot themselves; more than 1.2 million Greeks of Anatolia (including the
“45,000 Armenian refugees”15 that survived the Armenian Genocide) and 400,000 Turks of
Greece abandoned their lives in a day as the nationalist crusades of Venizelism and
Ataturkism clashed (Clark, 2006: xii; Mazower, 1998a:61).
The reason why we are referring to these historical events is because that Treaty
changed the map of Salonika which was previously characterised by Jewish, Greek, and
Muslim communities, for the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos relocated the Greek
population who lived in Smyrna in the city of Salonika as a part of Greek “irredentist” plan
(Bowman, 2006:18-19). As Bowman argues,
“Venizelos took the opportunity to direct the overflow of Anatolian Greeks to
Salonika. His aim was to Hellenize the city whose prewar economy had been
dominated by the Jews, who constituted the majority of its population.
Salonika, ravaged by the great fire of 1917, was being rebuilt as a modern
Greek metropolis by the Greek government. Its economy, already crippled by
the exodus of its middle - class entrepreneurs (many of them Jews) and by the
influx of refugees during the war, now had to cope with tens of thousands of
destitute but commercially astute Anatolian Greeks. Salonika had literally
exploded into the twentieth century, but who would govern her and reap the
14 Gewehr, 1967:103.
15 See Arendt, 1968:277.
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profits of the entrepôt of the Balkans and which recently independent Balkan
nationality would succeed in capturing this cosmopolitan prize emerging like a
phoenix from the detritus of the Ottoman Balkans? And would its Jewish
majority support Greek control, work for a return of Ottoman sovereignty and
their long- standing autonomy, or opt for the Austrian and French plan for a
free port, perhaps similar to the status later awarded to Danzig?” (Bowman,
2006:18-19).
It was a difficult moment for the Jewish communities in Salonika who soon faced the
social consequences of drastic geo-political changes; the spreading of Anatolian Greeks in a
city which after the fall of Ottoman Empire started to erase the Jewish life that was dominant
for four centuries. One of the first side-effects of this geographical transformation of the city
of Salonika, were felt on the basis of working relations. The Jews became victims of
exploitation as it was difficult to hold on to their jobs and businesses in concert with the
process of Hellenization. Greece recovered Greek Macedonia (previously part of the Ottoman
Empire) after winning the two Balkan Wars, giving priority to the Greek cultural element
(affecting language and history), challenging many socio-political, as well as cultural
elements of this cosmopolitan city. For instance, the Jewish companies were highly pressured
to change their Jewish labels otherwise that had to pay extra taxes, and they had to work on
Saturdays. Furthermore, since the educational system gave strong focus on the Greek history
in order for the city to adopt a new “cultural identity”, the cultural and historical heritage of
the Jewish community was severely suppressed (Bowman, 2006:19; see also Stavroulakis,
1997:54).
These socio-political changes paved the way to discriminate the Jews on a financial,
social, political as well as educational level. In fact as early as 1932 the local Jewish
newspapers were criticising the economic hardship of the Jews as the result of the new wave
of refugees. The Jewish businesses had to compete with those of the refugees while the
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newspaper El Pueblo, was commenting upon the great financial crisis that had hit the Greek
nation. It wrote in an article that “it is impossible for three hundred thousand souls to live like
this” accusing the Greek State of neglecting and discriminating the Jewish people of Salonika:
they were living in great misery, “with poor hygiene, and only with bread and water, without
the right to have a name, without joy, or sun”. The Jewish Press was reporting that “all the
communities in Greece are suffering but the Jews are suffering the most”. As the process of
Hellenization begun, the Christians started to have more privileges, gaining access in every
institution, such as the government, the “army” and the “Demos” (council).16
Out of this new reality, a great number of Jews immigrated, while the remaining
population struggled to survive with under-paid jobs along with the Greeks who lost their
fortunes after the Asia Minor Catastrophe. Furthermore, and apart from the city’s gradual
transformation, the political situation in Greece in the 30s already made a nation full of
antitheses and divisions. One the one hand, the country imposed nationalistic policies and
sentiments, while on the other, the extreme polarisations between fascism and communism, as
well as republicanism versus monarchism, paved the way for the disintegration of the socio-
political fabric of the country (Bowman, 2006:20). All these political polarisations along with
famine and financial insecurity of the working class, created the fertile ground for ethnic and
national antagonisms. Salonika especially, was one of these cities to confront this frenzy of
antitheses during the interwar period, which was “a contributing, albeit not a determining
factor in the subsequent destruction of the Jewish community during the war” (Bowman,
2006:21). What Bowman argues, here is that there was a certain degree of antisemitism and
discrimination against the Jews, but the geo-political changes that occurred in Salonika (that
resulted from the Balkan wars) undeniably exacerbated them.
16 Press Office of Thessaloniki, 9 December 1932, Filippos Dragoumis File: 68.3: “Ai Oikonomikai Kakouchiai
ton Evraion tes Thessalonikis” [The Economic Sorrow of Salonikan Jews] page 1, Gennadius Library, Athens.
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Furthermore, the city of Salonika welcomed a new wave of refugees from Anatolia in
1923, suffered from the Greek Dictatorship of Metaxas in ‘36 and the Italian Occupation in
1940-41. The city hosted a significant wave of new refugees as a result of occupation by the
Bulgarians in Greek Thrace, the same period the Nazis and Italians entered Greece. In fact,
the combination of complicated and dramatic events would last half a century, leading to the
transformation of the city and of course the whole country (Bowman, 2006:21). These were
also changes that reflected the gradual shift of “multi-religious societies of Ottoman Empire”
to a more “homogenous national society of modern nation-state” and undeniably these
changes affected the life of the Jewish communities in Greece as well (Mazower, 1998b:59).
Before explaining how the shift from empires to nation states affected the Jews and all
minorities under a single state, we need first to establish some boundaries as well as
distinctions between the different political systems. Despite the fact that the empires seemed
more multicultural and tolerant to minorities, this does not imply that the minorities enjoyed
full political and civil rights. If we take the case of the Ottoman Empire for example, one
could argue that its success (it lasted for four centuries) lay solely in its religious tolerance,
autonomy and “indifference to nationalist categories” (Mazower, 2001:51). Mark Mazower in
The Dark Continent writes of the “religious” and “ethnic” diversity of the empires such as the
Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian, yet, when he takes a closer look at the Ottoman Empire
in his book The Balkans, he argues that the communities in Salonika were characterised by
their religious rather than ethnic specificity. They were not perceived for instance as Greeks,
Turks, Bulgarians, Armenians, or Albanians but as Christians, Muslims and Jews (Mazower,
1998a:43; 2001:50-51, same in Clark, 2006:18).
It is one thing to be religiously tolerant, and quite another to recognise a community
for its equal ethnic, political, cultural as well as religious characteristics. What the Sultans
found as a clever solution to expand their imperialism in Balkan Europe, was to allow the
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different communities to exist (i.e. practice their customs, religious systems, and preserve
their language17), but all “non-Muslims” were “second-class” citizens (Mazower, 2001:57).
This distinction made the Ottoman Muslims superior to the Jews, the Greeks, the Armenians,
the Albanians, the Vlachs, the Slavs, and so on. All aforementioned communities and in order
to exist in the empire, were subjects both to discrimination and to a much “heavier” taxation
(i.e. Millet System) than the Muslim communities. This induced some people to convert to
Islam as they could no longer survive the tyrannical head-tax, even though the empire “did
not insist upon conversion” (Mazower, 2001:57, 58).
In other words diversity and plurality was conditioned to religion and to religion only,
and this alone is not enough for political emancipation and for self-expression. We are
making this distinction, so as to build a critical distance between what the Ottoman Empire
meant for the communities, and what it represents clearly today as a political system in its
own merit; namely an authoritarian and anachronistic regime, in the same way Mazower
would have said: the nation-states were “anachronism in the modern world”18 (Mazower,
1998a:45). My aim here is to see the changed position of the Jews from the Empires to the
nation-states, not to take a positive view over the Ottoman Empire.
And yet what the Ottomans achieved compared to other empires of Europe which
were more Christian-centred, was to minimise conflicts as the “majority-minority relations
were more relaxed” (Levy, 1994:17). Thus we could summarise, that the empires prior to
17 Despite the fact that these are indeed characteristics of ethnicity, the latter proved to be the symptom of
religious freedom during the Ottoman Era, but these were not given to the communities through the exercise of
their free political and ethnic rights. There were no Greek, Armenian, and Bulgarian schools during the Ottoman
Rule, thus ethnicity was exercised and limited only to religion. Language for instance was preserved through
religious scripts and not through free schools. As Mazower suggests: “The consciousness of most of the Sultan’s
subjects was shaped neither by school nor by the army- the two key institutions through which the modern state
propagates national identities. The Ottoman state had treated them on the basis of religion not language”
(Mazower, 2001:52).
18 Even though the nation-state was something new to the modern world that aimed to transform the empires and
the feudal societies, yet, as Arendt would have argued, the nation-state failed to protect the minorities with legal
means (Arendt, 1968:290). Thus one could argue that nation-state’s project was anachronistic to the modern
world, for clearly the modern states failed to guarantee the rights of minorities.
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their fall had a multicultural touch as they allowed religious toleration, thus made possible to
all different communities to exist together in contrast with the nation-states which promoted
the one-blood/one-nation/one-religion rhetoric. The Jewish communities suffered the worst as
a result of these nationalist antagonisms. Robert Fine declared that:
“Nationalism is a fickle beast. In its best moods it liberates human beings from
colonial oppression and unites people previously fragmented, but it also
excludes those deemed not to belong and demands the active assent of its
‘own’ nationals. It attracts us through images of home, warmth and love, but it
displaces emotions which belong to our personal lives onto political life, and
thereby robs both of their value” (Fine, 1999: 154).
This new political reality led to unimaginable consequences to those who were not
part of the new nation-states. In the Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt describes the
transition from the one regime to another and the ultimate consequences to the minorities of
Europe. The fall of multi-religious empires and the introduction of the nation-states in Europe
affected all minorities including the Jews. Any attempt to include all communities in a single
nation failed as now the peoples of Europe were defined and recognized by their national
identity. The minorities like the Jews fell out of this scheme and now they had no name, no
identity, and no country to represent them. They became in Arendt’s words “the stateless
people”, for not only they had no state, but Jewish expression to national differentiation was
failed and denied. During the first stages of nation-states, both the process of naturalisation
and repatriation of the refugees of Europe failed as “neither the country of origin nor any
other agreed to accept the stateless person”, though two “clearly exceptional” cases were the
Greco-Turkish exchange of populations in 1923 (for reasons we explained) and the analogous
move of Armenian refugees from Turkey to Syria and Lebanon (Arendt, 1968:282-283, 285).
But these were also symptoms present not only in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire but
also with the collapse of Austro- Hungarian Empire. As Misha Glenny argues:
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“The relatively high incidence of such persecutions and massacres in the
Balkans is the legacy of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. They left
a complex demographic patchwork within which ‘ethnic’ violence became
lethal. The Armenian case was soon followed by violence between Greeks and
Turks: The Greco-Turkish war and the Great Population Exchange between the
Greek Orthodox and Muslim populations of Greece and Turkey. Henceforth,
murder and expulsion became the most overused instruments in dealing with
nationality questions in the Balkans” (Glenny, 1999:326).
These political events on a European level along with the local Greek geo-political
changes help us understand the peculiar situation under which Jewish people were living for
decades in the city of Salonika, culminating (with Hitler’s politics) in the extermination of the
population, and enable us to appreciate the political turmoil in Greece and its effect upon the
Jewish communities. As Bowman argues,
“The question is far more complex than the complexity of urban politics or the
theme of indifference that has characterised recent Holocaust writing. Salonika,
during the 40 years between 1912 and 1952, went through ... catastrophic
changes that completely changed the composition and structure of the city from
an Ottoman market centre to a modern urban complex” (Bowman, 2006:21).
The above argument is powerful, for it challenges the belief that the problem of
“indifference” among the rest of the Greek civilians was the most important or the catalytic
factor for the fate of the Greek Jewry. The significant point here is that more research and
in-depth analysis needs to be done on “local” and “regional” politics and the impact of
Christian ethics, to understand why the city of Salonika responded differently from Athens
as to the fate of Jews. But what Bowman highlights here is that the local civilians “had little
to do with the decision” and that “those decisions were made in Berlin, Vienna and
Auschwitz” (Bowman, 2006:22). Gerald Reitlinger in his book The Final Solution, seems to
echo Bowman’s argument, declaring that although there was a “certain degree of anti-
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Semitism” in Greece after the new wave of refugees that resulted after the Greco-Turkish
exchange of populations, the Nazis did not feel confident to apply the Anti-Jewish laws in
Salonika, for the local population was not a help for them (Reitlinger, 1953:370). As
Reitlinger writes,
“On April 9th, 1941, Salonika had probably 260,000 inhabitants, only 46,000 of
them Jews. Emigration had been forced by poverty and also by a certain degree
of anti-Semitism, which became stronger, after the expulsion of the Turkish
population in 1923-24. But Salonika was not a place where the Germans could
count on the native population doing their work for them. This is shown by the
fact that they hesitated to apply the Final Solution till a year after the first
murderous Jewish deportation trains had left France and Slovakia” ( Reitlinger,
1953:370).
The reason why the Germans were not certain at all about their methods in Greece
was because occupation in Greece by the Nazis was not certain either. Hitler would not had
intervened in Greece but he was astonished when in 28 October 1940, Mussolini was
ridiculed inside Greece after the Greek Army did not surrender to the Axis and pushed the
Italians back to the Albanian Front, which was “the first clear victory over Axis powers on
the European Continent” (Lande, 2000:158). Hitler and before his invasion in Greece, felt
certain that Mussolini will do the job for him throughout Greece without him intervening, as
Mussolini did the same in Albania which was an Italian Protectorate during Axis Europe
(Mazower, 1993:15). It was then, that Hitler decided to enter Thessalonica as he could not
rely on Mussolini anymore, fearing that Winston Churchill will take the city as he did during
the Balkan Wars, asking at the same time assistance from his Bulgarian ally to occupy the
province of Greek Thrace from the east. Thus, a year later in 1941, and after the Italian
defeat, all four Axis armies (Albanian, Italian, German and Bulgarian) occupied Greece
(Lemkin, 1944:185). The same multi-axis occupation occurred in former Yugoslavia, where
not only the four aforementioned axis armies intervened but the Croatians as well
1944:241).
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/Triple_Occupation_of_Greece.png
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(Lemkin,
(Geographic Departments
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/69/GreeceRegionsEnglish_corrected2.png
/Peripheries of Greece)
Source:
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Anti-Semitism and racial hatred towards Jews increased with the formation of the
National Union of Greece (EEE), which gained support by those who supported or viewed
the deportations with indifference: “as just another element in the misery of the world”,
while others directly supported these horrific decisions (Bowman, 2006:22). Although the
National Union of Greece (EEE) in the 30s tried to exploit the conflicts and antagonisms
between the different communities as a result of famine and poverty by spreading anti-
Semitic propaganda19, it was “lacking any massive scale” of support (Fleischer, 1995b: 298).
At the same time, there was a strong resistance movement that fought the Nazi Germans,
were sympathetic towards their Jewish neighbours and friends, and strongly opposed the
expulsions; among them, there was a great number of Jews who took part in the resistance
(Bowman, 2006:22).20
This history does not fully support Hannah Arendt’s argument in Eichmann in
Jerusalem, that the Greek population was “indifferent at best” and that “even some of the
partisan groups” as far as the deportations are concerned “looked upon the operations with
approval” (Arendt, 2006:189). During the same period, Salonikan Jews sought to find ways
to escape to safer parts of Greece such as central Greece and the Peloponnese peninsula.
These peripheries were still under Italian Occupation (and no Jewish persecutions or
deportations were allowed, see Arendt, 2006:189). Arendt is right that there were indeed
some partisan groups who collaborated as well as a significant number of Greek politicians,
but she fails to name these groups and their background political ideology. In doing so, we
19 Hagen Fleischer in his book Crown and Swastika declares that the National Union of Greece (EEE) in the 30s
spread to the people of Thessaloniki the following motto: “Greeks, Annihilate the Jews”. The anti-Semitic party
tried to exploit the Anatolian Greeks who arrived in the city the previous decade and blame the Jews for their
economic sorrows. The offices of EEE closed down, but a decade later and after the death of Metaxas in 1941,
EEE was re-formed (Fleischer, 1995b:298).
20 I believe that Jewish Resistance during the Axis Occupation so far is not very researched or widely known
(especially as far as the Greek Jewry is concerned). My objective in this chapter not only gears towards
describing and analysing the horror and suffering of the Greek Jewry, but I wish to highlight the courageous
stance of those Jews who really risked their lives and joined the left partisans at all costs in the mountains of
Greece.
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could argue that she underestimated the effort of the overall resistance against the Nazi
Regime and specifically the major left partisan group EAM/ELAS. The latter, not only
welcomed the Jews with their support and protection, but without them resistance as such
would have been far more difficult.21
According to John Louis Hondros in Occupation and Resistance: the Greek Agony,
the cities and villages that EAM/ELAS controlled 22 in Thessaly and Central Greece
prefectures, such as the cities of Volos, Lamia, and Trikala “450 of 2,727 were deported”
(Hondros, 1983:93). Arendt’s argument was true of the small nationalist, anticommunist
and pro-royalist partisan group EDES under the leadership of Napoleon Zervas, which
controlled Epirus (the north-west prefecture of Greece). According to a report written by “a
German GFP”23, “one could hear only full approval of the action” in the city of Ioannina,
where collaboration between German and Greek police, led to the concentration of “90
percent” of that region (Hondros, 1983:93-94). There were in other words, parts of Greece
where the local authorities and civilians approved the Nazi actions and worked together to
deport the Jews, but there were other parts that prevented these actions, with the help of
partisans and the local authorities.
Indeed, the Nazis had suspicions that the Jews of Epirus had secret connections and
affiliations with the guerrillas and were preparing for some kind of sabotage. Given that the
SS were also suspicious of underground “communist elements” in the area, the police along
with the local authorities worked together with a common “hostile attitude” (Safrian,
2010:183-185). Let us not forget that Epirus was controlled by the resistance movement of
Napoleon Zervas, whose region was not only nationalist and royalist in terms of its political
21 The relation between the Jews and the EAM/ELAS will be analysed further in this chapter under the sub-
section: “The Jewish Partisans in the anti-Nazi Resistance of EAM/ELAS”.
22 Here the word “control” is used to indicate that EAM/ELAS liberated vast areas of Greece and thus controlled
regions with arms against the Nazi and Italian Occupier.
23 John Louis Hondros does not name the Nazi who wrote the report; see Hondros, 1983:94.
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ideology but also anticommunist, and treated any hypothetical revolt either by the left or by
the Jews as a product of a communist agenda (Amyntor, 1942-1943: 66).
Furthermore, there were many organisations who collaborated with the Nazis such
as the Security Battalions (known in Greek as “Tagmata Asfaleias”, “Germano-tsoliades”,
“Dosilogoi” or simply traitors), the Greek police as well as many politicians and “former
ministers of the quisling governments”, Greek Nazis, informers, people who worked in
Gestapo, and many other criminals that formed an illegal “parastate” (Iatrides, 1981:173-
174,175, for full exploration see also chapter 5 and chapter 6). But before analysing
resistance and collaboration, we should stay focused on the Greek Jewry and their fate
during the Nazi Occupation in Greece.
Anti-Jewish Propaganda in Greece
The first anti-Semitic laws came straight after the Germans arrived in the country.
Anti-Jewish sentiments came up in the surface and the National Union of Greece (EEE)
which was previously disallowed was “reformed”, while all the members of the Jewish
council in Salonika (including the head of the synagogue Rabbi Koretz), faced arrests, attacks
and persecutions (Mazower, 2005:423). One of the first anti-Semitic measures was to force all
the Jews by law to report and give all their assets including their “house pets” to the German
authorities; they were forbidden to go through any kind of transaction with the remaining
Greek populations on pain of being severely “punished” (Fleischer, 1995b:312).
On 23rd of April 1941 anti-Jewish measures came into effect in the country. The next
period was characterised by threats, attacks and lootings of Jewish buildings such as
synagogues, banks, schools, newspapers, and many associations. Nevertheless, the destiny of
the Greek Jewry seemed to vary depending on which part of the country they were living in,
for the country was divided into three occupational zones (German, Bulgarian, and Italian).
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The Italians did not approve of the deportations, 24 and in Athens blocked them until it fell
under the Nazis. Thessaloniki, by contrast, was under the influence of Nazi Germany. It was a
place which, even after the fall of Ottoman Rule, and Hellenization during the Greek War of
Independence, remained as one of the “leading centres of European Jewry” and the “Mother
of Israel”; a cosmopolitan city with four thousand years of Jewish history (Mazower, 1993:
235, 237-238). 25
The fact that the Italians did not allow deportations of Jews does not reveal
Mussolini’s philosemitism. If we take the case of Jews of the Dodecanese Islands, which were
under Italian occupation and possession until 1943, one can see that the treatment of the Jews
went hand in hand with the racist laws of Italy. The community in Rhodes island for instance
during the 30s faced systematic discrimination, as Jewish workers were excluded from the
teaching sector, and were forbidden to marry civilians who were “non-Jews” (Gilbert,
1986:706).
According to Browning, in The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office,
Mussolini’s foreign policy differed in his zones of occupation and in countries such as
Greece, Yugoslavia, south France and parts of Croatia, since some countries were used as
“satellite” zones for his own geo-political interests (Browning, 1978:109). However, we do
not wish to give the reader the impression that Mussolini was sympathetic to the Jews of
Greece (and in the aforementioned zones). But what Browning observes here is that although
there was a growing antisemitism in Occupied Europe, nevertheless in countries such as Italy,
24 During World War II Greece was occupied by three different armies. Germany occupied western Greek
Macedonia and eastern Thrace; the Bulgarians occupied western Thrace, while the rest of the country was under
Fascist Italy before Hitler took over the entire country in 1943 (Mazower, 1993:21).
25 According to Sevillias (1983), in his book Athens – Auschwitz, the history of Jewish existence in Greece is so
ancient that it dates back to 85 B.C.E. The first populations could be found in the Eastern Mediterranean. Later
in 170 and 161 BC, small communities could be traced in Thessaloniki, Crete, Smyrna, and Ephesus. From 1095
until 1154, Jewish communities could be found in Thebes (known for their silk industry); while in 1204 Jews
were exports and producers of agricultural goods (vii).
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although it was allied with Hitler among Italian citizens was not “widespread” (Browning,
1978:110). Of course that was the early attitude of Mussolini. As the war progressed, he fell
under pressure from the German Foreign Office and started to play a “double game”, on the
one hand satisfying the Nazis, on the other, aware of people’s revulsion at the Jewish
deportations. In other words, “he was promising the Germans his cooperation while tolerating
the sabotage of these promises by his army, police, and diplomats” (ibid).
Browning, observes further differences among occupied countries of Europe. In some
Balkan and Eastern countries, such as Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, although antisemitism
was on the rise, it differed from the antisemitism of Germany; “it was predominantly
nationalistic rather than racist”. During the axis occupation, certain countries of Eastern and
Balkan Europe were still managing to create their borders and their ethno-synthesis by
promoting forced assimilations so as to enable national homogeneity. However, the groups of
people who did not fit this promotional and nationalist agenda were discriminated against.
Whoever assimilated had a chance of survival. According to Browning, these countries in
contrast with Germany had rather “selective” criteria concerning the fate of the Jews. They
discriminated against or exempted Jewish communities for strategic reasons (Browning,
1978:110).
“A selective, nationalistically oriented anti-Semitism was the major factor in
Eastern Europe and ultimately determined which groups of Jews would be
killed, either massacred locally or turned over to the Germans, and which
would be protected from extermination though not from persecution. While the
Nazis wished to murder all the Jews, their east European Allies were eager to
kill only certain groups of Jews. [...] Political expediency was also a major
factor in determining the response of Germany’s southeast Allies to the Jewish
question [...] As German domination and influence grew, the radicalisation of
Old Right anti-Semitism continued. In order to deter excessive German
interference in internal politics, especially outright support of the New Right,
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the conservative regimes adopted anti-Jewish legislation based on the German
model” (Browning, 1978:110-111).
The Jewish Question in Greece
Prior to the Nazi occupation was there any “Jewish Question” in Greece? Mazower
argues that when the Nazis started to investigate the “world Jewry”, they found no evidence
that “there existed at any time a ghetto in Salonika” and that even the quisling PM Ioannis
Rallis, openly declared that the Greek majority did not consider the Jews as “political danger”
and that “there is no Jewish Question in Greece” (Mazower, 1993: 423-424). A rare report in
the research centre of Gennadius Library in Athens by a Jewish representative in Cairo
(named A. L. Molho), wrote that from 12 October 1943 until February 1943, there were no
measures against the Jews and that the people of Greece opposed racial discriminations as a
whole (Greek Characters, 1945: 1).
“The measures which have been adopted from the above date on against the
Jews of Salonika and entire Macedonia were originated exclusively by the
German occupation authorities. They acted, according to their own admission,
in conformity with very precise orders received by them from high quarters.
[...] The pressure of Greek public opinion has been so mighty that the Quisling
Prime Minister Mr. Joannis Rhallis, has been obliged to declare that he was
going to intervene on behalf of the Jewish element. It is not known whether he
had kept his promise. In any case, it hasn’t manifested itself officially”. 26
A number of Greeks may have opposed these measures. However, the Prime
Minister, and other politicians who collaborated with the Nazis wanted to introduce racial
laws against the Jews (Mazower, 1993:423). A number of Jews started to join the guerrillas of
EAM/ELAS to save themselves but also to fight against anti-Semitism. In particular, 650
Jews joined their fellow Greeks in the mountains of Free Greece, while 450 of them were
26 “Notes on the Present Situation of Greek Jewry, by A. L. Molho, Cairo, October 12, 1943”, in Greek
Characters, 1945, Gennadius Library, Athens, pp. 1-2.
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Salonika Jews who fought in the area of Greek Macedonia. Many guerrillas for instance
remember the active presence of Jews such as the Jewish partisan Yitzhak Mosheh (Issac
Moissis). From Thessaloniki; “Jews participated in every action with him” and many died
“having fought to the last bullet”. More than 3,000 escaped to Palestine with the help of the
Left-wing partisans of EAM/ELAS (Bowman, 2006:22; Kouzinopoulos, 2005:33). By the end
of the war approximately 10,000 Jewish members of ELAS were ready to get involved in a
long term civil war with the nationalists of EDES (Bowman, 2006: 25-26).
In fact, Jewish resistance can be traced back to as 1930 when the political atmosphere
started to shift towards fascism throughout Europe. When Hitlerism was on the rise in the
continent, the Jewish community in Salonika in 1933 organised a number of demonstrations
and a boycott of German products. And their protest did not stop only there, but they
organised a number of public protests against acts of discrimination for other communities in
Europe, such as the expulsion of Jews from Bulgaria. 27
In Athens, from the beginning of Nazi control (September 1943 until the end of
occupation October 1944) 10,000 Jews were saved (as we shall see in the forthcoming
sections), as a result of the actions of ELAS. Those who remained in the capital and registered
did so “because personal reasons made flight impossible”, such as when people refused to
leave behind their relatives. Other Jews were revealed by the intelligence and the police, and
still others were excluded from the Greek society and had poor access to information
(Mazower, 1993:252). According to the Athenian Jew Errikos Sevillias who survived
Auschwitz, a number of Jews in the beginning of the war (and given they were socially
excluded) were not informed about the “danger threatening them as they had little information
27 See Filippos Dragoumis File 39, sub-file 39-2 “Dia tou Boikotaz tha Syntrivei o Hitler, Ek tou Pouevlo”
(Hitler will be Crashed by Boycott, From ‘Pueblo’) Thessaloniki 30 March 1933, see also Press Office of
Thessaloniki, “Ai Diamartyriai ton En Boulgaria Evreon, Ek tis ‘Pravda’, (The Protest of Bulgarian Jews, From
‘Pravda’) Sofia 28.3.33.
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about the horrors perpetrated on the Jews in the countries of Europe”. The only thing they
learned was that Salonika Jews were sent to Nazi-Occupied Poland by the SS (Sevillias,
1983:5). Apart from the limited information the Jews of Salonika had and the social exclusion
they faced in the city, there is another parameter that is often forgotten and throws light on the
Salonikan situation. Saul Friedlander suggests that this lack of alertness from the part of the
Jews, did not result from any difficulty in understanding the imminent danger; on the
contrary, the Jewish community in Greek Macedonia already knew what danger meant, as
they saw with their own eyes dramatic scenes during the first stages of the nation-states in
Greece as well as the impact of the “Turkish atrocities”, and the “expulsions” of Greek
refugees of Anatolia, thus no one believed the Nazi policies would be any different. In other
words, they were all too familiar with what the newly states did to each other and the impact
on the communities (Friedlander, 2007:488). As Friedlander declares,
“They had direct experience or detailed knowledge of Turkish atrocities, of
expulsions from Asia Minor, in short of the misery, discrimination, massacres,
and resettlements of the World War I years and their immediate aftermath.
Many of these Jews probably imagined their fate at the hands of the Germans
in somewhat similar terms. Whether this was a significant factor in their
attitudes is less certain, however: No Jew in occupied Europe imagined what
the German measures would be” (Friedlander, 2007:488). 28
But going back to these Nazi measures and in relation to the Greek authorities, the
attitude of the latter in concert with the anti-Semitic laws became tougher in July 1942. Nazi
propaganda started to poison the social, political and bureaucratic fabric of the city. For
instance the “German controlled” newspaper Apogevmatini was characterizing Greek Jews as
28 Hagen Fleischer explains that the Jews in Greece and the whole “Christian” Europe, from the medieval times
until the twentieth century, experienced a chain of dramatic events, such as pogroms and racial hate. However,
and until the period of Nazism, there was something “missing”; namely the bureaucracy of the Nazi machine
and the systematic extermination of Jews that led to the genocide. Prior to that period, the Jews were all too
aware what persecution meant, but the Nazi methods were unique in history (Fleischer, 1995b:313). Thus, one
could argue here that no Jewish community was prepared to face the extent of Nazi ferocity.
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“parasites... who would now be put to productive use”, and in another headline the same
newspaper wrote on the front page “Get rid of them” (Mazower, 2005:424; Mazower,
1993:242). As Embros wrote in an article on 27 October 1912:
“The reason why most of our fellow-citizen Israelites have, due to the
corruption of their souls, tried to sabotage our national aspirations and have
diligently tried to poison our joy caused by the arrival of our Greek brothers is
their self interest [...] It is for this reason that we request our fellow Greek
citizens not to seek revenge on account of the contemptible behaviour of our
fellow Israelites citizens. Instead they should look down upon them, since they
are only worthy of disdain. Greeks, known for their pride, should not belittle
themselves in remembering these deceits by the Jews, who will undoubtedly
become aware, under the new government, that they have made a bad appraisal
of the situation, having feared the subjugation of Salonika to the Greeks”
(quoted in Molho, 1988-1993:255).
In fact, attacks upon the Jewish populations came as early as 1932. The London
Jewish Chronicle in 26 November 1932 criticised the anti-Jewish statement of the then Greek
Prime Minister Tsaldaris who argued that the “Jews of Thessaloniki must stay quiet while he
is in his cabinet, if they want to enjoy peace and order”.29 Eleven years later and in 1943, the
Nazi Germans closed down many Jewish businesses and shops, newspapers, destroyed
properties, looted valuable items from the community, while encouraging local Nazi
sympathisers and Anti-Semites to distribute anti-Jewish flyers on various Greek shops
(Mazower, 1993:238). Philip Spencer argues that during Nazi Occupation in Europe, the
systematic attack on Jewish culture whether it targeted their religious identity or their intellect
(through lootings and burnings of buildings, museums, synagogues, schools and so on), aimed
at destroying the “core elements of the Judeo-Christian tradition of the West before, in and
29 See Filippos Dragoumis: sub-file 38.2, “Diloseis tou K. Tsaldari dia tous Evraious tis Thessalonikis”
(Statement of M. Tsaldaris to the Salonika Jews, from Jewish Chronicle, 26 November 1932) Gennadius
Library, Athens.
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after the Enlightenment”. After Nazism destroyed the traces of their cultural heritage, it then
erased the physical existence of Jewish life in Europe through methods of deportation and
extermination (Spencer, 2006:530). As Spencer writes:
“There was, for instance, the famous burning of the books, the purging of
museums and exhibitions, the expulsion of academics and teachers, the hunting
down of intellectual dissent. If this was not an attack on culture tout court
(though this too can be argued), it was certainly on any aspect of culture
associated with the Jews, a sustained effort to attack the core elements of the
Judeo-Christian tradition of the West 30before, in and after the Enlightenment.
There was, secondly, a systematic policy of depopulation. Jewish communities
were removed from places where they had lived for centuries, transported
across Europe first into mass ghettoes and then to the extermination camps”
(Spencer, 2006:530).
One example of the destruction of cultural identity reoccurred in the city of
Thessaloniki, in December 1942, when the Germans destroyed the Jewish cemetery in
Salonika by pulling up everything from the graves in order to build roads. Many witnesses
declared that the city for many weeks looked like a “vast necropolis, scattered with fragments
of stone and rubbish”, that it “resembled a city that had been bombed, or destroyed by a
volcanic eruption” (Mazower, 1993:240). That was only the start, for the next months there
was a number of arrests and executions, as many Jews were “shot as communists” (Mazower,
1993:238). Few months before December, on 11th July 1942, the German Wehrmacht
commander ordered all male Jews – around 10,000 - to present themselves in Eleftheria
Square in the centre of Thessaloniki and register for “civilian labour”( Mazower, 1993:238-
239).
30 The Christians and Jews were living together in Europe for centuries. Thus one could argue that Europe had a
long Judeo-Christian tradition. However, by pushing away the Jews from that European heritage and
coexistence, the Nazis Christianised Europe. By destroying everything that was Jewish in Europe, the Nazis
attacked also that particular heritage that was shared with the Christians (see Spencer, 2006:530).
67
“At dawn on the appointed day, the men went to receive their work cards. It
turned out that they were to be deliberately humiliated. Crowds gathered to
watch the spectacle. Surrounded by armed soldiers, almost 10,000 men were
kept standing in the sun for hours. They were forbidden to wear hats – forcing
them to contravene religious custom (it was a Saturday) – and some eventually
collapsed in the heat. German soldiers kicked and beat them or doused them in
cold water. Some were forced to do physical exercises until they were
exhausted. Military personnel snapped photos of the scene while Greek
civilians watched them from their balconies. Actors and actresses visiting the
city with the army’s theatrical agency, ‘Strength through Joy’, applauded the
entertainment the army had laid on” (Mazower, 1993:238-239).
However, the Salonikan survivor Dr I. A. Matarasso argued that the passive people
who watched from their house balconies and hotels in Eleftheria Square were actually
German officials and troops as well as young German actresses of the military theatre “Kraft
Durch” (Matarasso, 1948:23-24). Many hours however after the events in Eleftheria Square,
the Jews were released and ordered to continue with further work on roads and buildings
although none of them were able to do so, after the physical and psychological abuse
(Mazower, 1993: 239). The picture of the scene is well known and it is exhibited in museums
in Greece and abroad.
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(The Jews are been forced to do humiliating exercises in the middle of a boiling noon in Eleftheria
Square by the SS, Thessaloniki, 11 July 1942).
http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/othercamps/greekjewry.html
Deportations and the Destruction of Greek Jewry
The Bulgarian Zone
According to the survivor Dr. Marco Nahon, the first Greek Jews that were deported
and sent to the death camps were the Jews of Greek Thrace. These people already had
experience of harassment from 1911 to 1918, the “early years of Greek Occupation” (Nahon,
1989:6). When Greek Thrace fell under Bulgarian occupation, Adolf Eichmann31 (a key SS
official for the implementation and organisation of deportations in Europe) made a murderous
deal with Alexander Belov (a “commissar” for Jewish Matters) in February 1943 to deport
20,000 Jews from Bulgaria and send them east for forced labour; yet, these Jews were
ultimately destined to be exterminated in the camp of Treblinka (ibid). Out of this tragic
31 Adolf Eichmann’s department was ‘IVB4 of the Reichsicherheitshauptamt RSHA’ (Nahon, 1989:6). Adolf
Eichmann turned out to assume a key role in the Final Solution during the Wannsee Conference, and organise
the transfer of Jews to ghettos and extermination camps (Arendt, 2006).
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number, around 4,000 were Jews from Greek Thrace, while the official Jewish Documents in
Greece recorded later that the number of Jewish losses in Thrace was even higher (Nahon,
1989:7).32
According to Leni Yahl, the Jews in the Bulgarian occupied areas were totally
“abandoned” at the latter’s hands. There were no attempts to be rescued by anyone, namely,
neither from an organised resistance, nor from the local authorities, since Bulgaria annexed
parts of Greece (Greek Thrace and Greek Macedonia) and there was literally no Greek
element present (Yahl, 1977:622). The Bulgarian Occupation in Greece is considered as
brutal as the Nazi Occupation, for this zone had also colonial characteristics. Raphael Lemkin
declares that prior to the implementation of Jewish deportation in Greek Thrace and Greek
eastern Macedonia, the Bulgarian occupants made their zone “free” from Greek populations.
When Hitler asked assistance from his Bulgarian ally in 1941 to invade north-eastern Greece
(as Italians proved ineffective to occupy Greece alone), the former seized the opportunity to
annex parts they did not conquer during the Balkan Wars. They annexed this particular
periphery, abolished every Greek element (the local people, administration, and bureaucracy),
colonized it and brought Bulgarian citizens to inhabit the zone, while practicing a “real
genocide policy” to the Greeks of north east Aegean (Lemkin, 1944:187-188; see also
Macdonald, 1993:56). As Lemkin declares:
“The policy pursued by the Bulgarian occupant in Eastern Macedonia was
entirely different from the one adopted in the Aegean region. Whereas in
Macedonia a policy of rehabilitation was followed, the Macedonians being
considered by the occupant as of Bulgarian origin, ‘freed from Greeks’, a real
genocide policy was applied to the Greeks in the Aegean region. Greek
32 Based on the official numbers of the Greek Jewish Community, the Jewish losses from the following Thracian
cities are: Serres (597), Drama (1,161), Kavala (2,058), Alexandroupolis (136), Xanthi (544), Komotini (791).
On the eastern part of Thrace on the other hand, which was occupied by the Germans, the number of deaths
from the following cities is: Dhidhimoteichon (970), Souflion (32), and Orestiada (160). These Jews were
included in the “Salonika’s fifty thousand Jews” (Nahon, 1989:8).
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churches and schools were closed and the Bulgarian language was made the
official language. These measures aimed at changes in the composition of the
population in accordance with the German pattern. First of all, the Greeks who
had come as immigrants from Anatolia and settled in Greece after the exchange
of populations in 1922-23 were expelled from Thrace into that part of the
Greek territory which was left under a Greek puppet33 government” (Lemkin,
1944:188).
What was to follow two years later was the total eradication of the Greek Jewry from
the Bulgarian zone. The reason why we are making this analogy is to support what has been
previously argued by Christopher Browning concerning the turmoil of Balkan Peninsula:
there were some regions in occupied Europe that combined anti-Jewish legislation with
policies of annexation and colonization, forced assimilation or ethnic cleansing due to their
multi-ethnic composition (Browning, 1978:110-111).
33 The term ‘puppet government’ is explained in chapter 5, in the subsection “Political and Armed
Collaboration”.
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(Light Grey colour next to the German Occupation zone in north east Greece and opposite Bulgaria, indicates
annexation policy of Bulgarians in Greek eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace. The light grey reveals the
disappearance of these geographic regions from the Greek map due to annexation and colonization. Serres,
Drama, Kavalla, Rhodope, and the islands of north-eastern Aegean such as Samothrace and Thasos were not part
of Greece during Bulgarian Occupation. This map does not paint the Bulgarian zone in contrast with the Nazi
and Italian zone, in order to see which peripheries belonged to Greece and which were annexed by the
Bulgarians. Same grey colour in Dodecanese islands indicates Italian possession though not annexation. The
islands of Dodecanese were under Italian occupation and possession until 1943. Re-unification of the latter with
Greece occurred in 1948).
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/Greece_Prefectures_1941-44.png
Mazower observes that:
“The Nazi Occupation triggered off ethnic civil war more widely in the
Balkans. Serb Chetniks talked of their intention ‘to cleanse Bosnia of
everything that is not Serb’, and killed tens of thousands of Non-Serbs.
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Bulgarian troops annexed parts of Greek Thrace, killed thousands of civilians,
banned the use of Greek, and tried to resettle the province with Bulgarian
settlers. A similar policy was attempted in former Yugoslav Macedonia, though
in both cases, wartime colonisation was a failure” (Mazower, 2001:124).
The German Zone
Adolf Eichmann and towards the “last months of 1942” was anxious to make “the
German zone free of Jews” (Mazower, 1993:240). The same period he visited Salonika and
told Dieter Wicliceny (the second of the three architects of Salonika destruction) to proceed
with the Final Solution. Eichmann wanted to deport 50,000 Jews within “six to eight weeks”
and Wicliceny to his eyes was the most reliable person to carry out the brutal acts: he had
organised the destruction of Slovakian Jews, the “first to be gassed” in the camps (Mazower,
1993: 240).
Few months later, in February 1943, Dieter Wicliceny and Alois Brunner34 arrived in
the city of Thessaloniki and forced 6,000 Jewish families to abandon their properties and give
them to the Germans. The SS created ghettos in the city and banned non-Jews from speaking
to their Jewish neighbours (Mazower, 1993:241). Dr Max Merten, organised fast-speed
procedures in order to implement the deportations (Steinberg, 2002:99). According to Dr
Nahon the political situation in Salonika was very brutal as the city was the “seat of
Wehrmacht Occupation Forces” (Nahon, 1989:9). The first phase of the war was so ferocious,
for between the spring of 1941 and the summer of 1942, the SS carried out executions and
arrests on a daily basis irrespective of whether the victims were Jews. The latter were “not
singled out from any special treatment” during the first and a half year of occupation; Greek
Christians, communists, Jews and everyone actively or not actively opposed to the Nazi
34 Both Dieter Wisliceny and Alois Brunner were “representatives” of Adolf Eichmann who carried out the
deportation policy in Greek Macedonia. Both were SS and under the “head” of Max Merten, who was the chief
of Thessalonikis’ “military administration” (Mazower, 1993:241).
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regime was persecuted. Nahon declares that during the first phase of occupation, Greek Jews
suffered and arrested “not as Jews but as Greeks” since they supported the guerrillas’ actions
against the Nazi regime (Nahon, 1989:9).
In March 1943 Eichmann decided that he “wanted the entire community to be
deported”. The chief Rabbi of Salonika, Koretz, tried to convince and “begged” Wisliceny to
reconsider and perhaps use the Jews as labourers within Greece instead of deporting them.
But Eichmann was not convinced, and proceded with the first orderings of the trains,
confirming back to German Head Quarters that the first train with 2, 600 Greek Jews was
already heading towards Auschwitz on 15 March 1943. In the mean time, Rabbi Koretz was
struggling to find ways to stop the deportations, and asked the quisling PM Ioannis Rallis to
negotiate with the Germans, but he replied to him that “he was in no position to help”
(Mazower, 1993:242-243).
Dr Nahon suggests that Eichmann and Wisliceny’s presence in Thessaloniki signified
the “final stage” of the holocaust. They created three ghettos in three different areas of the
city; the “Baron Hirsh”, the “Suburb 151”, and the “Hagia Paraskevi” camps. From the
second half of the same month (March 1943) and for three months, 20 trains left from
Salonika to Auschwitz carrying approximately 48,000 to 50,000 Jews, while the train that left
on 9th of May to Auschwitz carried Jews from Greek Eastern Thrace (Nahon, 1989:10-11).
However, there are other sources which suggest that apart from Wisliceny and Brunner,
General Loehr was also responsible for the deportation of the Jews in Salonika, as he as well
collaborated with the SS in the city during the same period (Rosenbaum and Hoffer, 1993: 54-
55). According to Mazower, 48,974 Jews left Salonika, while 37,386 were sent straight to the
gas chambers of Auschwitz II (Mazower, 1993:244; see also Steinberg, 2002: 100). The
Salonika transports included also elderly people with serious health problems as well as
young boys and girls. Some locals who witnessed the deportations remembered horrific
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stories. The Greek novelist Giorgos Ioannou was a young school boy during the Salonika
transportations and described the emotions of his father, who drove one of these deadly trains
to Serbia (Mazower, 1993: 245).
“Late one night we heard sobbing in the kitchen. My father had returned...He
was depressed and exhausted, but more than anything else, miserable. He asked
to see my young brother, who was then 3 or 4. We woke him up and carried
him into the kitchen. He had been asked to drive a train with Jews right into
Serbia and had seen terrible things with his own eyes. The Jews had already
begun to die. The Germans stopped the train at a quiet spot – they had their
plan. From inside, the Jews shouted and beat the wooden sides. Packed in as
they were, they could not breathe, and they had no water. The Germans, guns
in hand, began opening the wagons, not however for the benefit of the Jews,
but to steal their hidden jewellery, watches and coins. There was much crying.
From one wagon they threw out a young boy dead, and laid him – without of
course burying him – in the ditch alongside the trucks. It seems he looked like
my brother. As my father looked out from the engine, they threw him a handful
of watches” (Mazower, 1993:245-246).
The Italian Zone
According to the survivor Dr Nahon, the Jews of the Italian zone were “relatively safe
from the ravages of the Gestapo”, as the Italians wanted to control Greece and were
“antagonistic” towards Germany, giving them no “free hand until September 1943”.
However, they surrendered (Nahon, 1989:11). It is estimated that 140,000 Italian soldiers
gave up their arms in Greece after fighting the Nazis in the Ionian Islands. Among those
Italians who surrendered, some joined the Nazis; others went with the Greek guerrillas of
ELAS, while the majority was sent to the Nazi camps for forced labour (ibid). When the
whole country fell into the hands of Nazi Germany in 1943, Adolf Eichmann proceeded with
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deportations in all parts of the country. Onn 20 September 1943, Jurgen Stroop and Walter
Blume arrived in Athens, while Wisliceny was transferred to the capital to be in charge of the
Jewish policy under the supervision of Blume. He received specific directives from Eichmann
to hasten the registration process “as he wanted all the Jews in Athens and the rest of Greece
to be rounded up and sent to Auschwitz immediately” (Mazower, 1993:250). Eichmann’s
plans were interrupted, for when Wisliceny threatened the Athenian Rabbi Elias Barzilai to
give him the names and addresses of his community, “he was spirited out of Athens by
EAM/ELAS” and before escaping to the mountains, he destroyed the name list of the
Athenian Jews. In this way, many were saved (Mazower, 1993:250, see also Nahon, 1989:12).
According to Hilberg, the Jewish escape was so successful with the assistance of the partisans
that “no council came into being in Athens” (Hilberg, 1992:106).
With the help of Jewish activists, ELAS organised an escape plan (held by EAM’s
member Kostas Vidalis) to save the Rabbi who seized to inform his community about the
deportations. Indeed, “hidden in a truck”, the Rabbi and his family successfully escaped in the
mountains of Central Greece and stayed there until the end of the war with the guerrillas. The
plan was so successful that not only ELAS’s plan saved thousands of Jews with Barzilai’s
disappearance, but they sabotaged Eichmann’s plan as well. Jurgen Stroop was so furious that
Eichmann’s plan did not prosper that he ordered all the Athenian Jews to register “within 5
days on pain of being shot”. The order failed again as many Jews refused to register and a
great number escaped into the mountains to join EAM/ELAS. Even though the registration
deadline was extended for 17 September 1943, only 1,200 listed out of 8,000 Athenian Jews
were registered (Mazower, 1993:250-251).
Other Jews were able to hide in friends’ houses while, Mazower provides an
important information, namely that the authorities in Greece wanted to intervene on behalf of
“Greek-speaking Romaniot Jews”, showing their objection to the German authorities (to
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Altenburg in particular) and their “displeasure at the prospect of future deportations”
(Mazower, 1993:251). Fearing that the Greek objection will result to a similar incident that
took place in Denmark, leading to an escape of many Jews there, “the German Foreign Office
recommended proceeding cautiously in Greece” (ibid). Eichmann was so angry with the
successful escape of many Jews and the limited registrations, that he gave an order to invade
Jewish properties and confiscate everything (ibid).
A horrific tragedy occurred in Athens when Tony Burger (a top Nazi official) visited
without a notice on March 23rd 1944 the central synagogue. Burger, who took over
Wisliceny’s position after Eichmann realised that the latter was incapable of handling the
Jewish Question in Athens, informed the Jewish attendants that were about to be sent to
Germany for forced labour “due to their Anglophile sentiments” and that they would return to
Greece after the war was over. The SS locked the synagogue doors and ordered 20 Jews to
terrorise their inmates with weapons: they were forced to “round up the women and children
and bring them to the Centre” (Mazower, 1993: 252). Approximately one thousand terrified
Jews were kept rounded up like that for many hours, and when the doors finally opened, the
SS arrested them, sending them to the Haidari Camp (a few kilometres away from the centre
of Athens), where they were held for 10 days before being sent on to Auschwitz. There, Josef
Mengele selected 648 for his experiments, while the rest were immediately killed (ibid).
Further concentration camps were established not only in Salonika, but in Athens too.
Because of the strong presence of left-wing guerrilla activity in Attica, there were many
prisons in Haidari. Averoff, Tatoi, Kallithea, and in many other districts supervised by the
Greek police (Kouzinopoulos, 2005:126-127).
Whenever the locals and the authorities tried to save them, they successfully did so,
whereas other areas (such as the cities of Epirus) approved the Nazi actions. Jews who
remained in the cities or joined the partisans of ELAS in the mountains of Free Greece felt
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more “protected” as they had friends and relatives close to them as well as an organised
armed resistance by their side (Nahon, 1989: 13). As we already stated, in areas with strong
left wing resistance such as Thessaly and Central Greece, the Jews felt safer as the majority of
them received assistance from the local residents and the resistance of EAM/ELAS (Kitroeff,
1985:8-9).
According to Dr Nahon, the train that carried the Athenian Jews in April 1944
included deportees from other cities of Greece such as Arta (352), Patra (12 families), Preveza
(272), Chalkida (90), Volos (130), Larissa (255), Trikala (50), Ioannina (1,860), and Kastoria
(763). The 300 arrested Cretan Jews had a dreadful end as “their ship sank mysteriously”
between the islands of Thera (Santorini) and Milos “somewhere of the coast of Sounion”,
while 1,800 to 2,000 Jews from Corfu Island, and 2,000 Jews from the islands of Kos and
Rhodes were deported in July of the same year (Nahon, 1989:12). As Mazower declares,
Burger, who was responsible for the Jews of Corfu, convinced the local shipping to offer him
three transports in order to transfer the Jews to the neighbouring island of Lefkada. Many
escaped in the hills of the island while others were unwilling to leave their families. Those
however who were captured, were kept “locked” in a fort (a “former prison”) for many days
under barbaric conditions (Mazower, 1993:254).
When the prisoners of Corfu reached Lefkada Island, they were detained in the town
square of the island. It is suggested that the local population showed “sympathy for the
detainees” by giving them food, while Burger and the Nazi authorities threatened to kill the
local civilians in case they showed solidarity towards the Jews. In one incident, a local priest
offered a cigarette to a Jew once the first transport arrived in the island, and Burger, furious,
shot the Jewish man and looked towards the priest who was to be shot as well. This act was
prevented only by the Greek police (Mazower, 1993:254-255).
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At the same time, the author explains how difficult it was for the Jews to escape given
the danger of arrest and death, by giving us an example of a Jewish man named Aaron. Once
the boat arrived at the harbour, Aaron, and by mistake queued along with the Jews who were
about to be sent to Patras (Peloponnese). As a young spontaneous boy, he saw an old friend
and rushed in to talk to him. The young Jew realised the mistake he made and did not know
what to do. He was aware that his action would result to severe punishment or that his family
would be punished for their son’s action. But the young boy was lucky as he was saved by a
stranger called (George Mitsialis). The latter let him stay at his house over the night, while the
next day he walked through the mountains outside the city of Patras hoping he will reach
Athens at some point and meet his family. However in the mountains, “he met partisans of
ELAS, and spent the rest of the war with them”, returning back safe to the island of Corfu
without his family after the war was over (Mazower, 1993:255).
Resistance in the streets and the formation of EAM/ELAS
According to Hondros in Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony 1941-44, the
first informal and “spontaneous” forms of resistance occurred in Athens in the beginning of
May 1941, when Greek civilians protested against the German decision to imprison British
soldiers who arrived in the country the same year. Although the penalty for trying to save the
British was death, many individuals acted on their own, and tried to help them escape. Acts of
resistance included sabotage on various ships (especially in the port of Piraeus), occupation in
universities by professors and students, and open demonstrations in the streets of Athens
(Hondros, 1983:95-96). One of the most important and “spectacular” to this day acts of
resistance was, when the famous and current left-wing politician Manolis Glezos and his
friend Apostolos Santas, the night of 30 May 1941, accessed illegally the ancient area of
Acropolis and literally took down the swastika flag from the top of the hill and stole it without
been caught (Mazower, 1993: 86).
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It is argued that Greece and former Yugoslavia used similar methods of uprising
throughout the war, but in the former case and at least in the beginning of the occupation
started mainly from the people. Many spontaneous acts like the one we just described
occurred in occupied Greece. As a consequence, the Nazis constantly threatened the Greek
people ordering them to show “obedience” without much success though (Podinus, 1943: 9).
In fact the Nazis issued a proclamation stating the following:
“Because German military flags have been pulled down and torn from public
buildings, because the Greek people are hoarding foodstuffs and preventing
them reaching the German soldiers, because of the Greek population’s
sympathy with British prisoners, and because the Greek press refuses to
conform to the new order, the German authorities have decided that in the
future those found guilty of the above-mentioned offences will be shot”
(Podinus, 1943: 9).
However, anti-Nazi acts continued in many cities apart from Athens such as the city
of Salonika by those unemployed citizens who were deprived from the public sector. The act
of theft of swastika and the continuous acts of solidarity towards the British detainees, led to
the increase of numerous police units in areas of Athens, and the introduction of concentration
camps for those who were revolting. The growth of anti-fascist and anti-authoritarian
behaviour, made the local Nazi authorities and the quisling government to establish the first
courts that would handle cases of “anti-national offenses”. This led to the arrest of many
Athenians the next following months, sending them to the islands of exile. Despite the arrests
and persecutions, the tension between the civilians and the Nazis grew fast in concert with the
increase of hunger and deprivation (“Great Famine”) especially during the summer months of
1941 (Hondros, 1983:96-97).
Acts of provocation and sabotage from the Greek population continued in many cities
apart from Thessaloniki and Athens, and on 5th July 1941, the first partisans emerged in the
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village of Kozani (province of Western Greek Macedonia). The Nazis burned a number of
villages, killing civilians as a form of reply to the revolutionary behaviour, while leftist
partisans attempted to destroy the offices of the National Union of Greece (EEE) in Salonika
on 31st of August, but without success, as the partisans were arrested and executed (Hondros,
1983:97). Mazower declares that the impressive revolt that was prevailing in Greece was
something like a natural phenomenon as it originated from the Italian Occupation in the
country. A number of “Italian observers” suggested that the “revolt psychosis” among the
populations was something to be expected; it was “enough” and “straightforward” (Mazower,
1993: 89).
On the other hand, organised resistance emerged in the winter of 1941 and 1942 with
the appearance of armed bands of ELAS that sprang from the Greek Communist Party. The
Communist Party which was illegal at that time continued to grow from the 30s onwards,
when the fascist dictatorship of Metaxas ruled the country for a decade. It had ten percent of
the vote. EAM matured in concert with the growth of many other political conflicts. The
rivalries occurred between the royalists who wanted to keep alive the spirit of king George II
and the supporters of Venizelos (the Venizelists); between the anti-Venizelists and anti-
royalists, and all together against communism (Mazower, 1993:98). In the middle of the
thirties, the ideological conflicts reached their apogee, when former king George II abolished
democracy, destroyed the parliament in 1936, and tried at the same time to establish some
kind of coalition or “national unity” with the Venizelists, causing severe reactions from the
opposite camps who opted to get rid of pro-Metaxas and pro-king political influences (ibid).
The conservatism of the political elite grew in concert with the proletarianisation of
Greece. The latter formed a strong organised movement among itself and fellow citizens. It
started as EA (National Solidarity), and rapidly flourished because it attracted victims of
famine, forming later the EAM (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo, National Liberation Front).
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The latter did not wish communists members “play their dominant role in EAM”, and they
welcomed people from many other groups to enter their resistance, keeping it open, without
excluding the possibility of co-operation with members of the “political
mainstream”(Mazower, 1993:100). Nevertheless, their political opponents not only rejected
their offer, but they were treating resistance with great scepticism. Among the sceptics were
not only those who supported the king, but also Georgios Papandreou (the eldest, who was in
Cairo during the Axis Occupation) who thought that this resistance group had an “impersonal
form of political organization”35 that could not fit their ideological platform (ibid). From the
beginning of the war, the bourgeois parties feared that Greece’s National Resistance36 would
increase so much in numbers that their left-wing representatives would win the elections as
well as the support of the people who would jointly work together to take their “freedoms”
back, seeing the prospect of the king’s return with great hostility (Mazower, 1993:101).
Nevertheless, ELAS (the armed force of EAM) successfully managed to dominate as
the main resistance group in the country in contrast with the nationalist guerrilla group of
EDES for 3 distinct reasons. According to Iatrides, the first reason was the fact that the
guerrillas of ELAS supported the majority of the Greek population who was hostile towards
the regency and the government – in – exile. The second reason was “the failure of SOE37 and
35 Mazower explains that the “political elite” of Greece, namely Papandreou, Venizelos and the royalists had the
illusion that they were representing the popular will of the Greek people forgetting that Greece was a peasant
country. EAM/ELAS understood the conditions under which the majority of the population were living. Their
scheme did not pay attention on political canons such as leadership and guidance. The political elite on the other
hand, insisted that the populations needed guidance and monitoring with respect to “unstable and wavering
public opinion” of the Greek people. Top MPs and Papandreou himself thought that even the name of EAM
(national liberation front) was “childish” to the European eyes and that the “political world would lose all
credibility” if they followed them (Mazower, 1993:100). In other words, this impersonality of EAM or the
absence of clear party characteristics of the movement threatened the liberal brush of Greek politics which all
the aforementioned wanted to promote.
36 Traditionally, when we talk about the “National Resistance” in Greece as a whole during occupation, we refer
to EAM/ELAS, because it was the largest and the majority of the Greek land was under its protection.
37 SOE stands for “Special Operations Executives”; SOE was responsible to instigate “subversion, sabotage, and
guerrilla warfare against the Axis in cooperation with the resistance forces of occupied Europe”. They were
working under-cover and in strict secrecy, giving information and special reports to Britain as to the nature of
the resistance of the EAM/ELAS. Their intervention in Greece, although secret, was recognised by many
partisans as a burden, since the SOE was “committed” to support the return of the king and the government- in-
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the British Foreign Office to agree on a coordinated military – policy toward Greece”, and last
but not least EAM/ELAS managed to unite the Greek civilians in urban and rural areas quite
early. Indeed, as we shall see in chapter 5, the SOE and British Foreign Office struggled to
reconcile their interests, as the latter was following the instructions of Churchill in order to
monitor the resistance bands, while the SOE wished (at least in the beginning) to recognise
the post-war representation of EAM/ELAS, though it succumbed to the pressures of Churchill
in the end. It is also argued that ELAS was more popular to the people, since it had a
humanitarian mission in areas of Greece that were deeply affected by the Great Famine
(Iatrides, 1981:39, 42).
The Jewish Partisans in the Anti-Nazi resistance of ELAS
The story of Jewish resistance in occupied Greece is still not widely known. Joseph
Matsas who was born in the city of Ioannina, was a member of the Jewish community and an
active partisan in the resistance of ELAS. He argues, that what is most known about the
participation of Jews in the Greek war against Nazism and Fascism covers mainly the first
part of the war (from 1940 until 1941) when the war broke out between the Italians and the
Greeks in the Albanian front. Of course there is a lot to say about the second half of the war,
but Matsas explains to us that given that there were numerous Jewish persecutions and
deportations in the second half of the war – once the Germans took over the whole country -
and because a civil war broke out officially in December 1944 in Greece (unofficially it
sprung in 1943) along with the Cold War throughout Europe, there was an “official silence”
that “prevented any references to the events that took place during the German occupation”
(Matsas, 1991: 55) .
exile after the war was over, while EAM/ELAS was hostile to such a prospect, for it was genuinely “anti-
monarchical” and “politically left-wing” (for full exploration of the SOE activities in Greece, see Andre
Gerolymatos, “The Development of Guerrilla Warfare and British Policy Toward Greece 1943-1944”, Journal
of the Hellenic Diaspora, pages 97-114, September 1991, Vol. 17.1, published by Pella Publishing Company;
see also Stevens, J.M, C.M. Woodhouse and D.J. Wallace (1982) in British Reports on Greece 1943-44 on the
political conflicts in Greece, pp 4-24).
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It is worth mentioning that 4,000 Jews took part in the armed resistance of the Greco-
Italian war in Albania which was an Italian Protectorate (Matsas, 1991:56, on the Jewish
contribution to the war effort see also, Stavroulakis, 1997:55). As the former Jewish partisan
declares:
“Jewish soldiers had a highly patriotic spirit and fought the invaders fiercely,
fighting as Greeks for their country’s defence and as Jews for the defeat of
fascism and antisemitism. Their fighting spirit and participation in dangerous
missions earned them the admiration of their officers and shot down the myth,
created by antisemites and fanatical bigots, that Jews were cowards in the face
of the war. One battalion of the 50th Regiment was called ‘the Cohen Battalion’
because of the numerous Jewish fighters who served in its ranks” (Matsas,
1991:56).
Many Jewish women fought on the side of ELAS, such as Dora Bourla who fought
against the Nazis in Greek Macedonia with a unit of 30 armed women. The participation of
women in the resistance had a socio-political significance as well, since in the mountains of
Greece the provisional Government granted all men and women irrespective of age or
profession the same rights. This was a first step towards challenging the hard-core male-
dominated society prevalent in the cities (Bowman, 2006: 33-34). 38
The movement of EAM and especially EPON (EAM’s Youth) in Salonika tried to
help the Jewish students to escape by issuing flyers and newspapers illegally in the Aristotle
University, informing the imminent dangers of staying in the city (Matsas, 1991:58). They
were calling them to join the resistance, not surrender to the Germans and escape in the
38 Not to mention that recruiting women in general in the forces of EAM/ELAS and in the Youth Organisation
of EPON was extremely difficult, for many girls in their mid-teens found systematic disapproval from their
parents, as the latter feared for their lives. Many young women wanted to join the resistance of EAM/ELAS for
irrespective of one’s political background or family’s disapproval, it was the biggest and most organised
movement, paying also attention to female rights and to the rights of the most destitute. Thus a great number of
women and girls did not remain inactive during the war and wait for the men and the Allies to liberate them
(Hart, 1996:164-166).
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mountains or hide in territories that were still under Italian control.39 According to Matsas,
252 young Jewish students successfully escaped the Nazi terror of arrest, while the conditions
under which the students escaped were brutally adventurous. They had to follow routes of
extreme altitude and with low temperatures as these were areas that were controlled by the
Nazis (Matsas, 1991:58; see also Bowman, 2006: 49-53). In Athens, the close cooperation
between the chief Rabbi Elias Brazilai and EAM proved catalytic for the protection of the
Jews. The former through announcements via the left-wing newspapers of EAM/ ELAS such
as Eleftheri Ellada and Rizospastis on 14th and 10th of October 1943 respectively, was
sending messages to the Jews to unite with the resistance and show full “trust” on them
(Greek Characters, 1945a: 6). Brazilai through his links with EAM was sending new updates
about the situation in Greece and the fate of his community. A rare article called “The Jews
and the Liberation Struggle: A Report of the Central Committee of the EAM on the Jews of
Greece and the liberation Struggle” now stored in Gennadius Library of Athens, consists a
collection of old documents that were published by the EAM Committee and includes letters
and proclamations of the Athenian Rabbi aiming to increase the confidence of his community
and follow EAM/ELAS (Greek Character, 1945a:6-8). An excerpt of one of his letters shows
his great dynamism and fighting spirit on the side of the partisans:
“[...] I am happy to note that from this inferno, created by the Germans, about
10,000 Jews were able to escape. This miracle is due without question to the
organisations of the EAM. This highly patriotic organisation showed its
interest in the persecuted Jews from the first moment [...] From some
information reaching me, at least 1,000 Jews are in Free Greece, among them
100-200 guerrillas, 50 working actively in affiliate organisations such as the
National Solidarity and EPON (Panhellenic Union of Youth) and the rest are
dispersed in various cities and villages of Free Greece [...] Since the EAM is so
well disposed towards the Jews, it would be a good thing to find the means to
39 See “The Jews and the Liberation Struggle: A Report of the Central Committee of the EAM on the Jews of
Greece and the liberation Struggle” in Greek Characters, 1945:p.2, Gennadius Library, Athens, Greece.
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help those who are hungry and without clothing. Before I finish this report, I
deem it my duty to express on behalf of all the Jews who have been saved from
Hitlerite barbarism, my deep gratitude to the EAM/ELAS organisations which
gave material proof of their real patriotism, humanitarianism and pro-
Semitism. Somewhere in Free Greece, June 14 1944, Chief Rabbi of Athens,
Elias Barzilai” (Greek Characters, 1945a:7-8)
Martin Gilbert suggests that while the Athenian Rabbi was hiding in the province of
Thessaly, he along with the partisans of ELAS successfully saved 600 more Jews. The
headquarters of ELAS (in Lamia, Central Greece) in concert with the Rabbi arranged boats to
carry safely the Jews by sea to Turkey, and as a form of gratitude, “the Jewish Federation in
Palestine smuggled boots and money by sea to the Greek resistance” (Gilbert, 1986: 625).
There were areas in Greece such as the city of Volos, where the chief Rabbi welcomed the
offer of EAM/ELAS to take the Jewish community to the mountains. Indeed with this
initiative, the majority of Jews in Volos, Larisa, and Trikala were saved, while in the city of
Patras (Peloponnese), and after the Nazis issued the registration warnings, the Jews literally
“disappeared” in the Guerrilla Mountains (Gilbert, 1986:625-626).
Nina Matathias was a Salonikan Jew who escaped terror during occupation. She left
Thessaloniki and resided in the city of Volos that was under Italian occupation until 1943.
She and her husband were hearing rumors about the tragic situation in Salonika. She too
remembers the close cooperation between the Rabbi and the partisans. Once the Italians fell
and the Germans took over the city of Volos, the Rabbi Mosheh Pessah was threatened by the
Nazis to give the names of his community. Nina and her husband left prior to the Nazi
invasion and escaped to the mountains. But those Jews who remained in the city were
informed by the Rabbi that if they stayed they had no chance of survival, thus the majority
followed his advice and were saved. Nina remembers that the Rabbi spread the following
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message to his community: “Leave Volos because I’m leaving too. If you stay, you’re going
to be caught by the Germans” (Gurewitsch, 1998:27-28).
The situation in Salonika was evidently different. Many Jews who were prisoners in
the ghettos of the city did not know where they were going and what the future awaited them.
We referred earlier to the differences between the Jews of Salonika and Athens: the former
were eradicated almost entirely; the latter found support from local organisations of EAM as
well Archbishop Damaskinos’s contribution in issuing false identification cards and in
attacking the Quisling government for their indifference on Jewish deportations (Tomai,
2009:35; Enepekidi, 1969:47-52; Chroneka, 2006:100-101). We also noted earlier in this
chapter, and based on Steven Bowman’s argument, that there must be more adequate analysis
and research concerning the reasons why Salonika Jewry met with total destruction and why
it differed from Athens (Bowman, 2006:22).
In this volume, therefore, we are here to reveal these “local” politics of Thessaloniki
and see whether they had an impact on the measures against the Jews. Andrew Apostolou for
suggests that the Greek bureaucrat Vasilis Simonides in Salonika, who had a central position
in the administration, was totally “indifferent to the fate of the Jews” and kept in darkness the
Athenian administration about the Nazi measures in Salonika. For the Nazis he was the
“perfect example of a collaborator” (Apostolou, 2000:179, see also chapter 5). This cannot be
the whole truth. Minna Rozen demonstrates that people in Athens were aware about the
Jewish measures of Salonika and that the quisling PM Logothetopoulos knew very well what
was happening in the north but he “did not really mind” (Rozen, 2005:127).
There is little information about the decisions taken by Greek bureaucrats in Salonika,
as many archives have been destroyed. Another aspect that perhaps throws light to the
Salonika Jewry is the role of the chief Rabbi of the town, who received a lot of criticism from
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the Jewish survivors. In fact, there is a growing debate among Greek authors as well as many
Jewish survivors who wrote their autobiography and their experience in the camps, as to the
role of the Rabbi Koretz. Most of them seem to criticise the latter and openly declare that he
was a German collaborator. L. S. Stavrianos in his article “The Jews of Greece” declared that
the full responsibility as to the fate of Salonika Jewry lay with tactics of Rabbi Koretz
(Stavrianos, 1948:262). He argued that although the members of EAM urged Koretz to
collaborate with them, not to succumb to the Germans and escape into the mountains, he
followed the Nazi orders and the community “followed the advice of its Rabbi” (ibid). In the
same tone, the Jewish Chronicle of London of 29 November 1946 criticized Koretz’s actions:
it was on “the most charitable interpretation a deplorable and almost criminal subservience”
(ibid).
The survivor Yacoel in his book Apomnemoneumata 1941-1944 (Memoirs 1941-
1944) argues that prior to the EPON mission in 1942 to issue illegal flyers in the Aristotle
University and mobilise the Jewish community, two members of the central committee of
EAM (D. Maragos and the lawyer Elias Kefalidis), met with the chief Rabbi and warned him
about the Nazi tendencies, asking him to join the resistance in order to protect the Jewish
community. Koretz rejected their proposal (Yacoel, 1993: 30). Other Jewish survivors such as
Joseph Ben in “Jewish Leadership in Greece during the Holocaust”, have argued that when
Brunner, Wisliceny and Dr Max Merten arrived in Salonika to impose the anti-Semitic laws,
Koretz wanted “six other Jews, who had been appointed together with him, to bear collective
responsibility” for the German laws (Ben, 1979:339). When the Germans left Greece, Rabbi’s
wife was questioned concerning Koretz’s role, admitting that there was indeed a lot of
pressure on the part of the Germans to obey and that there was an opportunity to escape much
88
earlier in Egypt and once the Nazis invaded Greece. Koretz decided to stay in Salonika (Ben,
1979:340).40
There is more information that throws light to the Jewish community of Salonika,
namely, that a number of Jews were excluded from the Greek Society, not all spoke the
language, did not have contacts, and could not easily hide in a small city such as Salonika:
“their Jewish identity could easily be revealed” (Yacoel: 1993:30). Apart from the role of
Salonikan Rabbi, there were other mechanisms that did not help at all the Jewish community,
such as the role of the local Greek authorities and in particular of the bureaucrat Simmonides
who collaborated with the Germans.
Nevertheless, the role of the Rabbi Koretz has been criticized by Jewish survivors,
arguing that he must have known about the existence of the death camps in Nazi occupied-
Poland. For instance, the Jewish survivor Dr. I. A. Matarraso argued in his memoir that the
Rabbi of Salonika was trying to comfort the community by telling them not to worry about
the deportations and that their families would eventually “re-unite in Cracow”
(Mattaraso,1948:76). Mattaraso questioned Koretz’s honesty: “Did he believe the Cracow
fairytale” and were “his orders and speeches ... dictated by the Germans”? (Mattarasso,
1948:76-77; same in Handeli, 1992:48). Some tactics were tried, such as bribing Wisliceny
with 2.5 million drachma in order for some Jews to remain in the city, but whether this was
an act of collaboration remain a subject of controversy among authors and survivors (Ben,
1979:342-344).
40 Joseph Ben cites a part from Koretz’s testimony where his wife argues exactly: “It is true; we were extremely
unhappy when we saw how the Germans were gaining control, and we did not know what would happen. We
had no idea of what was to be, and had we known we ourselves might have escaped. We had sufficient
opportunity to do so. Immediately after the occupation, we had the chance to flee to Cairo, where the
government- in-exile was located. Kodases, the mayor of Athens at that time, phoned my husband and asked
him to go to Cairo, but my husband replied: ‘No thank you, my place is here, and I cannot consider leaving for a
moment’” (testimony of Koretz, YVA 0-3/3875 as in Ben’s (1979) “Jewish Leadership in Greece during the
Holocaust”, published in Patterns of Jewish Leadership in Nazi Europe, 1933-1945; Proceedings of the Third
Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, Jerusalem, April 1979, p340.
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There were examples in Occupied Europe in which Jewish leadership proved
sometimes effective and sometimes ineffective. We have seen the clear contrasting cases of
Athens and Thessaloniki in terms of their Jewish leadership, and other cases such as those of
Volos, Larisa and Trikala. There were similar examples in other parts of Europe. One of these
cases concerns the Jewish leadership of Adam Czerniakow in the city of Warsaw and Hayim
(Chaim) Rumkowski in the city of Lodz. Once the Polish state fell and the Germans took
over, the General Gouvernment changed the Jewish leadership and appointed new chiefs in
key cities (Friedlander, 2007:61). The case of Czerniakow is significantly different from
Rumkowski’s, for despite the fact that both men were appointed by the Nazis, the former
seems to have done everything he could to alter decisions, mobilize his community, and resist
the deportations, whereas the latter was a clear case of an “ambitious” man “whom the
Germans chose to lead the Jews of Lodz” (Friedlander, 2007:61-63). Dr Chaim Kaplan wrote
about Czerniakow that his ethos and resisting spirit to clash with the Nazis made him in fact
the “first victim of the expulsion decree” (Tushnet, 1972: 131). Confronted with everyday
terror and fear of his compatriots in the Warsaw ghetto, he could not see a way out. He ended
his life as he could no longer bear the weight of the situation: “he had refused to sign the
expulsion order, preferring to die himself rather than assist the enemy by sending others to
death” (Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, 1999:23). There was a lot of pressure from all angles,
and here Czerniakow too (like the Salonikan Rabbi) perhaps underestimated or “did not pay
attention to the rumors in the ghetto and to the serious portents concerning the ghetto’s fate”
(Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, 1999:22). However, the case of Rumkowski in Lodz is
different. The latter never initiated any resistance activity in the ghetto unlike the ghettos of
Warsaw and Vilna, for Rumkowski believed that by obeying the Germans, the Jews would
have better chances of survival (Tushnet, 1972: 64, 62). Tushnet declares in the Pavement of
Hell, that his collaboration with the Germans was so clear that not only he did not support any
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resistance activity but tried to erase any desire to resist by using “their hunger and ration
cards to break down morale”. Thus, resistance was denied and any individual activity was
severely suppressed on pain of arrest or death (Tushnet, 1972:64). The author furthermore,
provides important information concerning the situation in Lodz, arguing that the ghetto was
so isolated that the organised Polish movement could not provide any help or information to
the prisoners, in concert with the heavy anti-Semitic propaganda that was prevalent outside
the ghetto (Tushnet, 1972:64-65).
This is a significant argument for it sets new questions to many issues concerning the
enabling or disabling ground for Jewish resistance in occupied Europe. There must be a
critique on the conditions under which Jewish resistance in many cases was negated from the
part of leaders, civilians and collaborators. This “low morale” that Rumkowski spread to the
Jews in Lodz as we just saw, not only played a significant role as to the way in which the
Jews understood their chances of survival, but also these chances of survival were also
downplayed by the heavy censorship and anti-Semitic propaganda throughout Europe. To
make the argument simpler: when the whole world is against you there are few to help you;
hence the situation inside the ghettos and in the camps was not the same as elsewhere in
Europe. Smnuel Krakowski explains that a high morale was indispensable during WWII, but
not adequate when someone attempts to describe the “depressed and suppressed” conditions
of the camps or ghettos. For this morale is enough as a category when we explain moments of
“war and peace under normal circumstances”, but the ghettos were outside this frame of
discussion or normality 41 (Krakowski, [1977]-1979: 197). As he declares,
“A minimal degree of military knowledge is sufficient for understanding the
importance of the psychological element in war. A fighting spirit and a
readiness for self-sacrifice are worth many divisions, tanks, or planes. The low
41 Of course as normal a war can be.
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morale in the French army- and not the luck of supplies – was the principal
reason for the debacle of the summer of 1940. In contrast, a superior fighting
spirit made possible the victory of a tiny Greece over the Italian army in 1940;
but the fighting spirit alone cannot replace weapons and the conditions
necessary for the organisation and equipment of an army and its training.
Concepts which provide the basis for analysing events in time of war and peace
under normal circumstances are totally inadequate for the comprehension of
the Jewish ghetto during the time of the Nazi Occupation” (Krakowski, [1977]
- 1979: 197).
In other words there must be a thorough analysis concerning the conditions under
which resistance was undermined and place responsibility to those people who had the upper
hand outside the camps or ghettos. This leads us back to the Greek case. For even if the
accusations concerning the Rabbi of Salonika are indeed true (and since many Salonika Jews
questioned his role), what we see again is a systematic tendency to avoid the Greek
responsibility by emphasizing always on the other side. Roni Stauber in his introduction of
the book of essays Collaboration with the Nazis: Public Discourse after the Holocaust,
argues that the above argument portrays the poverty of the Greek society to take
responsibility over the issue of the Holocaust, the responsible Greek partners for the Jewish
deportations and why there is little attention to the memory of the Jewish events. Perhaps it
also explains the limited information the researchers have on the responsibility of the
“Christian collaboration” and why we know little on the role of the Orthodox Church in
Greek Macedonia, and why the emphasis is given only to Athens, where the escape was
successful. By paying attention only to the collaboration of the Rabbi of Salonika we fall into
the trap of discriminating them once again, accusing them for being responsible for “their
own destruction” (Stauder, 2011:11).
Indeed, the limited number of archives available to us concerning the Holocaust in
Greece especially in the period 1941-1943 testifies precisely this problematic. The General
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Archives of the State in Athens (GAK-Genika Archeia tou Kratous) for instance do not have a
single file on the Jewish Holocaust, while the research Archival Centre of Gennadius Library
has two well collected files (Files 38 and 39 in Filippos Dragoumis Collection) but only for
the period 1931-33 in Greek Macedonia.
Conclusion
This chapter aimed first to give an overall view of the Jewish community in Greece.
Particular emphasis was placed upon the changed position of the Jews into the Greek society
and the drastic socio-political side-effects of the transition from the fall of the empires to the
nation-states. By understanding these rapid European developments we also understood the
analogous nationalist trends and developments in Greece. From the fall of the Ottoman
Empire until Greece became a nation- state, the Jews lost their political, social and national
representation. Furthermore, we incorporated the Jewish participation into the Greek
resistance, and described the political mechanisms under which the Jews were either rescued
or persecuted. Concerning the latter, we can conclude that whenever the Greek authorities
wanted to rescue the Jews they did so successfully, but in other parts of the country they did
not mobilise the Jewish communities and they passively or actively approved the measures
against the Jews. At the same time we also revealed the differences of occupation zones of
Greece by looking also at the local politics of Salonika, such as the Greek collaboration with
the Nazis, the nationalist groups that prevailed in the region, the role of the local Greek
governors, and their indifference to the fate of the Jews. Further aspects that disabled Jewish
rescue have been also discussed, namely the weaknesses of Jewish Leadership in Salonika
and we viewed similarities and differences with those of Nazi-Occupied Poland. We referred
at the same time on the impact of nationalism that went hand in hand with processes of
ethnic-cleansing in particular zones of Greece, such as the Bulgarian zone. Last but not least,
we gave a first account as to the role of the Greek resistance in shaping the politics of
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Occupied Greece. Although the latter issues are discussed in chapter 5, we aimed to show so
far the political tone of the time in order to comprehend better the objectives of the following
chapters, namely to discuss and criticize the politics of collaboration. In doing so, we threw
light in a much neglected part of Greek history, which is the Jewish Holocaust by
incorporating it to the sociological examination of the European Holocaust. This
incorporation helps us to move to the next chapter and see how the Greek Jews along with
their European inmates experienced, survived and succumbed to the horrors of extermination
camps.
94
Chapter 3. The Greek Holocaust 2: Inside the Death Camps
“During the halts, no one tried anymore to communicate with the outside
world: we felt ourselves by now ‘on the other side’. There was a long halt in
open country. The train started up with extreme slowness, and the convoy
stopped for the last time, in the dead of night, in the middle of a dark silent
plain” (Levi, 1987:24).
Introduction
This chapter explores the structure and logic of the extermination camps, and the
conditions under which the Jews of Europe struggled to remain alive and perished. Particular
emphasis is placed on the experiences of the Greek Jewish community, through survivors’
stories and written memoirs. Almost the entire community of Greece was eradicated in the
concentration camps. It is a part of history during Occupied Greece which as we already
stated many times before is relatively unknown; however the voices of the victims who
survived or succumbed to death must be heard and respected. The primary objective in this
chapter is to bring together the Jewish stories of south Europe closer to the western, central
and eastern ones and understand how all prisoners struggled to preserve their dignity, hope
and will of survival. I seek to narrate the stories of Greek Jews who lived in the ghettos and
the concentration camps through a collection of works such as those of Abatzopoulou (2007),
Sevillias (1983) Salvador Kounio (1981), Menasche (1974), Tomai (2009), Matarasso (1948),
as well as primary documents that give us valuable information concerning their survival in
Auschwitz. This methodological approach is coupled with major works of Saul Friedlander
(2007), Christopher Browning (2004) and Martin Gilbert (1986) that describe the Jewish
persecution and extermination on a European and comparative level, as well as including
several European memoirs and stories of survivors such as those of Garlinski (1976), Lengyel
(1959) and Pawelczynska (1979) in order to see differences but most importantly similarities
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between the various groups and how they worked together. Moving from chapter 2 which
aimed to show the mechanisms under which the Jews experienced racial discrimination,
humiliation and absolute negation of human rights, by explaining how the transformation of
the nation-states created stateless people, as well as their participation in the resistance of
Greece, we are now shifting our focus, to view people’s experience in the camps. The first
section includes stories of Greek Jews who experienced the trains, and attempt to explain the
high percentage of Greek Jewish loss in the camps by providing a comparative approach. The
second and third part of the chapter provide narratives of survivors who witnessed the
atrocities of the camps, their first and last attempts to escape, their will to survive, and
cooperation. In doing so, I seek to include the Greek Jewish experience within the literature
of the European Holocaust.
From the Ghettos to the Trains
Deportations occurred throughout Europe. Eichmann and his Austrian colleague
Novak designed the implementation of continental transportations, with the highest number
of trains (260) leaving from Germany and Austria to the General Gouvernment and 147 from
major Hungarian cities. Numerous other transports left from the rest of Occupied Europe with
23 trains from Greece (Browning, 2004: 381-382). Analytically the trains that departed from
other major European cities were:
“87 from Holland, 76 from France, 63 from Slovakia, 27 from Belgium, 23
from Greece, 11 from Italy, 7 from Bulgaria, and 6 from Croatia – more than
707 from western and southern Europe. In the fall of 1941, therefore, Novak
was just beginning a process that was to become as routine as it was deadly”
(Browning, 2004: 382).
Alberto Menasche, a survivor from Thessaloniki remembers his terrifying days prior
to the deportations. At the end of February 1943 and on the 25th the Jews were informed that
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those who were held in the “Baron Hirsch” camp would be deported to Cracow. In this camp
many communists were held. The Rabbi of Salonika Koretz informed his fellow Jews that
there was nothing to be worried about, but soon people started to have suspicions (Menasche,
1974:13). A few days later, many Jews were transferred in the Baron Hirsch camp under
cramped conditions. 3,000 extra prisoners arrived, destined to be deported to Nazi-Occupied
Poland as well. The chief Rabbi was told by the Germans that the working class was
poisoned by the “communist virus” therefore the masses according to the Nazis had to be
“cleaned” via a forced “exodus” to the General Gouvernment (Menasche, 1974:14). In the
first day of June, Menasche remembers that he along with his compatriots had to stand
outside the wagons and were forced to embark. They were all treated like animals (Menasche,
1974:16). The trip lasted for about eight days, without food, water, or space to rest or sleep.
They were all locked in a train and the only thing that mattered was to arrive to their
destination and remain alive (ibid).
The survivor Salvador Kounio remembers that prior to their deportation from
Salonika, the community did not know how to react or what to think for this unknown trip, for
any kind of information that was reaching their ears was ambivalent, incoherent and
uncertain. They were all ordered to gather in the main square of the “Baron Hirch “camp after
hearing the sounds of the sirens and the frenzy of shootings. He and his compatriots took
nothing in this trip. The only thing they possessed was their clothes hoping it will be
sufficient to cope with the unbearable conditions of the north. Kounio declared that the Nazis
looted everything from their properties; they even confiscated their shoes (Kounio, 1981:22).
The following day, and prior to their departure, the communities stood in queues for many
hours. The journey was about to begin.
Each time the train stopped at a border, border guards demanded money or other
valuable items. The survivor Dr Nahon was in the train that left for Birkenau on 10 May 1943
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from Salonika which carried Jews from Dimotika and Orestiada (villages of Greek Thrace).
The Jews of Salonika travelled together with the Thracians and all the travellers, packed as
they were, “attended” all their needs in front of everyone. The Nazis with “sarcasm” and petty
smiles were saying: “It’s certainly obvious why they call you dirty Jews” (Nahon, 1989:33-
34). Despite cruel Nazi ironies, the deportees were extremely cooperative and very respectful
to one another. Dr Nahon was in the same overcrowded wagon when a pregnant lady was
giving birth under these unimaginable and dangerous conditions. Despite the harsh context
under which the labour took place, she managed to deliver her baby safely, however she and
her newborn child were about to be burned in the crematoria once they reached the death
camps (Nahon, 1989:35). The Athenian Jew, Errikos Sevillias summed up the feelings of his
fellow deportees:
“Now we appreciated how great these simple things were: air, a small place to
sleep, clean food, clean clothes, water. I tried to comprehend in what way I had
harmed these people who had taken away my humanity and locked me in a
freight car running endlessly into the unknown. Thoughts like these didn’t
remain long with me as I was seized by apathy as was everyone else in that
little space. We had so many immediate problems and yet we talked about the
most improbable things and everybody had something to say about his life”
(Sevillias: 1983: 17).
Percentage of Greek Jewish Loss
87% of Greek Jews perished in the concentration camps (Ikonomopoulos, 2003: 92;
Vasar, 2007:77). According to the Jewish Council of Greece, this tragic number which is one
of the highest in Europe can be explained if one takes into account some important yet quite
unexamined factors. Reasons such as the issue of Greek collaboration (i.e. quisling
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governments, administration, local nationalist and resistance42 groups), the exclusion of
Jewish communities from the Greek society, the poor access of information, collaboration of
the local authorities, as well as the weaknesses of the Jewish leadership in Salonika are
examined in chapter 2 and chapter 5.
However, we should examine the factors that led to the destruction of the Greek
Jewish community inside Auschwitz and why Greece had one of the highest percentages of
loss here. The percentage of Greek loss comes closer to the Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian
percentages. According to Philip Spencer, the Polish loss was “85 per cent”; the Latvian “89
per cent” while Lithuania lost “90 per cent” of its Jewish population when at the same time
most European countries lost “over 70 per cent” of their Jewish populations (Spencer,
2012:3). Belgium and France had one of the smallest percentages of loss with 37 % and 30%
respectively (Vasar, 2007:77).
42 As we are arguing in chapter 5, collaboration with the Germans occurred also within some sections of
resistance bands, such as EDES and EKKA (Fleischer, 2006:92). In areas for example such as Epirus, as we
have argued in chapter 2, the local authorities approved the deportations (Hondros, 1983:93-94). However, there
is no source so far that supports the argument that the periodic collaboration of EDES with the Germans had to
do with the Jewish deportations. What is evident in that region (and supported by references) is collaboration
with the Germans so as to weaken the rival resistance of EAM/ELAS. There is no source so far that suggests
that Zervas (EDES) himself approved the Jewish deportations, but only references that suggest that the local
authorities in Epirus approved the deportations. We suspect that ‘local authorities’ back in rural Epirus could
have been from the mayor to the church, from local generals to local governors and police officers and from the
milkman to the shepherd. But there is no correlation so far between the deportations and the leadership of
EDES. According to Vasar, the department of EDES in Athens did save a number of Jews (Vasar, 2007:82).
What targets Zervas per se, is when Mazower declares that his name was mentioned at the Nuremberg Trials
(Mazower, 2000:216). That alone is very important but what was mentioned about Zervas during the Nuremberg
Trials is still unknown. Concerning his explicit moves with the Germans please refer to chapter 5 particularly
the section: “Collaboration in the Resistance: The Zervas-German Liaison”.
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(Average Jewish loss per country)
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/70/Holocaustdeathtoll%25.png
One factor that determined the high percentage of Greek loss was the chronological
period the Greek Jews arrived in Birkenau. They were among the last groups that entered the
camps and the death machine of Auschwitz was running without interruptions, in contrast
with other communities of western and central Europe that arrived earlier and certain death
methods (i.e. crematoria) were yet absent. The majority of Greek Jews were deported during
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the last stage of the final solution in Birkenau (like the Yugoslav Jewry) and upon arrival the
majority (78%) were “immediately” killed (Ikonomopoulos, 2003:95). Concerning the
operation of the crematoria, it has been suggested that for some time the furnaces did not
operate until they were used again, for “after the liquidation of the Jews from Krakow,
crematorium II remained inactive until March 20, when 2,191 Greek Jews from Salonika were
gassed” (Pressac and Pelt, 1994:232).
Another decisive factor was the time of the journeys. For instance, the Jews of
Salonika travelled at least “5 days”, while other transports from other parts of Greece
travelled approximately for “7-8 days”, when “the average time for arrival at Auschwitz from
other points in Europe (Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland)
was one to three days” (Ikonomopoulos, 2003:96). The same argument is suggested by Saul
Friedlander who declares that “generally the travel from Western Europe, Italy, or even from
Germany, appears to have been less lethal than the transports within Eastern Europe or from
the Balkans to Auschwitz or Treblinka” (Friedlander, 2007:493). This factor proved catalytic
to determine the life expectancy of the prisoners inside the wagons, especially during the cold
month of March when the first Greek transport took place. The case of Jews from the Greek
islands is the most extreme on a European level, as a great number of deportees never made it
to Auschwitz. The journey from these parts of the country (i.e. south-eastern Aegean) lasted
for about twenty four days, and those who survived without food and water and made it to
Auschwitz were unable to avoid selections as all prisoners looked physically exhausted
(Ikonomopoulos, 2003:96). As the author argues,
“The Jews of Rhodes were taken off the island on July 23: they did not arrive
at Auschwitz until August 16, a journey of 24 days. Simply put, by the time the
Jews of Greece arrived at the train station at Auschwitz- Birkenau, the young
looked old beyond their years and many were too feeble to even walk, let alone
appear fit for work. As reported by eyewitness, when the Jews of Corfu arrived
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in July of 1944 and the doors to the cattlecars [sic] opened, there was dead
silence” (Ikonomopoulos, 2003:96).
Similarly Martin Gilbert writes about the experience of a Jewish prisoner Violette
Fintz who travelled from the island of Rhodes, arguing that in this almost a - month – trip,
people were dying of exhaustion and “dehydration” as food and water was barely supplied
during the stops in neighbouring islands (Gilbert, 1986:708).
“On the afternoon of July 23 the three boats set off across the eastern Aegean,
within sight of the Turkish coast. On the first night a Jew died. On the
following morning the boat stopped at a deserted little island, and two men
were allowed off with the dead man to bury him. After a second night at sea
the boats arrived at the island of Kos, where ninety-four Jews were brought on
board. The boats reached the Greek island of Leros. There, the captain, an
Austrian, refused to continue the journey unless food was brought on board.
Only after bread and water were produced did he agree to continue the voyage.
For ten days, the boats continued on their way, without any further stops. Forty
years later Violette Fintz recalled ‘the very cold, very rough seas, all the water
on top of us; we were soaking wet. Everyone was seasick’. During the journey
across the Aegean, five Jews died” (Gilbert, 1986:708).
Another decisive parameter that determined the high percentage of Jewish loss of
Greece, which of course affected all prisoners from all over Europe but mostly southerners,
was the climate. The first Salonikan Jews arrived at Birkenau in the cold month of March
1943, however not all Europeans could endure the same way the freezing conditions.
Mediterranean Jews such as the Italians and the Greeks unlike Poles or Germans (who where
better trained in the Polish climate), found it harder to adjust, and were among the first
victims to die from typhus. Many Greek survivors for instance did not “remember the sun
ever shining at Auschwitz and that even the Polish spring and summers were harsh for them”
(Ikonomopoulos, 2003:104). Similarly, Saul Friedlander declares, that the first Salonikan
Jews who arrived in Auschwitz could not endure the brutal temperatures, and upon arrival
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they carried a “typhus epidemic” that spread rapidly in the camps, making the Nazis to
“divert” the next transports from Birkenau to Sobibor (Friedlander, 2007: 486). Pawelczynska
too, writes about the inability of the Mediterranean communities to endure the weather, when
she declares that “prisoners from countries in southern Europe (e.g., Greece) could not stand
the cold, and their chances of surviving were minimal compared to prisoners whose previous
environment had endured them to such climatic conditions” (Pawelczynska, 1979: 53-54).
While Olga Lengyel remembers that once the Greek Jews arrived in the death camps, the
majority were gassed, while the remainder who survived the selections died the following
period with remarkable speed along with the Italians as they were “unable to adapt themselves
to the climate” (Lengyel, 1957:81). As the survivor declared: “Indeed the Greeks and the
Italians, probably because they were most poorly nourished before they came, bore up the
poorest under the cold and the privations” (ibid).
SS Dieter Wisliceny testified in 1946 at the Nuremberg Trials, that the majority of
Jews from Greece were immediately annihilated upon arrival for they were unable to work.
During the hearing the Judge Lt. Col. Brookhart asked him:
B: “In connection with the Jews about whom you have personal knowledge,
how many were subjected to the final solution, that is, to be killed?”
W: “The exact number is extremely hard for me to determine. I have only one
basis for a possible estimate, that is a conversation between Eichmann and
Hoess in Vienna, in which he said that only a very few of those sent from
Greece to Auschwitz had been fit for work. Of the Slovakian and Hungarian
Jews about 20 to 30 percent had been able to work. It is very hard for me to
give a reliable total”. 43
43 Complete Testimony of Dieter Wisliceny, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 4, Twenty-Sixth Day,
Thursday 3 January 1946, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/01-03-46.asp
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Last but not least, one could argue that the percentage of Jewish loss in Greece was
also affected by the high percentage of Greek prisoners who worked as Sonderkommando.
Like all Jews of Europe, every time a train arrived in Auschwitz, a number of prisoners were
immediately selected to perform this macabre task, but a greater number of Greek Jews was
chosen in relation to their percentage and compared to other communities (Ikonomopoulos,
2003:104-105). As Ikonomopoulos suggests:
“Greek-Jewish men were chosen disproportionally to their percentage in the
camp population. Many had worked as hamales [sic] at the ports (especially in
Salonika and Corfu) and were able to withstand the heavy physical labor
involved [...] Therefore, young able-bodied Greek-Jewish men, who otherwise
could have possibly withstood the hard-ships of the camp, were systematically
exterminated. Among the last group of Sonderkommando (involved in the
uprising at Auschwitz in October of 1944 known as the Revolt of the
Sonderkommando) some survived to tell the gruesome story of their ordeal”
(Ikonomopoulos, 2003:105).
Of course one should note here, that the number of Greek Jews that was immediately
selected upon arrival either as Sonderkommando or to be murdered in the gas chambers was
purely a contingent number for the Nazis. For as we already mentioned, the Jews of Greece
like the Jews of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were the last groups to arrive in the death camps,
therefore their selection coincided with the last stage of the Final Solution and had minimum
chances of survival as all methods of extermination were in full operation as we already
mentioned. By summarizing all the aforementioned factors, namely, the period they arrived in
the camps (that coincided with the full efficiency of all the death methods), the long distance
of the journey, the climatic component, the high percentage of Greek Jews who worked as
Sonderkommando, one can suggest that all these parameters though by no means exclusive,
pushed the percentage of Greek Jewish loss even higher. Approximately 55,000 Greek Jews
were sent to Auschwitz and 42,509 (approximately 80%) were immediately murdered, while
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the remaining 12,987 who worked as forced labourers only 2,000 remained alive, thus “over
85% of Greek Jewry would succumb to the hardships of the camp compared to 70% of Jews
from other countries” (Ikonomopoulos, 2003:105).
However, we should note here, that we are comparing percentages of human loss and
not actual numbers, and certainly we do not take into account the actual population size of
each country. If we compare the number of Polish prisoners for instance with the number of
Greek prisoners, one will evidently find an impressive gap, as more than 3 million Polish
Jews perished in the camps out of 6 million Polish citizens who died throughout Nazi-
Occupied Poland, excluding the remaining 3 million Jewish prisoners from the rest of Europe
(Gilbert, 2000:746). The comparison between Greece and Nazi- Occupied Poland is provided
to the reader to show that the number of Polish Jews in the camps of the General
Gouvernment sometimes outnumbered even the total Jewish population of other European
cities. As Christopher Browning suggests:
“The Warsaw ghetto contained more Jews than all of France; The Lodz ghetto
more Jews than all of the Netherlands. More Jews lived in the city of Cracow
than in all of Italy, and virtually any medium – sized town in Poland had a
larger Jewish population than all of Scandinavia. All of south – east Europe-
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece- had fewer Jews than the
original four districts of the General Government” (Browning,2004:194).
However, the above argument does not aim to minimize the importance of loss of
other Jewish communities which were smaller, for the terrifying number of 6 million
murdered Polish citizens (Jews and non-Jews) was approximately the total number of Greek
population during the 40s (around 6 million), thus the percentage of Jewish loss in Greece is
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equally significant for a small country of the time.44 Analytically, there were cities in Greece
that the Jewish loss reached almost 100%, such as the cities that were under Bulgarian and
Nazi Occupation (i.e. peripheries of Greek Macedonia and Thrace). The Thracian cities such
as Serres and Xanthi saw 99% loss, in Kavala, Orestiada and Souflion was 98%, in
Alexandroupolis and Drama was 97%, while the city of Thessaloniki that was under Nazi
control lost 96% of its Jewish population (Vasar, 2007:79). According to Vasar, there is an
evident “geographic” topography of the Jewish loss in Greece. As we already discussed in
chapter 2, the cities under Italian Occupation (until 1943) in concert with a larger resistance
activity in the aforementioned zone, saw a smaller percentage of Jewish loss. These examples
include Athens that had less than 40-50% loss, while the “smallest percentage” of Jewish loss
can be found in the periphery of Thessaly and in the cities of Volos (26%), Trikala (31%),
Larisa (35%), while “the small community of Karditsa was saved in its entirety, as its
members escaped in the nearby villages, where they found protection from the residents”
(Vasar, 2007:81-82).
The Death camps
After mapping and sketching the death toll of the Jewish community of Greece inside
and outside the camps in relation to other European communities, we need to see the
experiences of the prisoners inside the death camps. First of all the Nazi Ideology was
epitomized with the implementation of the camps. The system of terror was designed not only
to “suppress” anything that went against the totalitarian doctrine but to “educate SS men in
the spirit of the National-Socialist ideology” (Weiss, 1984:117). This occurred prior to the
beginning of the war around Europe, and after its introduction, the terror gained rationality,
structure and purpose. The Nazis created camps based on ethnicity, class and political
44 Mazower declares that the total population of Greece until the period in question was “just over six million”
including the one and half million Greek refugees of Asia Minor (Mazower, 2001:103). Until the end of WWII
Greece would lose 10% of its population; approximately a million citizens.
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conviction. The prisoners were detached from one another, as there were camps only for
Poles, for prisoners of war, for hostages, camps for labor, concentration camps, and of course
the extermination camps (Weiss, 1984:121-126). The first prisoners who arrived in the camps
were the Poles. Garlinski declares that the “Poles, apart from being the most numerous,
differed from the others in that on the whole they were a compact group” and yet surrounded
by people of “at least thirty nations” (Garlinski, 1976:170). The prisoners went through
painful experimental programs, such as sterilization, narcotic use, organ removals and
euthanasia (Lifton, 1984: 218-223). The most horrible experiments took place in the
extermination camps using deadly chemicals. The gas chambers and crematoria signified the
last stage of the final solution. The first victims were “600 Soviet prisoners of war” while in
1943 the Nazis created a new series of crematoria aiming to kill thousands of Jewish prisoners
from all around Europe (Piper, 1994:157-159). From 1943, five separate crematoria
functioned along with the gas chambers. Jewish prisoners were selected to perform the
macabre task of transferring the bodies from the gas chambers to the furnaces (Piper,
1994:164). The death methods were in full operation all day. Suffocation inside the gas
chambers was taking place at night and in the morning the Sonderkommando were empting
the spaces. The Nazis dictated the Sonderkommando to open the gas chambers at least thirty
minutes after the victims inhaled the poisonous gas so as “to ensure there were no survivors”
(Piper, 1994:163). Piper graphically wrote that:
“About a half hour after the induction of the gas, the ventilation was turned on,
the door was opened, and Sonderkommando prisoners wearing gas masks
began dragging the corpses out of the chamber. In cases of great congestion,
many of the dead were found half-squatting, their skin colored pink with
occasional red or green spots. Some foamed at the mouth, others bled from the
ears. In the gas chamber’s anteroom, the bodies were relieved of spectacles and
artificial limbs, and the women’s hair was cut off. Thereupon the corpses were
loaded on the elevator platform and lifted to the ground floor. Some of the
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corpses were dragged directly to the oven area. Others were moved to the
corpse storage room opposite the elevator, which also served as a site of
executions by shooting. Just before incineration, Sonderkommando prisoners
removed jewellery, which they tossed into a special numbered crate” (Piper,
1994:170-171).
The Nazi ferocity aimed first and by 1943 to cremate 4,756 bodies per day in all five
crematoria, while later the SS maximized the “capacity” of the furnaces, aiming at cremating
three bodies per oven in less than twenty minutes; “as a result, the capacity of the crematoria
almost doubled, reaching about 8,000 bodies in 24 hours” (Piper, 1994:165-166). Outside the
structure of death, the SS designed a system of hierarchy among the prisoners in order to
divide them, and discourage cooperation by exposing their political, social, and national
differences. In this social ladder destined to fit the Nazi model, Jewish prisoners “no matter
their nationality, were at the bottom”, while “Slavs toward the bottom, Russians below the
Slavs” while the German prisoners were always “at the top” (Czech, 1994:364). Further
divisions were based on their political convictions, their mental well - being, their nationality
and their “criminal record” as a different colour of triangle aimed at stigmatizing each
prisoner individually (ibid). Last but not least all prisoners now had different and multiple
tasks. Apart from the presence of Sonderkommando at Birkenau, thousands of prisoners
worked as police enforcers (Kapos), as clerks, women as Canada Commandos who were
responsible for collecting valuable items, the skeleton bodies or else the “human shadows”,
labourers, medical doctors, cooks, and musicians (Czech, 1994:368-370).
After giving an overall description of the death camps and how the groups worked
together, we are now passing on the experiences of Greek Jews and read a few of their stories
inside the death camps. What happened once the Greek Jews arrived in Auschwitz? The
survivor Dr Nahon witnessed the following:
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“When they arrived at Auschwitz, 85 percent of them were immediately gassed
and cremated. Thus, of the approximately fifty-five thousand who were
deported, about forty-two thousand never even knew that they had not reached
the Kingdom of Krakovia, where the new Jewish reserve was supposedly
located. Of the 12,757 selected for labour upon arrival, fewer than 2,000
returned to Greece after the war. Greek Jews were to be found in many camps,
where they worked and died alongside the Ashkenazi Jews, with whom they
could not generally communicate. Among the Greek Jews, men and women
alike were subjected to medical experiments at Auschwitz, Majdanek, and
other camps...One of the early published memoirs from Auschwitz, Olga
Lengyel’s Five Chimneys, praised the bravery of some four hundred young
Greek Jews who refused to serve in the crematoria Sonderkommando even
under the threat of death. They were immediately killed. During the Warsaw
Uprising of August 1944, hundreds, if not thousands, of Greek Jews who had
since September 1943 been transported to the ruins of the ghetto to recycle its
debris and treasures were able to join forces with the beleaguered Polish forces.
These Greek Jews died as free men. And the following month, during the
revolt of the crematorium Sonderkommando in Auschwitz, most of the Greek
contingent chose to die fighting rather than to be sent to the gas chamber, as
obsolete commandos normally were” (Nahon, 1989:12-13).
Berry Nahmia, a woman from Salonika remembers her suffering and feelings of terror
when she and her compatriots entered the gates of Birkenau, as all stood in lines under the
Nazi arms. She saw many fellow Jews who were already working as forced labourers, but she
could not believe the transformation of their bodies: “they looked like weird beings. They did
not look like humans” (Abatzopoulou, 2007: 151). She confronted skinny female and male
bodies with destroyed clothes and no hair, tired and dislocated faces in a place which was
“lonely” and with no destination. In this barbaric environment, surrealism and irrationality co-
existed as she viewed on the one hand the fires emerging from the chimneys, and on the other
heard the music of the forced labourers ordered to entertain the SS (Abatzopoulou, 2007:151-
152). Olga Lengyel, remembers a Greek girl who looked seriously ill, anorexic, and
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dislocated. She did not speak at all and could not move either. When they brought her in the
camp hospital nobody knew what was going on, only when the medical prisoners realised she
was “mentally ill” and that she was in the wrong department (Legyel, 1957:76-77). Olga
Lengyel remembered that,
“She sat nearly all the time, initiating the precision-like gestures of a spinning-
mill worker. From time to time, as if worn out by her work, she lost
consciousness. Nor could she be revived for an hour or two. Then she shook
her head, opened her eyes, and threw her arms up, as though to shield her head
from a beating. A day later we found her dead. During the night she had
emptied her straw mattress to ‘spin’ the straw. She had also torn her blouse into
tiny shreds to make more raw material for her imaginary spindle. I have seen
many dead, but few faces upset me as much as that of the young Greek girl.
She had probably been employed somewhere as a forced labourer in a spinning
mill. Her efforts had brought her nothing but beatings. She succumbed, and the
desperate animal fear had finally destroyed the equilibrium of her mind”
(Legyel, 1957:77).
The women in the camps were tortured every morning with terroristic warnings and
physical abuse. They were forced to swallow pills in order to stop their hormones, while they
were dictated to perform hard male duties such as carrying “heavy rocks” in long distances for
no reason at all. The Nazis who supervised these physical drills were humiliating the women
by laughing and “clapping”. The Greek Jewish survivor Berry Nahmia, who revealed her
horror in the camps, argued that she and her friend Dora were struggling not to lose their
sanity and the one tried to comfort the other. But most of the time it was extremely difficult to
preserve their rationality, for thoughts of escaping this barbaric and “primitive” situation was
limited. They were witnessing unprecedented scenes of murder every day. Both women for
instance became eye witness of a raw murder such as when the Nazis killed newborn babies
by drowning them in “boiling water” or in a “pile of excrement” (Abatzopoulou, 2007: 154-
156).
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The women and children were the most tragic crowds. The former were subjected not
only to physical drills, but were constantly harassed, beaten, and sexually abused. After the
implementation of “women’s penal squat” in 1942, the SS sought to suppress any female
desire to escape or revolt. With this act many courageous French Jewish women died as
ninety of them attempted to escape (Strzelecka, 1994:406-407). On the other hand, the case of
children is even more tragic as the majority were immediately gassed upon arrival along with
pregnant women. There are no complete records available to determine how many children
throughout Europe perished in the camps (Kubica, 1994: 412-414). However in some
countries such as France the picture is clearer, for among the 71 trains that reached the death
camps between 1941 and 1944, some 9,820 children registered. In Belgium it is estimated that
around 4,654 children were deported, 2,500 from Germany, 4,300 from Holland, 1,040 from
Czechoslovakia, 12,000 children from Greece were all gassed immediately once they reached
destination along with the “80 percent” of the Greek Jewry, while in Italy the few and
disperse documents that are available can only estimate that 296 children were deported.
There is no clear picture concerning the children of Nazi-Occupied Poland and Hungary, as
all documents have been destroyed, but there is no doubt that these countries had the highest
percentage of registered children given the high number of Polish and Hungarian prisoners.
Furthermore, in former Yugoslavia, the few available records indicate that possibly 63
children registered and only 12 survived to see the end of the war, while from the Gypsy
community 6,000 children registered, 363 of which “were born in the camp” (Kubica,1994:
414-416, 418). According to Kubica, most new-born babies from all over Europe were
immediately gassed, while older children and teenagers not only suffered from severe
illnesses due to malnutrition but were subjected to unimaginable experiments, such as
invasive procedures in the eyes causing permanent damage or “complete loss of sight”,
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castration, sterilization, and deadly heart damage caused by “phenol injections” that attacked
instantly the myocardium (Kubica, 1994:423-424).
It is difficult to conceptualise these events and it is extremely difficult to comprehend
that this kind barbarism was possible. On the issue of incomprehensibility, Hannah Arendt in
the Origins of Totalitarianism, declared that what is actually “difficult” to conceptualise is not
so much the systematic organisation of death through the use of most sadistic and bestial
deeds accepting them as “a normal measure”, but the fact that no one outside had any idea
what was going inside the concentration camps. Such a reality, gave impetus to create a sort
of secret mystery behind bestiality and everything that was occurring in Auschwitz was
considered as an “absurd dream”, a “reality” that was more than real and yet secret (Arendt,
1968: 445-446). On these grounds all the prisoners in the death camps including the Jews
from Greece, were experiencing torture and punishment in total secrecy, creating a world of
ghosts and as Arendt would put it, a “world of perverse, malignant fantasies” (Arendt,
1968:445). As Arendt declares,
“It is not so much the barbed wire as the skilfully manufactured unreality of
those whom it fences in that it provokes such enormous cruelties and ultimately
makes extermination look like a perfectly human measure. Everything that was
done in the camps is known to us from the world of perverse, malignant
fantasies. The difficult thing to understand is that, like such fantasies, these
gruesome crimes took place in a phantom world, which however, has
materialised, as it were, into a world which is complete with all sensual data of
reality but lacks that structure of consequence and responsibility without which
reality remains for us a mass of incomprehensible data. The result is that a
place has been established where men can be tortured and slaughtered, and yet
neither the tormentors nor the tormented, and least all the outsider, can be
aware that what is happening is anything more than a cruel game or an absurd
dream” (Arendt, 1968: 445-446).
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Arendt captures this unrealism of the real in the camps, and it is reflected in the style
and tone of Jewish memoirs. The Athenian Jew Sevillias as well speaks of this reality which
became a routine to all prisoners. A routine, for being alive – this or that day- was a matter of
contingency and a pure luck. In Athens- Auschwitz, he considered himself lucky as he
survived “three selections”. However, he and his fellow inmates were living in constant
mental panic, as they feared they would be in the next round of victims who would end up in
the furnaces (Sevillias, 1983:46). However, as the process of selection continued and new
prisoners came from all parts of Europe, he was always desperate and anxious to hear news
from fellow Greeks concerning his family in Athens. In one of the trains that arrived,
Athenian Jews informed him that his wife, child and parents “were safe in Christian homes”
(Sevillias, 1983:48).
Like many communities in the camps, a number of survivors such as Olga Lengyel
remember the courage and unity of the small community of Greece (Lengyel, 1959:123). The
same issue has been also explained by other authors such as Fleming, who argue that this
unity may have resulted from the exclusion they experienced in Greece. Despite serving in the
Greco-Italian War and later in the partisan war against the Nazis, they were still deprived and
discriminated by certain sections of the Greek Society, who refused not only their Jewish but
their Greek identity. Although in the 20s and 30s the Jewish community of Greece for the first
time gained full Greek citizenship (during the formation of the Greek State), however it was
in the camps that they could really and freely exhibit it for the first time (Fleming, 2007:19).
Sephardic Jews of Salonika although in Greece for four centuries, they really struggled to
convince the Christian society that they were also Greek. They felt discrimination in their
city, and far away from the Romaniote Jews of Athens. When Greek Macedonia and Greek
Thrace alike were incorporated to Greece in 1913, the communities from these two regions
came closer to the Romaniote Jews of the south, as all tried to hide and escape in the Italian
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controlled zone. This sense of unity came into shape in Auschwitz, as now for the first time
they felt they were all from Greece, since a number of people in their own country questioned
their identity. Inside the death camps, the tragic truth was that the Greek Jew felt more “Greek
than he had ever been in Greece” and yet different from the customs and habits of Ashkenazi
Jews that characterised the “majority” of European Jews (Fleming, 2007:36). This cultural
differentiation was present in all communities, and here Friedlander compares the Jewish
communities of Eastern and Western Europe. He argues that the Sephardic Jewry was a tiny
community compared to the Western Ashkenazi, and they were mainly located in Greece, as
well as in areas within Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (Friedlander, 2007:6).
Despite differences among the groups, year after year the prisoners attempted
successfully to overcome them. This successful attempt was epitomised in the birth of the
underground movement in the concentration camps. Garlinski declared that “naturally at the
beginning people of the same nationality, speaking the same language, got together; but later,
as time passed, these differences lessened, and when men began to trust each other the closest
ties were between those of similar character and attitude” (Garlinski, 1975: 253). This is a
very important aspect in the nature of the camps, for it shows how all prisoners gradually and
irrespective of their class, nationality and cultural background began to relate to one another
in order to form a common goal, namely to built a resistance front. The latter attempted and
even bypassed political rivalries sometimes between the left-wing and right- wing groups in
the barracks. Unity of this kind proved catalytic to assist the other, provide food for the most
needed, as well as leaking information to the outside world as to the condition of their
existence, bringing for the first time optimism in “the darkest of days” (Garlinski, 1975:252-
254).
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The Participation of Greek Jews in the Crematorium IV rebellion
Outside the organised resistance movement in the camps, there were numerous
attempts to organise spontaneous uprisings. The revolt of 7 October 1944 is considered as the
only recorded rebellious act in the history of Auschwitz, consisting of Greeks, Polish, French
and Hungarians. The Greek participation in the resistance in the crematoria however remains
largely unknown (Bowman, 1986: 53). The Greek literature includes testimonies of the Greek
Jewry in the camps who testify their active participation (see Kounio, 1981:351-353; Tomai,
2009:149-159; Menasch, 1974; Kouzinopoulos, 2005:139-146). It is estimated that “135 out
of 400” Greeks took part in the rebellious act (Bowman, 1986: 53). Greek scholarship speaks
of a collective effort to organise a rebellious act and in that effort Greeks were also included,
whereas Polish scholarship speaks of a Polish revolt. For example Anna Pawelczynska does
not mention any other group taking part in the revolt apart from Poles, though she leaves
some room open that others might have taken part, when she declares that “the decisive role
in the resistance movement at Auschwitz was played by Poles” given that they were the
majority, that “Auschwitz was situated on Polish territory”, thus these prisoners had the best
connections (Pawelczynska, 1979:113-114). Another similar example is Halvini’s article
“The Birkenau Revolt: Poles Prevent a Timely Insurrection”, where the author describes only
the Polish participation, and yet only in a short footnote at the end of her work argues that the
Greek assistance cannot be disputed since survivors verify it, but she does not discuss their
participation and denies that two Greek prisoners were the leading figures of the revolt
(Halvini, 1979:153).
“In an account with numerous mistakes, Issak Kabeli lists the Greek Jews,
Former Colonel Yosef Baruch and Yom Tom Yakoel as leaders of the
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conspiracy. The participation of Greek Jews is corroborated by survivors, not
the particular names, however” (Halvini, 1979:153).
However, there are other European Jews who also speak of a collective effort in the
rebellion between Hungarian and Greek prisoners. Filip Müller, a Slovakian Jew who
survived Auschwitz argued that the Sonderkommando selected by the Kapos “were mainly
Hungarian and Greek Jews”. These prisoners were responsible not only for the organisation of
the revolt but for mobilizing the rest of the camp, however, the organised Polish resistance did
not respond to their call (Müller, 1979:154). He further wrote that:
“...some of these selected prisoners contacted our Resistance leaders and
declared that not one of the 300 was prepared to let himself be slaughtered
without resistance. They thought the time for the planned rebellion was now
and requested the entire Sonderkommando to throw in their lot with them, and
to do so whether or not the rest of the camps were to join in. They went on to
say that they were determined to go it alone if nobody was prepared to support
them. [...] Their answer was waiting for them when they returned to fetch the
evening meal. Any uprising, the message went, was to be avoided at all costs
because it might have disastrous consequences for the whole camp. In turn our
Resistance leaders explained the situation to the men on the selection list,
namely, that we all appreciated their position but could not participate in any
violent measure and that the Resistance in the camp shared this view” (Müller,
1979: 154-155).
Historians also discuss the Greek participation in the crematorium rebellion. Martin
Gilbert in The Holocaust: The History of the Jews of Europe during the Second World War,
declares that “more than three hundred Greek Jews were among the Sonderkommando
preparing for revolt, among them Errera de Larissa, a former lieutenant in the Greek army”
(Gilbert, 1986:743). Alberto Errera (known as “Alex”) not only did actively participate in the
revolt, but took pictures from the scenes that survived and now are exhibited in the Yad
Vashem Museum in Israel (Chare, 2011:144; Stone, 2001: 134-136; see next page the
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pictures of Alex Errera). The names of the 59 Greek Jews who survived and took part in the
revolt were published by the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Photini Tomai’s book
Greeks in Auschwitz – Birkenau (Tomai, 2009: 152-153).45
45 The names of Jews that are published are: Maurice Aron, Baruch Baruch, Issac Barouch, Joseph Barouch,
Aaron Barzilai, Matys Bitali, Jacob Broudo, Henri Nehama Capon, Leon Cohen, Raoul Djahon, Alberto Moiss
Errera, Dario Gabai, Albert Gani, Joseph Gani, Moise Gani, Pepo Gani, Albert Jachon, Haim Cohen, Joseph
Levy, Samuel Levi, Sabetay Levis, Mois Levy, Michael Matsas,, Elia Mazza, Menasche, Mechoulam Eliezer,
Abroum Meli, Haim Misan, Moissis Misan, Albertos Misrachi, Mois Misrahis, Moissis Negrin, Dani Marc
Nachmias, Yossif Namer, Marcel Nadjary, Eugen Nakamoulis, David Persiadis, Salomone Pinhas, Issac Samuel
Rousso, Erikos Sevillias, Selomo brothers, Moissis Serris, Samuel Sidis, Issac Soussis, Jacques Soussis, Moissis
Sabetai, Giosepos Sabas, Pesos Sabas, Savas Sabetai, Albert Salvado, Alberto Tzachon, Joseph Varouch, Hugo
Barouch Venezia, Issak Venezia, Mois Venezia, Salomone Venezia, Menahem Zakar, Yozef Zakar (Tomai,
2009:152-153).
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All three macabre pictures were captured by the Greek Jew Alberto “Alex” Errera
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Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderkommando
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Despite the differences between opinions concerning the revolt in Birkenau, we do
not wish to dispute any side, since on the one hand the Greek scholarship speaks of a
collective effort as we already stated, and on the other, the organised Polish underground
movement was massive and well known inside and outside the death camps. Anna
Pawelczynska attempts to bridge this gap arguing that:
“It is very hard to draw the line between the spontaneous and the organised
resistance movement in Auschwitz, even for those who belonged to the
conspiratorial organisation. For a member at the lowest level in one of the
camp organisations, it was hard to say on whose behalf he was carrying out his
particular instructions. Memory and the very fragmentary documents distort
these past events. Doubtless, they will never enable all the phenomena of
conspiratorial work in the camp to be established with complete precision,
much less the phenomena of spontaneous resistance among people loyally
working together in response to specific situations” (Pawelczynska 1979:114-
115).
However, Fleming declares that some communities were never heard. The only Greek
voice during the trial of Eichmann for example was Itzchak Nehama, who was speaking
“only of his hometown, Salonika” and was the only person representing the entire Sephardic
community of Europe, excluding the Romaniot community of south Greece where no
survivor or representative testified. Similarly, other Jewish survivors from countries such as
Bulgaria and North Africa never testified what they witnessed in their own country (Fleming,
2007:35). But then again, this absence portrays another problematic, namely the overall
silence of Greek Jewish experience in the European literature, the popular media, and
documentaries in Western Europe. It was only after the effort of a small number of Greek
survivors who started to write about their experience in Israel after the 80s, that their presence
started to become visible, since as the son of a survivor noted once: “there weren’t many
articles or stories about the Jews of Greece” (Fleming, 2007: 33).
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Moreover, and apart from the successful rebellion which took place in the crematoria,
there were other moments as well where the Greek Jews tried to resist. Some of the Jews
from Corfu for instance in the summer of 1944, refused to kill their fellow inmates as they
were selected as forced labourers in the crematoria. For their refusal to perform these actions
they were executed (Tomai, 2009:149). Another example concerns the Greek Jew, Joseph
Barouch, who was working in the crematoria in July 1944. While transferring the bodies to
the furnaces, he recognised his own parents. He was possessed by such sorrow that he started
organising a rescue plan despite having no means to resist. He along with Jews from Greece,
France, Hungary and Nazi-Occupied Poland were about to revolt in August 15th,
unfortunately though, their plan was changed, for new Polish prisoners arrived in the camps
that day, and many SS officials were present upon their arrival, and any attempt of uprising
was extremely difficult (Tomai, 2009:154-155).
Before exploring the participation of the Greek Jews in the uprising, it is wise to
understand the difficulties of resisting in Auschwitz, not only because the punishment for
revolt was death, but because the mental and physical “exhaustion” of the prisoners made
resistance difficult. The Nazis were selecting Jews to burn their own fellows, epitomizing the
most “humiliating” and destructive means of Nazi ferocity. The Jews who worked as
Sonderkommando and after fulfilling the macabre tasks, they were dictated to be thrown to
the ovens as well in order to keep this destructive method in total secrecy (Tomai, 2009:150).
Despite oppression and suppression, a number of Jews were about to give a counterattack.
Some prisoners by singing Greek songs and by changing the lyrics were giving valuable
information to other prisoners regarding the existence of the crematoria. They were passing
information to the women of “Kanada Kommando”; lay next to crematorium IV (Tomai,
2009:150).
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Salvador Kounio remembers that in September 1944, the total number of the Jews
working as Sonderkommando was approximately 630. However from this number, 200 were
selected and were informed to another camp (“Gleiwitz”) outside Auschwitz. The prisoners
were deceived, for the Nazi guards forced them to enter the gas chambers. Many prisoners
identified members of Sonderkommando while being transferred to the furnaces and all
understood what the future awaited them (Kounio, 1981: 350-351). The prisoners decided to
take action. According to Tomai, a Greek Jew from Larissa, Alberto (Alex) Errera, was one
of the leading figures of the uprising. With two more Greek fellows they were responsible for
throwing the remaining ashes of the ovens in the river Vistula nearby. Errera and while on
duty, attacked two SS guards with “his spade” and killed them, and although he received a
bullet in his head, he escaped by hiding in the forest (Tomai, 2009: 155).
Errikos Sevillias remembers the above event quite vividly, arguing that the Nazis
were outraged when they found out that two SS guards were killed and that Errerra was still
in the woods hiding until the next day. Sevillias remembered the sirens and the barking of
dogs the next morning when the guards found him. Unfortunately Errera could not go further.
He was beaten “without mercy” and the Nazis killed him along with other prisoners who tried
to escape too. Although he accepted “full responsibility” to save his fellow inmates, none of
them survived as they were burned in the furnaces (Sevillias, 1983: 41-42). However,
Erreras’s brave stance was about to be discussed and remembered for a very long time.
Sevillias wrote that “if someone wanted to escape, he first had to decide to sacrifice his life,
and then make the attempt” (Sevillias, 1983:42).
The most organised form of resistance occurred a few days later on the 7th. There was
a new selection that day in the division of “Sonderkommando” consisting 200 prisoners from
Greece and Hungary. When the guards started to call their names, no Greek responded.
According to Photini Tomai, someone “possibly Josef Varouch” said loudly and in “Greek”:
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“Will we make our attack, or not?” (Tomai, 2009: 158). The name Varouch was also verified
by Kouzinopoulos, arguing that he was determined to take action despite efforts from fellow
prisoners to warn him that they could be killed. Varouch could not stand watching the
crematoria and he could not accept that his father and mother were burned in such a bestial
way (Kouzinopoulos, 2005:144).46 Therefore, the prisoners attacked once again the SS guards
but this time inside the Crematorium III. Equipped with some weapons they tried to take
action and “signalled” to their fellow prisoners to join, but they were late in responding their
call, while the prisoners of the second crematorium received the call on time and they
attacked on more SS guard and successfully blew up the crematorium IV with dynamite that
was supplied by women who worked in the “Kanada Kommando” (Tomai, 2009:158-159). It
has been witnessed that,
“Only the crematorium II commando division responded instinctively to the
sounds of the shootings. The chief of the kapos – ‘a beastly criminal”, as the
survivors remembered him- and an SS soldier that served that shift were thrown,
alive, into the ovens. Another soldier was beaten to death. In a short period of
time, however, a large military squad, complete with dogs and machine-guns,
had enriched the building, and a heroic but desperate and uneven battle began.
The inmates tried cutting the barbed wirers in order to move the uprising to the
central camp. However, realising quickly that this was a doomed effort, the
inmates blew up Crematorium IV with dynamite, and tried escaping into the
nearby woods. Most fell heroically under the fire of machine-guns, while the
rest, who eventually surrendered, were executed on the spot. Among them were
Mois Aaron, Iakov (Viko) Broudo, Isaak Barouch (part of Crematorium IV), and
Sam Karasso” (Tomai, 2009: 158-159).
The whole area around the crematoria resembled scenes from the apocalypse as there
were fires coming out of the explosions. They were dead bodies everywhere and few
prisoners survived. It is estimated that around 100 prisoners survived, while the four women
46 See more on the Jewish revolt in Kouzinopoulos (2005) especially in pages 139-146.
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of “Kanada Kommando” who supplied the rebels with explosives were arrested and
imprisoned “for betrayal” for several weeks. They were brutally abused and tortured, and
after their release they were hanged in front of the rest of the prisoners (Kouzinopoulos,
2005: 145-146). The women who were sent to the gallows was the only “reported” case in
Auschwitz, for usually the “Germans did not hang women” (Tomai, 2009:159). By
estimating the casualties of the revolt, around “450 prisoners” were killed, out of which
“200” were executed by the Germans, while “only 26 Greeks had survived” the Nazi brutality
(ibid).
As we stated earlier, the revolt in the crematoria was significant for resistance as such
under physical and emotional pain was difficult. Fotini Abatzopoulou in this respect argues
that since the prisoners in the camps did not share the same language, culture or habits, could
not communicate well in order to form a common goal or sustain a strong sense of “identity”
(Abatzopoulou, 2007:20). She argues that prisoners who have a strong level of “solidarity”, a
sense of identity within a community, and who are politically active happen to be in a more
“privileged position” than other prisoners, as the former characteristics make them stronger
and the feelings of survival more attainable. In the same line of thought, Abatzopoulou
declares that the Greek Jews stood really close to one another as many testimonies reveal,
keeping the spirit of survival alive (Abatzopoulou, 2007:21). Primo Levi in Survival in
Auschwitz echoes Abatzopoulou’s thought concerning the unity, integration and solidarity of
the Greek Jewry in the concentration camps, and how they helped one another so as to keep
the spirit of survival alive (Levi, 1996:73).
However, the political element alone cannot explain or determine necessarily the
relationship between the sense of unity, assistance and survival. According to Gutman, the
political element for instance among the “political criminals” served indeed as a means to
assist the weaker, older, younger and in general more fragile prisoners as well as coping with
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the “years of hardships and suffering” (Gutman, 1984:166). Yet the previous argument
cannot serve as a general theory for all political prisoners in the same way that not all
“criminal” prisoners were immune to assistance (ibid). For, other authors like Eugen Kogon,
may well suggest the opposite concerning the political prisoner; namely, that some sections
of communist prisoners were often reluctant to collaborate with prisoners who did not share
the same political convictions, despite the fact that the author acknowledges their
indispensable contribution in the camps (Kogon, 1950:231-232). Kogon declared that:
“The positive achievement of the Communists on behalf of the concentration-
camp prisoners can hardly be overrated. In many cases the whole camp literally
owed them its life, even though their motives seldom sprang from pure
altruism but rather from the collective instinct for self-preservation in which
the whole camp joined because of its positive results” (Kogon, 1950:232).
Despite the importance of the political element, that alone cannot determine the
reasons why the “spontaneous” revolt in the crematoria took place either. There are
alternative reasons that enabled this uprising. Yisrael Gutman declares that the
Sonderkommando “knew their days were numbered” and after they failed to agree with the
organised resistance, they “decided to revolt alone in October 1944” by paying with their lives
(Gutman, 1984:175-176). However, there were other numerous attempts to revolt. These
attempts many times failed not only because it was difficult to revolt without weapons ( as we
already suggested) but as Garlinski remembers, the Nazis “increased” their methods of
“terror” as the war progressed, as they were winning ground in Occupied Europe, and as the
prisoners themselves systematically tried to escape. In every individual or collective attempt
to escape there was severe punishment from the part of the Nazis, systematic processes of
“retaliation”, as well as leaving many prisoners to starve by setting paradigmatic examples to
the rest of the camp (Garlinski, 1976: 67-68). Furthermore, the conditions under which either
a revolt or a planned escape took place were incredibly difficult. Here, we are not talking
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about any kind of escape plan (like an organised plan in the mountains of an occupied
European territory, though that alone was extremely dangerous given the multiple risks), but
inside the camps, the prisoners had to pass “high-voltage barbed-wire fences”, numerous
towers, fences and guards every “fifty” meters (Kulka, 1984:402). Not to mention, that the
prisoners (and once successfully out of the camps) had to bypass a new set of guards who
were situated “between the rivers Sola and Vistula” (Kulka, 1984:403).
But the everyday will to survive among all prisoners was in itself a form of resistance
whether someone was a member of the organised movement, of an unorganised group or
whether someone was acting on his or her own. According to Pawelczynska, one’s ability to
resist the everyday brutality of the camps was in itself a form of resistance, as the latter “was
expressed in the constant effort to maintain inner freedom while outwardly adapting”
(Pawelczynska 1973:127). And that was a hard duty every day, for survival in the camps
meant facing with conflicting and harsh “choices about how to live”. And how this could be
accomplished Homer asks in his book Primo Levi and the Politics of Survival? “Do we steal
from one another? Do we collaborate with others for another piece of bread?” (Homer,
2001:17). Yisrael Gutman goes through the painful process to understand the logic of
prisoners behind the death camps and how the groups worked together, arguing that:
“The prisoner’s physical and mental capacities are unceasingly employed in a
never-ending effort to get through all the tortuous stages that constitute an
ordinary day- walking at dawn, straightening one’s pallet, morning roll-call,
the journey to work, hours of hard labor, standing in line for a meal, the return
to camp, block inspection and evening roll-call” (Gutman, 1984:155).
Survival also meant detaching from your previous lifestyle and finding means (any
means) to survive. Not all prisoners passed this test. Gutman provides a truly sad example of
two sisters from Holland who tried to learn ways to access food. They were gazing other
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prisoners who were returning in the camp blocks with food. One of the two sisters tried to do
the same and returned with a small portion of “rotten potatoes”, but the other along with her
Dutch friends “were not prepared to eat from the ‘stolen potatoes’ ”. Both girls and unable to
adapt to this everyday cruel reality walked together to the end point: they “threw themselves
on the electric fence” (Gutman, 1984:154). The need to revolt and to resist, the will to live
and the weakness of adaptability, were all moments of the same dignified personality. All
actions of the prisoners were signs of genuine need to continue to exist, and to preserve one’s
humanity. As Martin Gilbert writes:
“In every ghetto, in every deportation train, in every labor camp, even in the
death camps, the will to resist was strong, and took many forms: fighting with
those few weapons that could be found, fighting with sticks and knives,
individual acts of defiance and protest, the courage of obtaining food under the
threat of death, the nobility of refusing to allow the Germans their final wish to
gloat over panic and despair. Even passivity was a form of courage [...] To die
with dignity was itself courageous. To resist the dehumanising, brutalising
force of evil, to refuse to be abased to the level of animals, to live through the
torment, to outlive the tormentors, these too were courageous. Merely to give
witness by one’s own testimony was, in the end, to contribute to a moral
victory. Simply to survive was a victory of the human spirit” (Gilbert,
1986:828).
Conclusion
This chapter looked at the system of horror in the extermination camps. The camps
served as a laboratory for the Nazi Ideology. We reviewed stories of Greek Jews during their
imprisonment at the ghettos and in the extermination camps. We also explained the factors
that contributed to the high percentage of Greek Jewish loss inside the death camps in a
comparative approach. We have argued that certain parameters such as the climate, the long
journeys to Birkenau in contrast with other European communities, the period they arrived in
Auschwitz that coincided with the full implementation of all death methods, as well as the
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high percentage of Greek Jews who worked as Sonderkommando affected the high
percentage of their loss. Furthermore, we analysed the conditions under which all
communities in the concentration camps struggled to remain alive; how the Nazi order was
set up, the structure of terror, the divisions and statuses among the groups but most
importantly how all worked together to overcome barbarity, assist one another and remain
alive. At the same time we reviewed differences among the prisoners. Yet, there was a
successful effort to overcome these differences by building the organised resistance
movement, supporting a common cause. Under this context, we also understood the
difficulties of the prisoners to resist on pain of been killed, abused and deprived from food,
and how this systematic terrorism gave birth to some spontaneous revolts such as the
Crematorium IV revolt, by examining also the reasons that enabled it, and the contribution of
the Greek Jewry in that effort. We also viewed the systematic empowerment and abuse of the
most fragile groups of the camps such as the women and the children, and concluded in this
chapter, that every single effort to resist, living, to assist, as well as the inability of a prisoner
to adapt, were all sides of the same civilised personality. Last but not least, the experience of
the Jewish prisoners in the death camps which was our main inquiry in this chapter will
enable us to establish connections with the next chapter that deals with a single case of a
massacre that occurred in small village in Greece. In doing so, we will view how as the war
progressed throughout Europe, Nazi atrocities systematically committed against local
populations in Greece and all over Europe, as a form of retaliation, and as a means to
suppress guerrilla activity and individual resistance. Certain questions will then come out in
the surface to establish clear distinctions between the conditions under which the genocide
was committed upon the European Jewry, and massacres throughout Europe.
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Chapter 4. The Massacre of Distomo 10 June 1944, an Episode.
“...The cannons and the bullets,
rusted fires,
which are falling in love
at the snowed of our eyes.
The bullets, unwashed screams of darkness,
they look like funeral songs
at the crossroads of the world,
at the time that the heroes pray
and the war chiefs
Repentant cyclamens,
Forgive the afternoon sadness
of thirst...”
(Andreas S. Tsouras, “Distomo, Bleeding humanity”)47
Introduction
So far I have emphasised the changed position of the Jews in the Greek society and
their fate in the extermination camps, in order to comprehend how racial discrimination,
socio-political exclusion and annihilation was implemented. Greece numbered thousands of
casualties during the Second World War while only in the first year of the occupation,
between 1941 until 1942 around 450,000 civilians died from hunger and malnutrition, and 80
percent of children suffered from tuberculosis, while the BBC reported that more than
500,000 Greeks died in the first year of occupation (Kessel, 1944: 21, Fleischer, 1995a: 195).
Apart from the tragic loss of the Jewish communities in the country, there have been
catastrophic consequences for the civilians who either directly or indirectly fought the Nazis;
executions, rapes, setting fire to entire villages, and massacres.48 The massacres in the
villages of Kommeno, Kalavryta and Distomo are one of those cases where Nazi horror
47 An excerpt from the poetic drama of Andreas S. Tsouras’s Distomo, Bleeding Humanity, Municipality of
Distomo Edition, 1999: 29.
48 According to Life Magazine, “more than 2,000 Greek villages have been destroyed” (see Life, November 27,
1944, Vol. 17,No. 22: p 21).
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showed its unlimited possibilities in unequal battles between civilians who stood side by side
with the guerrillas against the Nazis. However, little effort has been made by Greek and
international authors to throw light to these atrocities and only recently -after many decades-
there has been a more adequate research and coherent presentation of the events (Mayer,
2010:15).
In this chapter I provide an in depth investigation of the massacre via unstructured
interviews of the very few survivors that are still alive today. By including this episode in my
thesis I do not seek to compare the two events; namely the experience of the Greek Jewry in
the camps with the massacre of Distomo for that would be unequal. It would be unequal
because the persecution of Jews was massive, and it was based on anti-Semitic and racist
laws. The non Jews for instance, who were tortured in the camps, were held as “political
prisoners” with charges for resisting and for being enemies of the German State. These
political prisoners were not imprisoned on the grounds of race or because they were
considered as “sub- humans”, and therefore one can argue that they were in a different and
perhaps more “privileged” position than their fellow Jewish prisoners who were charged for
all the ills and pathologies of the world. Hence the crematoria as well as the gas chambers
were used exclusively for the Jews and on the grounds of being “racially dirty”
(Abatzopoulou, 2007: 24-25). The latter stands as a clear distinction between the Genocide
and the motives of vengeance for political reasons, either in a form of a massacre, or in a
form of a mass killing during guerrilla warfare. According to Lemkin, “Genocide is directed
against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against
individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group” (Lemkin,
1944:79). As Lemkin suggests,
“It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at
the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the
130
aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would
be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language,
national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and
the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the
lives of the individuals belonging to these groups” (Lemkin, 1944:79).
The inclusion of the massacre of Distomo in my thesis has one clear purpose. There
were approximately 2000 Greek Jews who returned from the death camps, but there were also
10,000 Jewish survivors who returned from the Guerrilla Mountains fighting the Nazis
(Lewkowitz, 2000:247). All the Jewish survivors in their histories and memoirs, not only talk
about their experience before and during persecution, or in the death camps, but share with us
their memories after they returned from the mountains in the disintegrated and politically
divided country. If we have to hear the Jewish voices, we are obliged to hear them from the
beginning until the end. The Jewish survivors highlight the political rivalries in occupied and
aftermath Greece, and rationally understand that the political situation affected them (see,
Lewkowitz, 2000; see also Bourlas, 2000). These issues of course are highlighted in the last
chapter where themes of collective memory and restitution are coupled, but the massacre of
Distomo stands as a mediation between the genocide of the Jews and the description of what
was happening up in the mountains, and how the political rivalries developed gradually
throughout the war that had an immediate effect on the rescued Jews. For example, Bea
Lewkowitz (2000), in her essay “After the War We Were All Together”: Jewish Memories of
Postwar Thessaloniki”, has collected interviews in a 10-year period from Jewish survivors.
Now, as we shall see in the final chapter, these survivors were pre-occupied with political
themes of post-war Greece. Thus, if their analysis is valuable we must explain what the
victims describe in this and remaining chapters until we close our discussion on themes of
restitution and collective memory in the final chapter. The account of the Massacre of
Distomo aims to inform the reader as to the conditions in which the Jews and non-Jews
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perished, survived or struggled to survive in the mountains of Greece. Last but not least, the
account aims at describing the growth of systematic terror of the Nazi ideology as the war
progressed.
Methodological Design, Purpose and the Usefulness of the Survivors’ Voices
As seen in chapter 3, whereby we described the conditions of the death camps through
the narratives of the victims; the usefulness of survivors has been indispensable to understand
gaps and questions that histories do not always address or answer. Concerning the accuracy
of the survivor’s stories and its historical usefulness, Lawrence Langer, suggests that even if
the passage of time may erase or cause trouble to remember some details, the memory of a
dreadful event such as the Holocaust never sleeps; it is in a constant “insomniac” condition
and always adds to the historical richness (Langer, 1991: xv). Because as the author writes:
“testimonies are human documents rather than merely historical ones, the troubled interaction
between past and present achieves a gravity that surpasses the concern with accuracy. Factual
errors do occur from time to time, as do simple lapses; but they seem trivial in comparison to
the complex layers of memory...” (ibid). Similarly, when I took interviews from men and
women who survived the massacre of Distomo, I did not pay attention to some lapses that are
not verified by the literature. I was listening with the same curiosity, respect and
unawareness, without thinking about my pre-judgements and pre-knowledge. The latter
simply collapsed once I heard the stories of the survivors, and the personal strength these
people had so as to recollect their thoughts for me after 70 years. Driven from the previous
argument, the case study gives you both the freedom and the spontaneous information that
comes out from the testimonies of the survivors. According to Gary Thomas, case studies
leave an anarchic liberty to the researcher to set her own “boundary”, namely design and
interpret a meaningful content and context, but at the same time enrich her own knowledge
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about a situation that is already significant in its own merit (Thomas, 2011:21). The choice of
a case study as a research method, for the present purpose, the Distomo massacre, has
enabled me to see “something in its completeness, looking at it from many angles. This is
good science. In fact it is the essence of good science” (Thomas, 2011:23). This case study
would not have been successful without primary and secondary data. I collected a small but
meaningful secondary literature, such as newspapers, books, personal memoirs, valuable
primary archives and documents, such as official reports from the International Red Cross, a
list of primary documents that were sent to Washington Embassy, and of course the
collection of five comprehensive interviews.
The reason I decided to do interviews was because I sought to “achieve a depth of
understanding” of an event, namely the massacre (Gillham, 2005:3). I collected five
interviews, four of which were recorded, lasting from one to two hours respectively, and one
written interview that lasted about 30 minutes. The interview questions were unstructured, as
my initial inquiry was to hear the stories of the victims. According to Gillham, the
“strengths” of this approach, namely the unstructured questions, aim at leaving the survivor
“to lead the way”, make his or her own narrative, without me interfering. This is the best
approach especially when I had to interview victims of a massacre, for otherwise a more
structured technique, “may lose the thread of a narrative” (Gillham, 2005:45). At the same
time, I was aware of the difficulty of this approach. An unstructured interview, may lead a
researcher to a set of questions or answers that are not so relevant. However, even at this risk,
there is always a set of “focused topics” that enable specificity (Gillham, 2005:47-49).
The latter was achieved by researching first the massacre of Distomo and the issues
that were involved around it, namely, life in the mountains during the war, partisan activity,
political rivalries, and collaboration. All new information that springs from an interview may
bring forth elements to the study of an event such as a massacre. According to Yin,
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“interviews are an essential source of case study evidence because most case studies are
about human affairs. These human affairs should be reported and interpreted through the eyes
of specific interviewees, and well- informed respondents can provide important insights into
a situation” (Yin, 2003: 92). At the same time I recognise the limitations of a single case
study, namely the inability to “generalise” after a specific investigation (Wellington and
Szczerbinski, 2007: 93). However, I do not seek to generalise with the massacre of Distomo,
rather I seek to understand, interpret and analyse a phenomenon; an all too real phenomenon,
that is “vivid” and “insightful”, and has a value in its own (Wellington and Szczerbinski,
2007: 94). It is a substantial effort to understand what was happening in the mountains of
Greece when the war was progressing and I seek to engage this experience with the Nazi
ferocity throughout Europe. A case study that is “explanatory” can be applied to other similar
cases studies and events (Thomas, 2011: 95). This approach will enable me to draw
awareness to similar developments elsewhere, namely other massacres, ethnic cleansings and
mass atrocities that occurred throughout Occupied Europe. Despite using this approach, the
account of Distomo stands as an episode between the Jews during occupation and after the
war, so as to see as we argued what was happing up in the mountains.
Distomo is a small village 130 kilometres outside Athens between Parnassus
Mountains and Delphi, in the prefecture of Boeotia (Veotia/ Viotia) in Central Greece, and
around 15 kilometres outside Veotia’s capital Levadia (Livadeia). I travelled there in autumn
2009.
(Memorial Museum of Distomo, Distomo, September 2009)
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(Woman in the picture: Maria Padiska, entrance of Distomo Memorial Museum, p
2009).
I was happy to know that
they revealed to me that for many years
from many parts of Europe
psychologically exhausted by frequent
extremely willing to talk to me for a
war and their experiences in younger generations in
icture captured
Distomo survivors were willing to tell their stories since
journalists and documentary film makers travelled
apart from Greece in order to record the massacre and f
questions of journalists. However
s they told me off the record, they prefer to talk about the
an informal way and without cameras.
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, they were
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A Chronicle of the Slaughter
In the morning of 10 June 1944, a heavily armed SS unit of eighteen men left Levadia
for Distomo, with two Greek private cars. On the way, five more SS cars followed (Lappas,
2001:14). Before arriving at the village they killed everyone they found on their way; from
animals to local farmers, while at the same time, they took 12 hostages from the nearby fields
outside the village of Distomo. Once they entered the town, in two hours they killed 218
people in a “door-to-door” slaughter. According to the official document of the Red Cross
Committee which arrived from Athens two days after the massacre, around 600 people were
killed from the areas in and around Distomo. The massacre occurred after a heavy battle that
occurred a few kilometres outside Distomo between the bands of ELAS and the SS, in the
town of Stiri.49
The chief of the Red Cross delegate G. Wehrly and his Swedish colleague Callmer
approached the bishop of the town to get a first description of the events. The Nazis had
executed everyone they saw on their way with bayonets and machine guns. A small
committee supervised by the Red Cross was formed in order to provide aid to the survivors.
The team recorded some informal testimonies by locals while they walked through the town
to see by themselves the traces of the atrocity. Outside the houses of the victims they saw
many bullets in the streets and dead animals in the fields. According to Callmer’s official
report even “within a distance of approximately 5 kilometres away from the village, the
stench was highly prevalent because of the sepsis of the dead animals caused by the sun.
They were around 100 slaughtered horses and donkeys” (see Archives of the International
Committee of Red Cross: A Report on aid to Distomo, Veotias, D.E.E.S, Athens, 23 June
1944: p 4-5). He reported the following:
49 Archeia tes Diethnous Epitropis tou Erythrou Stavrou: Ekthesis stes Metaferomenes voethies sto Distomo
Boeotias , D.E.E.S (Archives of the International Committee of Red Cross: A Report on aid to Distomo,
Veotias, D.E.E.S), Athens, 23 June 1944: page 2.
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“.... I visited the houses of the slaughtered. In these houses, I found traces of
blood some of which were prevalent, in some there was female hair crawling,
blood in some shoes, torn clothes, pieces of blanket. The testimonies reveal
that the soldiers chased from room to room the residents and they did not leave
anyone alive. From the massacre they got away only people who managed to
escape or hide. In one room I found a very thick pile of blood which prevented
the door to open. There I found pellets, but it seems that the massacre was
mainly committed with bayonets, for this can be proven by the very large
numbers of victims, because the villagers did not realise what kind of acts were
taking place inside the houses. I was astonished by the extent of bayonet use.
The children until five years old were all murdered, many young women were
raped and afterwards they were disembowelled. No woman made it, except
from those who managed to escape from the village”. 50
One of the first victims of the massacre was the local priest of the town Sotirios
Zissis. He along with the mayor of the town was questioned whether there were partisans of
ELAS in the area (Manolopoulou, 2007:14). The priest refused to give them any information
and told them that there were no Elasites in the town or in the wider area and as a result he
was decapitated in his house. According to some people’s testimonies, ten more victims were
slaughtered in Father’s Zissis’s house; five of which were children below the age of five. His
wife was also found dead with her murdered little daughter in her hands and her little “head
cut in her mother’s knees” (Archives of the International Committee of Red Cross: A Report
on aid to Distomo, Veotias, D.E.E.S, Athens, 23 June 1944: p. 6). 51 Based on other people’s
accounts who talked to the team of the Red Cross, they found whole families brutally killed,
as well as many young children such as that of a three month baby. The survivors found a
50 Archeia tes Diethnous Epitropis tou Erythrou Stavrou: Ekthesis stes Metaferomenes voethies sto Distomo
Boeotias , D.E.E.S (Archives of the International Committee of Red Cross: A Report on aid to Distomo,
Veotias, D.E.E.S), Athens, 23 June 1944: p 5.
51 Other sources suggest that they were 12 or 14 people locked in Father’s Sotirios Zissi’s house, some of which
finally escaped death (Theoharis, 2010: 331).
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new born child with “his carotid cut and a part of his intestines wrapped around his neck” ,
while his “mother’s breast was cut and was put into her baby’s mouth” (ibid).
The Anti-Nazi Resistance in the Battle of Stiri
Before we start discussing the stories of the survivors and hear from their own words
what they viewed and experienced, we need first to explain what happened before the
massacre; how and why the Germans went to the village after an intense battle with the
partisans of ELAS. I therefore met Giannis whose father was a guerrilla of the ELAS and
who took part in the battle of Stiri. His father was 20 years old when he joined the partisans
in the mountains of Parnassus. He became a member of the 11th Unit, of the 3rd Battalion, of
the 34th Regiment of ELAS, which had its base in the Mount Elicon (Elikonas) and near the
town of Stiri. He left his home to live in the icy mountains of Parnassus to fight the Italians
and the Nazis from 1942 until the end of the war, and specifically “he along with his partisan
group attacked the last German convoy that was leaving Athens, crushing them in the district
of Aghia Sotira, where the Germans experienced the last defeat” (Giannis, Distomo, 29
September, 2009).
(Driving 20 kilometres outside the village of Distomo
Guerrilla Mountains of Parnassus, Boeotia,
I asked him to give me more information
Germans to go back to Distomo and commit
with great detail:
“In June 1944, the unit Chief took permission from the 3
to go to a small area of Aghios Pantelei
do some routine cleaning work. Men from the nearby St
patch the boots, for the partisans were always coming back from the mountains
with destroyed boots, and the women of the town helped them to bo
clothes in order to kill the lice. Therefore they decided to stay there. But since
that area was near the road, they had to take some extra measures precisely
because they were partisans. And a partisan was always in danger since the
Germans could have attacked them any time. For that reason
, near the village of Thourio and towards reaching the
Central Greece. Picture captured in December 2008).
concerning the battle of Stiri that led the
the massacre. Giannis unfolded
rd Battalion of ELAS
monas near the town of Stir
iri helped them to
,
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i in order to
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the military
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captain and his assistant sent the partisans to an even higher area so as to be
able to inspect both Distomo and the route that connects Levadia town with
Distomo, signalling them about possible German convoys coming towards
them. At the same time, the military captain ordered two more seniors and my
father who at that time was a Sergeant major to move north-west, towards
Distomo, in order to inspect the route Distomo- Stiri and set up an ambush in
case German convoys were coming near the area. They determined the location
in a hill close to Stiri” (Giannis, Distomo, 29 September 2008).
It was very early in the morning when they started their cleaning work. After 5 hours
and around eight in the morning the cleaning soon had to be stopped, when they saw from the
ambush a large German convoy of around 40 men coming from Levadia and towards
Arachova. The senior gave a signal to the partisans and warned them to go straight to the
ambush, and be ready for a possible attack. They took all the ammunition and waited for
orders. The location of the ambush was chosen very carefully in a spot where the old road
was extremely narrow and thus it would be impossible for a convoy to make a turn and
retreat. While waiting however, they already heard gun fire coming from the village of
Distomo. On their way, the Nazis killed everyone they saw; “they killed villagers and farmers
who were working in the fields for no reason at all. Everyone they saw, they killed them!
They also killed many Distomites on their way to Distomo and took 12 hostages who had
nothing to do with the resistance” (Giannis, Distomo, 29 September 2009, see also
Manolopoulou, 1994:15). When the Germans approached the ambush, the partisans fired
towards the Nazi convoy. The first two SS cars were caught by surprise immobilizing the rest
of the convoy (Giannis, Distomo, 29 September, 2008, see also Lappas, 2001:17). Giannis
declared that:
“The first rows of German cars were disguised. The Germans who came from
the city of Levadia were dressed with civil clothes that took from prisoners at a
local prison. They disguised the first two cars in order to fool the locals and
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look like black marketers. But the guerrilla attack on the first cars was deadly,
for imagine: a unit of 100 partisans to shoot non-stop towards one direction!
[...] the German casualties were enormous, for the partisans were shooting the
immobilised convoy non-stop! The battle lasted for some time, while the
Germans tried to retreat by moving towards the hills. But while moving into
the hills, they were even more exposed [...] The andarte52 used all their
ammunition, for this is the very purpose of setting up an ambush, which is to
astonish the enemy, have a short fight, kill as much as possible and use all your
weapons. The Germans eventually retreated. The Elasites had one wounded
who unfortunately died, but it was the only casualty” (Giannis, 29 September
2009).
Survivors’ Memoirs
When the Germans retreated as we just heard, they took their casualties and hostages
and went to Distomo for retaliation. I met Dimitris whose family and relatives were all
murdered. He was six years old when the massacre occurred, while his sister Katerina was
four, and his little brother Makis was 2 years old.53 The day of the massacre, his father told his
children to go to their grandmother’s house and hide. On the way however, they met their
mother who took their little brother Maki, and she returned to their house. Dimitris and his
sister heard a lot of shootings while at their grandmother’s house and very soon had to leave
this house as well and go straight to the next one which was their aunt’s house. Dimitris told
me that back in those days, most relatives in every village of Greece used to live in close
proximity, and thus it was easy to move and hide. So that house as he argued, hosted many
relatives at that time. They hid there for a long time. From the windows of the house one
could see the town square and the public school and they were actually very close to the
massacre scene (Dimitris, Distomo, 29 September, 2009). His sister Katerina described to me
her mother’s fear when she saw the Nazis and started speculating that something is going on:
52 Andarte(s) is the name for Greek partisan (literally a rebel).
53 In my presentation of the interviews I use pseudonyms for all my interviewees.
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“My mother, sad as she was, feared they would take her husband. Once we
reached the other house we went to my mother’s cousin. Our aunt said to my
mother: ‘Angeliki something is happening and we must hide. What should we
do?’ My mother said to her: ‘take the kids and I will stay with Makis’ and she
took him to her shoulders. She took him and went back to her house to find her
husband as he had just returned from work” (Katerina, Distomo, 29 September
2009).
In the mean time, the two siblings who hid at their grandmother’s house could see
from the window what was happening. The Germans arrived at the village square and they
executed the 12 hostages in the school’s wall which was used as a firing squad. Katerina’s
brother, Dimitris, who was two years older, remembered that one of the hostages named
Pavlos resisted to the Germans. The Nazis beat him without mercy and then shot him along
with the other hostages. Their grandmother was gripped by terror as she tried to close the eyes
of the kids, but Dimitris said: “I was very curious as a child and I sat next to her and I saw
them standing against the wall as they shot them” (Dimitris, Distomo, 29 September 2009).
After the Germans left the firing squad, the time stopped for Distomo. In two hours
approximately, the SS murdered 218 people, almost the entire population of the village. The
Nazis disembowelled pregnant women, raped many girls of early teens, and then they
slaughtered them with bayonets. They decapitated babies, took people’s eyes out and
executed the men of the town, while everyone else who survived the atrocity totally “lost their
reasoning”, for they could not believe it was true what they saw (Theocharis, 2010: 346-
347).54
Dimitris’ grand-grandfather was sitting outside the house in a step, and beneath a tent
in order to protect from the sun and from possible shootings. His wife and daughter were
“kneading the bread while they saw that actually the Germans entered their house and killed
54 Similarly the description of the events were vividly described by many local newspapers of the time, see Mahi
9.6.1946, Mahi, 7.7.1944, Embros, 12.6.1945, Asyrmatos, 9.6.1945.
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them both”. His grand-grandfather tried to resist but he and his cousin were executed.
Dimitris, Katerina and their aunt saw this horrific scene and the latter screamed: “they killed
my mother Athina!” (Dimitris, Distomo, 29 September, 2009). The two siblings were very
lucky as their aunt helped them to hide. The house was on the ground floor and had a trap
door beneath the cement. Although it was very small and narrow, the one after the other
managed to get in. Their aunt Vicki helped her sister first, and then the two siblings and she
closed the trap door and covered it with a rug (Katerina, Distomo, 29 September, 2009).
Katerina’s brother Dimitris, remembers that the trap door was so narrow and small – only a
meter long- and he wandered as he was chatting with me, how was it possible for his
grandmother to get into the trap-door, given that she was very old and overweight. He told
me: “how did she get in? It was God’s will!” (Dimitris, Distomo, 29 September, 2009).
While the siblings and their relatives stayed underground, Dimitris, was hurt but he
didn’t notice. The Germans entered their house through the kitchen door and they left through
the main door as they did not find anyone. They could hear however the Nazi boots as they
passed above the trap door, and Katerina told me: “now that I am thinking..., if they had
burned the house, after finding no one in the house, we would be burned like mice trapped in
the cage” (Katerina, Distomo, 29 September, 2009). When the Germans stopped firing she
declared that:
“We opened the trap door and came out. Now imagine...., a child staying in
this tiny basement for an hour or two...was it for a year? I didn’t realise. We
stayed there and we didn’t cry or cough at all, but deep inside us we were
really frightened. Then, we left and went back to our parent’s house. We were
the first children and actually the first people who walked in the streets after
the massacre. We started screaming: “Mum, Dad, Maki!” We found our mum
sitting next to the fireplace of the room and as we touched her, she fell down.
Little Makis was on the floor! When my brother Dimitris – who was older than
me- tried to lift him up, his little stomach and inner organs fell on the floor! We
144
were screaming and shouting, hoping we will hear a response from our parents.
But we realised they were no longer alive! We went to the balcony and started
shouting” (Katerina, Distomo, 29 September, 2009).
When their aunt Vicki told them to go back to their parent’s house, the children said to
her that everyone was killed. Dimitris told me that her sister screamed over the balcony:
“Grandma, Vicki! They killed mum, dad and little Makis!” They were told to go to their other
grandma’s house which was on the other side of the village. Soon the massacre stopped as
the night was falling. When the siblings left, they saw their grand- grandfather and their
second cousin executed outside the house along with many other villagers in the streets.
Dimitris declared that they found specifically a man on the street covered in blood begging for
help. Dimitris told me: “You understand now huh? I was 6 years old and my sister 4! What do
you expect...and those days my girl ...what could one expect?” (Dimitris, Distomo, 29
September, 2009).
Once they arrived to the other side of the town, they were bombarded with questions
by many villagers who escaped murder. They heard the shootings but did not know what was
happening on the other side of the town. It has been suggested that the massacre lasted
approximately two hours as the Germans rushed to leave before the nightfall. Katerina argued,
that “if there was still daylight had the Germans arrived earlier, they would have killed by far
more civilians” (Katerina, Distomo, 29 September, 2009). Indeed as Lappas argues, the
nightfall made the Nazis to abandon their bestial deeds. However and apart from the horrific
murders they committed the previous hours, they looted everything from the houses; they
took money, jewellery, destroyed furniture and ripped clothes (Lappas, 2001:42, see also
Manolopoulou, 1994: 14-15).
145
The survivor Alexandra was 12 years old and described to me her own experience.
She told me that some of the 12 hostages that the Germans took after the battle of Stiri were
distant relatives. She asked me: “Why did they do this to us? From which bitch’s body they
came out? ” For a moment she stopped and cried. She told me that the Germans were
extremely “anticommunist” and were keeping an eye on the partisans all the time. But the
guerrillas were always alert and ready for a possible attack as if they “knew what would
happen”. They were always around the villages protecting the civilians and in their spare time
she could hear them relaxing with songs and marches (Alexandra, Distomo, 29 September,
2009). Her siblings were six and three years old respectively, while her mother was twenty
nine. Once the Germans entered their house her father was really scared. They “came into our
house with anger and they were looking everywhere like demons, I guess for weapons or
whether they were partisans hiding somewhere”. When they found her father they tortured
and beat him severely. Alexandra was “gripped by terror” when she saw her father in that
condition. But suddenly, emotions of survival came back to her reason. She wanted to save
herself. She was too young to safely jump from the window, and her father prevented her to
make the attempt (Alexandra, Distomo, 29 September, 2009).55 She said:
“I wanted to jump out of the window, even though it was very high, in order to
enter the next house, where my friend was staying. My friend was very strong,
she did not fear. She stayed still. I fell after all in to a trap door! And inside my
mind, my instinct, was telling me that there will be death here! I entered the
house next by, and the Germans came in with weapons. I was torn to shreds!
The Germans told us not to go out, otherwise ‘kaput’! [...] My mother, who
was 29 years old at that time, was killed with a machine-gun. Her brains came
out! In general, there was a lot of killing with bayonets and disembowelment.
[...] My grandfather, 65, came out of the house to see what happened. But he
was executed! [...]My grandmother saw her parents on the street dead! All of
55 See also Alexandra’s experience of the massacre in Miltiadi N. Nikolaou’s book Emerologio Apo to Metopo
(Diary from the Front), 2007:137-157.
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my relatives were executed with machine guns. Afterwards, I was running like
crazy out in the streets without shoes. My sorrow could not be described. My
grandmother, 56, was waiting in order to bury them. But who would bury
them? There was no priest anymore!” (Alexandra, Distomo, 29 September
2009).
After the massacre, Alexandra received aid from international organisations such as
the Red Cross. She left Distomo however after the massacre to stay with her uncle for some
time in Athens who was “a left-wing idealist”. She told me she was “lucky twice” in her life
as she nearly escaped death again during the “December Events” in 1944, once the Germans
left the country (during liberation). That month she argued, the British bombarded Athens and
started a war against the Greek left.56 She was present during the events and that her uncle
was “arrested by the British”, but she told me: “I don’t know why” (Alexandra, Distomo, 29
September, 2009).
Very soon the news of the massacre reached the radio stations all over Europe and in
the U.S, commenting on the act of “barbarity” and the inconceivable extent of “anthropo-
slaughter” (Lappas, 2001: 81). But the worst was yet to come for this small village in central
56 The December Events in Athens 1944 known in Greece as the “Dekemvriana” or the “Battle for Athens” refer
to the events that followed after the Germans left the country, when British troops arrived in Athens and
announced that the city was liberated. The battle that lasted 32 days refers to the conflict created by Winston
Churchill’s policy to prevail in the Athenian capital against the Greek left and destroy the resistance of
EAM/ELAS that was winning public support (see Churchill’s letter to General Scobie instructing him to occupy
Athens “with bloodshed if necessary” on the 5th of December 1944: FO 954/11B, image ref: 154). The first two
days of Dekemvriana marked with bombings, arrests and “28 deaths and over a hundred wounded” of unarmed
demonstrators from the shootings of the collaborators (Security Battalions) and the nationalist / far-right group
“X”, along with the presence of British troops in Athens’s central square, Syntagma Square (Tsoucalas,
1969:85). The events lasted for many weeks with thousands of dead people, marking the beginning of the civil
war between the left and the right as the politics of Downing Street insisted in bringing king George II back in
Greece from Britain and govern the country, satisfying in this way British interests in Greece and in the wider
Mediterranean region (Gerolymatos, 2005: 54-55). However, George II was a political figure extremely
unpopular in Greece since he was a fascist and a great supporter of Metaxas’s dictatorship (Myers, 1985:104).
Some authors consider the December Events of 1944 as “the first major counterinsurgency” and foreign
interference on domestic affairs in post war Europe along with the U.S intervention following the Truman
Doctrine in 1947(Chomsky, 1997:192-193). We will come back to these events properly in the next chapter and
understand a little bit more the “Anglo-Greek affair” that shaped Greece’s post war politics but most
importantly its legal aftermath, since many Greek collaborators were hired in prestigious positions in the
political arena, in the army and the police while many royalists and fascists remained in power fighting the left
until the early 50s. As a political consequence, proper legal prosecution of the Greek Nazis and collaborators
came really late in Greece and only for a few.
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Greece. For a long time and after the massacre, Distomites were sleeping at night in the caves
of nearby mountains. All the survivors hid the night after the massacre, as the Nazis came
back the next day to take revenge by burning many houses. Dimitris, remembers that when
the Germans returned to the town they also burned his uncle’s shop (Dimitris, Distomo, 29
September, 2009). His sister Katerina shared with me her memories of the next day and once
the Germans left the town for good. It was very difficult for the remaining residents to really
conceptualise the events as well as finding the psychological strength to search for the bodies
of their relatives “since they didn’t know who was present and who was absent”. She declared
that many victims were buried in the same grave, while other survivors buried their relatives
in their gardens as there was no empty space available in the cemetery (Katerina, Distomo, 29
September, 2009). She burst into tears when she told me that:
“During the burial, my brother’s clothes smelt really badly as the previous day
tried to hold his little brother Makis. He had little Makis’s blood in his clothes!
When my grandmother realised that Dimitris smelt she said: ‘We should bring
clean clothes for Dimitris!’ My grandma’s grief was horrific during the burial!
Her mourning, cry and sorrow were so strong that her navel burst open! She said
to me: ‘I don’t know if you are aware that this can happen actually’. I said: ‘I am
afraid I didn’t know that this is possible’. She took her black headscarf and tried
to roll it over her waist to ease the pain. And yet, she kept walking towards the
house in order to find new clothes for my brother Dimitris. When she arrived at
the house, she screamed to her daughter: ‘Vicky, the child will go crazy with this
dirt in his body!’ ” (Katerina, Distomo, 29 September, 2009).
The events of the massacre had such a deadly psychological effect upon its people that
it marked the village for many years. The current Mayor of Distomo, Thanasis Panourgias,
argued that as a child who was born after the deadly events and until the age of twelve, did
not know that women wear any other colour apart from black, for they were mourning for
their relatives for years (Theocharis, 2009:206). Katerina too, remembers the constant grief
148
that prevailed in the town for many years. After the burials for instance, she returned to her
parent’s house to collect a few items from her mother in order to remember her. She found a
red bracelet, but when her grandmother saw her wearing it she said: “my child, this bracelet is
red, you must not wear it. From now on you will only wear black!” (Katerina, Distomo, 29
September, 2009). These words as she revealed to me really “stigmatised” her not only as a
child but also during her adulthood for she never really enjoyed her life and it was very
difficult for her to wear anything else apart from the mourning colours of black and purple.
The villagers started to recover the following years, however soon the question rose over who
was responsible and why the massacre happened in the first place.
Investigation of the Massacre
There is a growing debate among the residents of Distomo over who was responsible
and whether the massacre committed as an act of revenge or not. Some seem to blame the
partisans, for if they did not fight with the Nazis none of this would have happened. During
my interview with Dimitris, he argued that it was a “wrong tactic” at the wrong time for the
partisans of ELAS to get involved to that specific battle with the Nazis and that the deadly
massacre was ultimately an “act of revenge”. He declared that the Germans wouldn’t hurt
them had the partisans “remained quiet”, and that the 12 hostages who were caught in the
fields and later killed were members of “Psarros’s organisation” (EKKA).57 The latter
Dimitris said, was a resistance organisation ordered by the Allies to fight the Germans and
Psarros was “trained in the German Academy of Germany” after Dictator Metaxas threw him
57 EKKA stands for Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleftherosis (National and Social Liberation). It was the third and
smallest resistance group in Greece, closely tight to EDES group as they were both anti-left, but the latter’s
politics came closer to republicanism under the leadership of Dimitrios Psarros, contra to EDES which was
nationalist and loyal to the Greek crown (Woodhouse, 1968:246). Dimitrios Psarros’s main co-chief was
Georgios Kartalis; both were about to be accused of collaboration, for they were holding contacts with members
of the Security Battalions in order to fight communism (Fleischer, 2006: 92). Stefanos Sarafis (previously an
EKKA member) and Gikopoulos (no relation at all with the last, previously an EDES member), abandoned their
groups in order to join the bands of ELAS. In fact, Sarafis would be the co-chief of ELAS later along with Ares
Velouchiotis.
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away from the party.58 But soon, Dimitris said, Psarros’ movement would be destroyed by
Ares Velouchiotis’s leader of ELAS for they did not “want them in their feet” and that “they
did not get along with Zervas’s EDES either”, while he believes that Ares’ actions were
driven by his tactic to eradicate all other resistance bands in the area and that is why they
attacked the Nazis at Stiri, so as to attack basically the partisans of EKKA (Dimitris, Distomo,
29 September, 2009). However, we found no evidence from any source that gives us this
information, that is, that the hostages were members of EKKA, but only that they were
farmers who were not members of any resistance, but caught while working in the fields (see,
Lappas, 2001, Mazower, 1993, Manolopoulou, 1994, Red Cross Report 23 June 1944, Life
Magazine November 27 1994, Asyrmatos 9/10/45, Embros 12/10/45, Mahi 7/7/44). Alexandra
did not mention anything either concerning the hostages, since she knew many of them for
they “were distant relatives” (Alexandra, Distomo, 29 September, 2009).
The nationalist and Nazi-controlled newspapers of the time accused the partisan
activity for the massacre without giving credit to the partisans who killed many SS. It is
significant to refer and analyse some excerpts of the articles for they reflect the political spirit
of the time, the early signs of civil conflict and the ideological motives of those newspapers,
since they were serving the interests of the Quisling Governments of the time. It was
therefore, quite revealing to read for instance in the newspaper Embros that the only
explanation for the barbarity of the Nazis was their hatred of communists (Embros, 7/7/44).
“[...] all this terror that the German soldier feels for the speedy Russian
advance has been expressed with the most repulsive way and with the massacre
of Distomo. It is impossible to explain it otherwise why the Germans acted
beyond themselves [...] Despite the fact that in the periphery of Levadia during
spring there were some clashes between the Germans and the partisans,
58 Indeed Metaxas “rejected” Psarros’s offer to join resistance against the Italians in the Albanian Front. He was
previously chased and found by the officers of Metaxas, sending him to exile for 3 years (see Fleischer,
1995:238).
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Distomo did not suffer for it did not involve in to the war. The Germans
themselves lifted a plate in the entrance of the village which said: ‘Do not
touch this village for it is quiet and law-abiding’” (Embros, 7/7/44 underline
my emphasis, strict translation mine).
The false accusations are quite evident in the previous excerpt of the propagandistic
newspaper, since the partisans had indeed contacts with all the nearby villages and the village
of Distomo was not an exception. The way in which the journalist expressed his astonishment
concerning the Nazi ferocity suggested that it was impossible for an armed Nazi unit to
behave this way. This argument reveals the pro-Nazi sentiments of a large section of the press
during occupation. In the same way Lappas criticizes the whole report that was written by the
then Prefect of Veotia, Ioannis Georgopoulos, when a few days after the atrocities, he
defended the Germans accusing ELAS, arguing that the communists were “naughty” and that
“they fuel severely the German anger” (Lappas, 2001:78). Lappas further said that although
the events of the massacre were very fresh and therefore nobody had a clear picture, yet this
telegram that was sent to the Ministry of Domestic Affairs in Athens, was soon leaked to the
“secret nationalist organisations” and the latter distributed it everywhere, finding the best
opportunity to provoke the partisans (Lappas, 2001:80).
Although the news of the massacre in a few days reached many parts in and outside
Greece, many Nazi officials as well as Greek collaborators sought to cover it or partly excuse
it. The quisling PM Ioannis Rallis for instance, although protested against the massacre to a
German General, the latter excused himself arguing that he did not have any official report in
his hands and that the events seemed “excessive and imaginative” (Lappas, 2001:82). While
other German officials, hoped to cover their acts by arguing that it was the work of
“mercenaries”. They published a written report in the Nazi controlled Athenian press,
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declaring that the “communists” were trying to shape opinion by giving false information to
the Greek people that the Germans committed ferocious deeds (Lappas, 2001: 83-84).
The full report fell to my hands while researching in Gennadius Library in Athens.
The document gives an analytical account of the Distomo events, providing a full list of the
victims as well as a summary of the German controlled Athenian Press. And as Lappas indeed
argued, the press sought to cover the Nazis by blaming the partisans of EAM/ELAS for
spreading rumours about the German atrocities. The published report called on all Greeks to
refuse to believe that the Nazis committed these terrible crimes, dictating them to remain quiet
and stay out of the resistance. The proclamation is eighteen pages long and the same report
was sent a few months later to the Washington Embassy. As we read an excerpt from the
official report:
“GREEK KINGDOM
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION
Protocol Number 21630 Athens 18 November 1944
SUMMARY
About the catastrophe of Distomo
To Washington B’ Embassy
Today’s telegram 21294 of 18/11/44
We have the honour to announce that in 9 July the then German controlled Athenian Press published under the
title ‘The buncombe concerning the bestiality of Distomo’ the following announcement:
The communist buncombe which always tried to disturb the public opinion of Athens by inventing false news
regarding raw bestial deeds, has issued a new recent story. Communist buncombe spreads the rumours that, in
the peaceful village of Distomo (between Levadia and Arachova, province of Boeotia) more than a thousand of
people were slaughtered with bestiality by a German Military Unit. And they claim that even the Mayor, the
priest and the pharmacist were murdered after their families. The remaining few survivors were transferred into
a safe place by the International Red Cross.
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For all nationally minded Greeks, who know the methods of false propaganda of EAM, it is evident its
communist origin and motives for spreading this. According to the actual events of Distomo we have been
informed by the responsible authorities the following:
In 10 June 1944 one German military unit while on route from Levadia to Arachova was attacked with weapons
and machine guns. This unit suffered casualties, deaths and many wounded due to an unmanly attack of EAM.
There followed a battle against the gangs who retreated in Distomo using all their means. After using all their
heavy weapons, the village, this gang nest was occupied. There were some 350 deaths from the part of the
gangs. The deaths of women and children were inevitable after using all the machine guns against this village.
Then there was an order to burn the village, whose residents collaborated with the gangs.
These are the facts.
If the gangs of EAM did not go against the German military unit, they would not have attacked and burned the
village.
[...] For all the populations of the provinces in Greece this is a new warning that is not to collaborate with the
gangs. It depends exclusively on the position of the populations how they will behave or not according to the
laws against the gangs. The populations ought to stay away from any political or military action [...]” 59
Perhaps the above document gives us a vivid example of the Nazi propaganda and the
ideological tendencies behind the Nazi controlled press, which was to issue terroristic
warnings, along with giving false information to the events. After all, there was no battle
between the partisans and the Nazis inside Distomo, but in Stiri, and the propaganda in those
cases was to cover up Nazi deeds and abuse the public with false accusations. Not to mention
that there is no single critique from the part of the authorities concerning the atrocities that
were committed in the village, but instead they criticized heavily the resistance for provoking
the SS. Giannis, whose father was a member of ELAS and took part in the battle of Stiri,
argued that although the Nazis murdered the victims, it was not an act of revenge (Giannis, 29
September 2009).
We will stay a bit more on this issue as we need to focus on the Nazi perpetrators of
the Distomo Massacre and throw more light to the debate.
59 Filippos Dragoumis sub-file 62.4: “About the Catastrophe of Distomo”, 18 November 1944, To Washington
B’ Embassy, Gennadius Library, Athens. Please note that the excerpt which has been used here was carefully
translated from the original Greek. However, some words have been modified or excluded to fit modern text,
since the original was written in “Katharevousa Greek” (“pure” or “clean” Greek), meaning a combination of
modern (demotiki) and ancient Greek which was used at that time and until 1974, therefore a strict translation
into English would have been impossible.
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The Nazi Perpetrators
Giannis declared, that everything was “predetermined” from the part of the SS units
and argued that it is “not what I think, but there are German documents that prove this”.
Giannis said, that according to the German Historian Dieter Begemann who examined the
atrocity of Distomo and “searched the military archives of Germany”, traced the real
perpetrators who revealed to him that they were planning to attack the nearby villages anyway
(Giannis, Distomo, 29 September, 2009). Dieter Begemann’s investigation into the massacre
appear in the Greek book of Giorgos H. Theocharis (2010) Distomo 10 Iouniou 1944, To
Olokautoma, as well as in a recent documentary of Greek Skai Channel which was
broadcasted by the journalistic group of “Skai Folders”.60
Giannis, furthermore declared that the historian found that the SS left Levadia in the
morning of 10 June already with wild and “aggressive intentions” and that they “were specific
orders and central planning” prior to any battle with the partisans. They knew in other words
that the villages in the mountains were well organised in the Anti-Nazi war and wanted to
suppress the resistance by spreading terror to the civilians. Furthermore, the Nazi Occupation
was coming to an end and the Nazi troops had to find a way to leave the occupied zones of
Greece and Europe as a whole without resistance, securing in this way that the “road-exits”
were open and free from any partisan activity (Giannis, Distomo, 29 September 2009). As
Giannis told me:
“[....] the German goal in those circumstances was precisely to spread terror
and commit crimes against local unarmed people. Why? Because we have to
connect the story with the time it happened (i.e. 10 June 1944); the landing at
Normandy had been already decided, the Red Army had entered Hungary, and
the Germans therefore knew they were losing the war. Hence as far as Greece
60 see the documentary on the official site of Skai Folders were Dieter Begemann is providing new insights on
the perpetrators and their intentions, http://folders.skai.gr/main/theme?id=97&locale=en
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is concerned and towards the end of the war, the Nazis had to make sure that
the exit-roads were open in order to retreat easily, for after all they knew that
within two to three months they had to leave the country61 [...] for example,
while leaving the country, the Germans paid a heavy price in some parts of
Greece when the guerrillas set them many ambushes. So that was their goal,
and this can be understood by many other events. First of all, the German units
in the area of Levadia and around were very specific; they were not part of the
Wermacht but they were SS. They were in other words, Grenadier Armoured
of the 4th German Police Division, whose main goal in Greece was to do an
anti-partisan war in the mountains, and destroy the resistance all together.
Therefore and as you imagine, such a division had a specific method such as
slaughtering, spreading horror and executing, for otherwise you cannot terrify a
whole population that is anti-Nazi and part of the resistance movement. [...]
They were deliberately located in the most difficult parts of Greece (such as
areas of extreme altitude) in order to ‘clean’ them and retreat easily” (Giannis,
Distomo, 29 September, 2009).
Of course Gianni’s argument is strong and convincing; however, the SS appeared in
Greece and specifically in Salonika not in 1944 but a year earlier, when they practiced anti-
Semitic laws. However, Gianni’s argument has indeed a historical and political validity and
we would agree that the SS had a strong anti-resistance mission, but it was of secondary
importance which became primary after they deported the Jews from the major cities of the
country, or we can argue that these two Nazi missions co-existed, for while Jews were
persecuted in Greece and throughout Europe, the partisan war was continuing in the continent.
But for now we will stay on the previous argument, for the Nazi ferocity did not stop at
Distomo, but there was the battle in the village of Stiri that numbered many deaths of
61 What Giannis argues here, is that the Germans increased the methods of terror as resistance activity was
everywhere in Greece. Towards the end of the war all roads were closed and destroyed and the mountains were
full of partisans. There was no way out for the Germans. In order to leave the mountains and go to the nearest
cities, they had to face ambushes. Their methods of terror and slaughter increased so as to get away from the
country as they were losing the war. “Cleaning” the roads so as to leave meant killing the populations on their
way out.
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unarmed people, as well the catastrophe of another nearby village, Kyriaki. The latter was set
on fire and 110 people were executed. Specifically, in the slaughter of Kyriaki, ELAS
partisans killed two more SS officers along with the chief commander of the Greek Security
Battalions who “ordered the execution of 110 communists and the total catastrophe of the
village Kyriaki” as an act of “retaliation” (Vima, 2/5/1944). In this small geographical region
that covered three small towns, more than 750 were killed (Theocharis, 2010:87). That also
explains the fact that the Germans had a well planned strategy and they wanted to search and
destroy the resistance in the mountains of Central Greece.
However, we left deliberately towards the end of our discussion the issue of
perpetrators for there was confusion in the beginning among some residents of the town as
well as many officials as to why the massacre happened and who was involved. Some
residents for instance, believed that the one who ordered the massacre was an officer named
Theo who left Levadia with the SS cars towards Arachova. Once he came to Distomo he died
deeply wounded (see Lappas, 2001:14-15). The survivors who spoke to me saw him indeed
that day. However, Giannis does not deny that he was wounded or that he was not involved
from the beginning when the tracks left Levadia, but he was not the one who ordered the
massacre. In fact the one who ordered this atrocity was the company commander of SS Fritz
Lautenbach, Karl Schuemers (commander of the 7th Regiment of SS) and Kurt Rickert
(commander of the 1st Band of SS) who were based in Levadia and were under the
supervision of the chief Kopfner who escorted those tracks (Giannis, Distomo, 29 September,
2009; see also Mazower, 1993:209, 212-215; see also Theocharis, 2010:345).
Giannis declared that “based on documents and pictures that I have” Theo was not a
German official but a “Greek collaborator” who knew the German language very well
(“possibly his mother was German”) and the SS were using him as an “interpreter”. His real
name was Theodoros but “some German officers were calling him Theo for convenience, and
in fact Fritz Lautenbach did not even know Theo
first rows who died at Stiri. (
one who approached the priest Sotirios Zissis along with Kofner and question
he was murdered (Theocharis, 2010: 102).
(Pictures were taken at the Distomo Museum: from left, SS Karl Schuemers and Kurt Rickert were among
responsible for the massacre)
”, yet he was one of the track drivers in the
Giannis, Distomo, 29 September, 2009). Hence, Theo was the
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ed him before
those
(Picture from the Distomo Museum: The
Upon further investigation, there were other Nazis as well who were involved in the
central planning of the massacre such as
military police of GFP of Levadia,
more who were charged later
Pahr and a female interpreter
Nazi who ordered the massacre was SS Fritz Lautenbach)
Georg Koch who was a sergeant of the secret
Willy Janis, a commander of the GFP
for similar crimes in the wider region of Veotia, such as
named Joanna (see Theocharis, 2010:343-
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, along with two
Karl
345). Furthermore,
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Fritz Lautenbach and in order to excuse himself, declared that the German convoy was
actually attacked “from the direction of Distomo” and not at Stiri during the battle with the
ELAS (Mazower, 1993: 212; see also Theocharis, 2010:376). He lied in other words for there
was no battle inside the town of Distomo, not only because our literature supports this or
because Gianni’s father was present in the events, but because the historian Dieter
Begemman found Georg Koch himself after the massacre who escorted the German convoys,
refuting Lautenbach’s version. Georg Koch claimed that the Nazis were attacked by ELAS
few kilometres away from Distomo near Stiri as a result of an ambush and that the massacre
committed for no reason at all, while Lautenbach argued that they were attacked inside
Distomo (see Dieter Begemann’s analysis in Theocharis, 2010: 374-375; see also Mazower,
1993:212; see also Begemann’s interview at Skai Forders on
http://folders.skai.gr/main/theme?id=97&locale=en).
According to Mazower, Fritz Lautenbach “admitted that he had gone beyond standing
orders” and that the surprised attack by the partisans of ELAS would not have been
successfully implemented without the close cooperation of the civilians of Distomo and the
nearby villages (Mazower, 1993: 212). Based on the interview of Dieter Begemann at Skai
Folders where he gave for the first time new insights regarding the perpetrators, declared that
no member of the SS would have been legally charged had the then Prefect of Veotia not sent
a “desperate letter” to the German military commander asking for help and talking about
“unprecedented catastrophe” in Distomo. That urgent letter made the chiefs of the SS in the
province of Veotia “succumb to general pressures” and start questioning their division. There
were two reports; one for the events of Stiri and one for Distomo. The latter was highly
“controversial” as the SS Division tried to manipulate the events
(http://folders.skai.gr/main/theme?id=97&locale=en). When Dieter Begemann interviewed Georg
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Koch in prison a few days before he died and in a rare audio report, revealed to him the deeds
of the SS Division inside Distomo. In his own words Georg Koch said:
“The Germans took position. They set houses on fire, killing everyone they
saw. It was horrific. There is a scene which I cannot forget. There was a
woman with her baby in her arms begging for her life. But they killed her and
her baby. This scene I will never forget”.62
The newspapers of the time published the names of the perpetrators calling them to
stand in court and bring them in front of justice. The newspaper Eleftheria for instance wrote
that the SS Kurt Rickert along with five more officials were charged for war crimes and that
the “ordinance will be send to the martial court as well as to London” where the central
committee for war crimes was based (Eleftheria, 13/12/1945).
The Legal Prosecutions
The whole legal procedure against the Nazi perpetrators in the case of Distomo was a
parody and so disappointing to the point of suspicion. Since Georg Koch and Lautenbach
wrote two different reports to the chief commander of the SS Police Division in Athens as to
the events of Distomo, and Lautenbach lied in his report, Germany argued a month after the
events, that since he “wrote a false report”, he was not officially in charge for ordering these
“retaliation operations”, therefore he could not be found guilty without further supporting
documentation (Theocharis, 2009:376-377). The remaining perpetrators escaped justice,
however some of them such as Karl Schuemers died in the fall of 1944 after “falling into a
mine” in Northern Greece, while Lautenbach died a month later “following a retreat from
Hungary”. The only SS officer who was charged for the massacre was Helmut Felmy (a
commander based in Levadia) who was accused of “war crimes” during the Nuremberg
Trials. He was imprisoned for 15 years (later reduced), while the same court found
62 http://folders.skai.gr/main/theme?id=97&locale=en
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Lautenbach innocent on the basis of his “false report” (Theocharis, 2009: 375-376, 378). The
only SS that the Greek Authorities found and sent to the prisons of Averoff in Athens was
Heinz Zabel. The latter and according to the documents of the Historian Dieter Begemann
was a “local commander in Levadia” in the summer of 1944 and although nobody knew him,
“his name appeared in all public announcements and staff documents”, and according to the
Greek authorities he was highly involved in the case of the massacre (Theoharis, 2009: 378).
However, in 1953 Germany struggled with the Greek Authorities to release him from prison
on the grounds that the “procedure against him would be continued in Germany” (ibid).
Although further substantial information about the Distomo massacre was found after the
events in order to re-open the case in 1969, the Local Court of Munich decided that the case
was already closed in 1944, thus they could not procede further (Theoharis, 2009:379).
The case of Distomo closed for good without further investigation. Costas, who was 4
years old when his parents were murdered by the Nazis, revealed to me his great
disappointment concerning not only the escape of the perpetrators, but also the failure of the
German Government to give compensation to the victims. Costas was active for more than 10
years in the Greek, Italian and German courts, fighting for compensating the victims, and
although the Greek and Italian courts approved their case, the “Supreme Court of Germany
did not dare to search for laws that would justify the victims” and that the only case reaching
the German courts was the massacre of Kommeno in the province of Epirus, “nevertheless no
Nazi was charged” for their crimes (Costas, 30 September 2009, Athens).
Finally the case of Distomo stands as an example to refer to other dreadful events that
occurred throughout Occupied Europe. It is very difficult to list all the massacres, mass
crimes, and revengeful acts that were committed against numerous unarmed communities all
over the continent during but also after the war. Nazi occupation ended in most countries with
brutal replies as numerous slaughters committed in the name of revenge without always
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resistance. A tragic coincidence was that the same day and year Distomo lost almost its entire
population, another massacre occurred some thousand miles away. In 10 June 1944, SS men
slaughtered 642 civilians in Oradour-sur-Glane in France. The civilians were not part of the
resistance, yet the remnants were 80 survivors who counted numerous corpses and burned
homes (Farmer, 1999:1-2, 25; see also Kruuse, 1967:8). Further south in Italy and close to
Tuscany, in 12 August 1944, 300 SS massacred approximately 560 civilians in Sant’ Anna di
Stazemma, 116 of which were children. (Pezzino, 2012: xiv).
A recent and remarkable study by Jan Gross, Neighbours, describes the horrific
massacre that occurred in Jedwabne in Nazi-Occupied Poland in 10 July 1941. This study
caused seismic waves to the modern public opinion in Poland, as the pogrom was committed
against the Polish Jews by their Polish neighbours; hence, the massacre was to be silent and
un-reported for decades (Gross, 2001: 73, 22). This study was remarkable because Gross
observed that many atrocities occurred on Polish soil, as a result of Nazi and Soviet advances;
however the latter historiography overshadowed “the reality of autonomous dynamics in the
relationships between Poles and Jews within the constraints imposed by the occupiers”
(Gross, 2001:9). This unreported and undocumented massacre that counted hundreds of
Jewish victims came along with further pogroms that occurred before the Jedwabne massacre
in the nearby village of Radzilow (Gross, 2001: 57). Furthermore, there were numerous
killings, rapes, massacres and ethnic cleansings throughout the war in Europe. In most cases,
these dreadful events occurred with no resistance (Lowe, 2012).
Conclusion
Revenge, purge, retaliation was the everyday vocabulary in most European cities and
villages during Nazi Occupation. Imperialism, irredentism, intervention, culminated during
and after the war was over, as Western and Eastern Allies, European political parties and
nationalist factions would assume new roles, dividing Europe into dynamic seismic geo-
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plates. This chapter through the account of Distomo aimed at addressing these aspects of the
war and connect the memories of the Jews with the memories of non-Jews. We established
first clear distinctions between the Genocide of the Jews during Occupation and massacres
that committed upon other populations on the basis of ethnic and political rivalries. We
examined the massacre, the chronicle of the slaughter and the anti-Nazi resistance in the
Battle of Stiri. We sought to narrate the atrocity through the testimonies of the survivors’
interviews and we further analysed the motives of the Nazi perpetrators and the legal response
in the aftermath. We have concluded that there were many atrocities, mass rapes, massacres
and ethnic cleansings throughout the war in the European continent without always resistance
and yet in the name of vengeance and retaliation. Many dreadful events went unreported for a
long time throughout Europe, whereby victims did not receive compensation in the aftermath,
and a number of perpetrators escaped the judiciary as in the case of many massacres in
Greece. Last but not least, the massacre of Distomo aimed to understand what was happening
in the Greek mountains during occupation, how collaborators worked with the Nazi
authorities, how political rivalries emerged in the resistance and how atrocities committed
upon local populations. The Greek Jewish survivors who returned both from the camps and
the mountains were constantly pre-occupied with political themes during and after the war,
and understand that the political turmoil affected them. This episode therefore, stood as a
mediator between the Jews during the war and the Jews in the years of post-war memory and
restitution (see final chapter).
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PART III: POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
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Chapter 5. Collaboration in Greek Politics, 1940-1945
Introduction
This chapter deals with the politics that prevailed in Greece throughout the war and
the mechanisms of collaboration. First, it deals with the political agenda of Greece
throughout the 40s, and second it challenges the issue of collaboration in Greece by exploring
the socio – political mechanisms under which the country found itself. The Greek political
elite kept alive the forces of monarchy (politics of old Greece) to shape the future political
agenda by destroying the revolutionary resistance that was winning public support. The
aforementioned political issues paved the way to shape Nazi legal decisions in Greece as a
whole that we shall discuss in the next chapter.
The section on collaboration gives an account on the political agenda of the Quisling
Governments during Axis Occupation, the role of the Security Battalions, para-statists, para-
militarists, fascists, and the politics of former king George II who was a great supporter of the
dictatorship of Metaxas. All aforementioned remained in the Greek air after the war was over
assuming post-war posts in the government and the army (Close, 1995a:153-154). At the
same time, the conflict between the Left and the Right-wing resistance groups during the
Nazi war paved the way for a new political entanglement to blow up (and since based on new
findings the nationalist right-wing EDES made truce with the Germans in many cases in
order to fight ELAS), discussing also the British policy which had a role on the latter issue as
well as shaping Greece’s political future (Stevens, 1982:44). In doing so, we do not seek to
criticize British politics during the Nazi Occupation as a whole, for no one can deny their
effort as a great ally and their contribution to the war against Nazism, but our analysis will
stay on their direct responsibility for releasing collaborators from Greek prisons to fight the
Left, and for supporting and funding post-war governments with uniquely fascistic
characteristics. These developments did not enable Greece to eradicate the fascistoid
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atmosphere after the war was over (Richter, 2006:298, 301-303). The politics of Churchill
pressured at all costs the Greek politicians in Cairo to support the Greek monarchy, despite
going against some of his party members, against much of British public opinion, against the
British Press and against “an overwhelming majority of Greek people”.63 In doing so, we will
appreciate better the mechanisms under which Greece was one of those countries in Europe
that did not prosecute the Nazis accordingly but instead, they murdered, tried, and exiled the
people who fought Nazism, accusing them for being enemies of the state. As a result, Greece
from the second part of the war and until 1950, the nationalist politics of the Right were more
concerned to eradicate leftism than Nazism, and they showed indifference towards punishing
the Nazi perpetrators (see Iatrides, 1995:9). Chapter 5 is crucial to understand the logic of the
next chapter, which will focus on the legal prosecutions. At the same time, I am raising
awareness towards analogous trends in other parts of Europe, namely civil conflicts,
collaboration, Allied intervention to fit post-war strategy, so as to address the military,
strategic and economic priorities of Allied Europe at the expense of punishment. This
discussion is part of an overall dialogue between collaboration and post-war appropriation, in
order to understand the poverty of legal aftermath in Greece in the following chapter.
Prolegomena
We are beginning our discussion with one of the most crucial parts in the history of
Greece during Axis occupation, namely our critique on the Greek politics that prevailed in
the 40s that led also to the conflict between the left and the right while they were still fighting
the Nazis. What concerns us in this chapter is that Greece fell really soon into the logic of
cold war, even before entering into the logic of civil war. Of course these two go hand in
hand since both achieved polarisations, but we need to bear in mind that countries with
63 Debate in the House of Commons, Independent member Driberg’s speech, 12/12/44 London , copy of
summary to the Greek Information Office, see Filippos Dragoumis Subfile:62.5 “Dekemvriana 1944”
(December Events 1944), Gennadius Library, Athens.
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massive resistance such as former Yugoslavia and Greece suffered the worst and experienced
the war and its aftermath much differently than the rest of the European family (Judt,
2010:35). Very soon, a question in Greece had to be answered; namely, what the Allies
should do with the unexpected growing size of resistance as well as the revolutionary
population after the war was over. For clearly, the politicians wanted to go back to the old
political agenda (i.e. crown), attack the political forces that were going against their values,
fighting any attempt of social revolution. We would agree here with Tony Judt, that Greece
and Yugoslavia’s war struggle and resistance was so enormous that cannot be compared with
any other country even though Greece’s resistance is less known. He declared that “there is
no doubt that the Greek resistance to the Italians and the Germans was more effective than
the better known resistance movements in France or Italy – in 1943-44 alone it killed or
wounded over 6,000 German soldiers” (Judt, 2010: 35). There are other reasons however that
enabled effective resistance in the above countries, including many parts of France and Nazi-
Occupied Poland. These geographical positions were extremely mountainous unlike most
north western countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark. The extreme altitudes in some
parts of the European continent favoured the birth of resistance activity as it was easy to hide,
surprise the enemy, and make the Nazi operations difficult to implement (Lande, 2000:10).
Greece’s terrain therefore contributed to the birth of an effective resistance activity as “over
three-fourths of Greece’s land area is mountainous – a roller coaster of almost abysmal
gorges and mile-high mountain peaks” (Lande, 2000:159). As Lande declares:
“Of all the occupied countries in Europe, only a few regions had terrain
conducive to guerrilla warfare. In east central Europe there were Carpathian
Poland, Yugoslavia, and Greece. But in the north west, only Norway north of
Oslo provided the mountainous and wooded terrain needed” (Lande, 2000:73).
Moreover, in countries such as former Yugoslavia and Greece, the brutal war never
really ended in 1944, but extended for many years resulting to too many human losses due to
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internal and external political involvements (Judt, 2010:35). Perhaps we could argue here,
that Greece’s resistance is less known because, in order to know it, one must look at the same
time the tacit and toxic political manoeuvres that were imposed in Greece by the Greek
politicians and their Allies. The war in Greece extended for many years and although the
country numbered several thousand victims from the Nazi brutalities, the casualties resulting
from internal conflicts between the right which was loyal to king George II and the left which
was against the old political guard (i.e. crown), were even higher (ibid). The fragmented
political atmosphere that occurred in Greece for decades was described quite vividly by one
of the former prime ministers of the Greek government - in - exile, Emmanuel Tsouderos,
arguing that:
“Since the occupation a terrible civil war has been the symptom or
consequence of national disunity and has divided us into slaughterers and
slaughtered. And what is worse, this costly clash occurs at internationally
critical moment, when post-war political and economic antagonism between
the Great Powers of West and East, Allies of the last war, tends to develop into
a new world war. The differences between the supporters of the monarchy and
the republic, of communism and anti-communism, of the rebels and anti-rebels,
of pre-Anglo-Americans and pro-Russians, constitute the facets of the
country’s complex and most serious internal problem...” 64
The key reason for the political anomaly that prevailed in Greece throughout the 40s
was the fear from the part of the Allies and the Greek politicians that after Hitler’s fall, the
country would pass in to the hands of a possible communist dictatorship, and that
EAM/ELAS would seize power by force.65 This speculation came along with Churchill’s
decision to support the old politics of Greece (i.e. crown), enabling at the same time his
strategic post war policy to open the links between the West and the East (i.e. Suez Canal,
64 See “Translation of a series of five articles by M. Emm. Tsouderos, former prime minister, published in
‘Vima’ of 22nd to 26th April on the internal situation of Greece”, single page file number: xiv-1, in Tsouderos
File:14 “Exthrikai Thiriodiai” (Enemy’s Ferocities), Gennadius Library, Athens.
65 CAB 101/250, Churchill to General Wilson [Italy] and Mr Leeper [Athens], 08/11/44.
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Indonesia, Egypt), establishing therefore “routes to the vital oil supplies” in the region, as
well as strengthening Britain’s position worldwide. Greece, for that matter – and given its
crucial geopolitical location – was the guarantee of the above interests, and the latter could
never have been achieved without a “friendly regime” for Britain established in Greece.
Hence, Britain sought to establish this “friendly” regime in the face of Greek king George II
who was yet a dictator and an open advocate of Hitler and Mussolini66 (Sfikas, 1991:310,
same in Hondros, 1988:33). SOE wrote in their Memorandum: “hooligans were freely used
by the ‘Royalist Club’ who threatened people with death whistle lots of others were victims
of aggression” (HS 5/242, Image: 00088, Memorandum).
The fact that the movement of EAM/ELAS was thriving towards the end of the Nazi
war in Greece enjoying overwhelming public support, made British and Greek elite’s future
plans difficult, for the emerging leftist phenomenon in Greece was translated into an
obsession as to whether the country would fall in to the hands of a possible left-wing
dictatorship (Alexander, 1982: 245-246). This hypothesis however, overshadowed what
actually did occur, namely not a left-wing but a right-wing dictatorship. Political figures both
in Greece and Britain such as Winston Churchill and Georgios Papandreou (prime minister of
the Government-in-exile) as well as Emmanuel Tsouderos (former Greek prime minister in
Cairo), stated many times in public and written speeches about the possibility of the Left to
seize power after the Nazis left the country.67 There are also numerous telegrams between the
first two leaders expressing their anxiety as to how they will prevail in Greece against the
left, where Papandreou and the coalition government in Cairo wrote to Churchill asking him
66 In fact, Greek crown was so openly fascistic and dictatorial, not only because there was a “dual dictatorship of
King and Metaxas”, but because the king recruited in a “compulsory” way in his ranks young boys by poisoning
them with “principles of Nazism and Fascism into them” (HS 5/242, Image: 000091, Memorandum).
67 See for example Tsouderos’s views concerning the future politics of Greece after the German departure in
Tsouderos File, 14: “Exthrikai Thiriodiai” (Enemy’s Ferocities), single file number: xiv-1, Gennadius Library,
Athens. See also Churchill’s views against a leftish prospect in Greece in Churchill: Press Conference,
December 27th 1944 in Filippos Dragoumis File Sub-file:62.5 “Dekemvriana”, Gennadius Library, Athens.
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for help in order to avoid the Greek left to seize power, maintaining in this way Georgios
Papandreou’s position (the eldest) as a future Prime Minister in post-war Greece, as well as
preventing an imminent civil war. 68
As we mentioned earlier, although the Greek and British authorities feared that the
Left would win the political elections after liberation, nothing of the above happened and
certainly the civil war was not prevented. On the contrary, it was carefully preserved by both
Greek and British policies in order for monarchy to return in the country and the terrorism of
right-wing gangs and collaborators to thrive throughout, as they were used as mediators to
return to the old regime. We can see from the above personal letters of Churchill how the
democratic right of the people to choose their own politicians in the after-math Greece was
deeply suppressed. Although the State Department informed the Allies and in particular
Churchill and Roosevelt that their insistence in bringing the king back (given that he was
unwanted) would automatically mean “political upheaval and even civil war”, they insisted
and clashed with the major anti-Nazi resistance of EAM/ELAS (Sfikas, 1991:314).
What worries us in this chapter in particular is that the political obsession concerning
a possible communist takeover in Greece overshadowed the alternative politics they
suggested and actually ruled the country which were based on fascism, authoritarianism,
nationalism and far-rightism. As a result, the system of collaboration which was supported by
royalists and right-wingers during Nazi occupation was preserved so as to return back to
monarchy after liberation. The need to establish order in Greece especially in the years 1945-
1950 was given in the hands of the extreme right wing groups (known as the period of
“White Terror”) who were in fact funded by people who “profited from economic
collaboration”. These policies not only suppressed the population as well as all forms of
68 Confidential telegram to the British Embassy: 10/12/44, in Filippos Dragoumis sub-file: 62.3 “Politika-
Politiaka” (Political-Civic), Gennadius Library, Athens.
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political opposition, but the preservation of monarchy was seeing precisely as a key to
preserve “traditional values and practices” which were shaken by the Left during the war
(Close, 1995b: 125-126).69
King George II after all, not only supported the fascist dictatorship of Metaxas in
1936 but returned to his seat a year after with a cooked referendum. However, the majority of
the Greek population (around “80-90 per cent”- a number which was estimated by royalists
themselves) was negative towards the monarchy (Sfikas, 1991:312). Sfikas suggests that it
was 80-90 % of the population that did not want the king. The official statement of SOE gave
a 70% antipathy, while arguing at the same time that all political parties in Greece were
unanimous against the crown by signing a “United Declaration Front Declaration against the
King” in the summer of 1943 (SOE, HS5/ 242, Image: 00059, 18 July 1943, Most Secret:
“Formation of Shadow Government”). People’s fear and hostility towards the crown was
justified on the grounds that the latter would restore a new right-wing dictatorship, and these
were realistic fears and imminent possibilities that the Foreign Office and Churchill knew
very well, but they carried out their policies anyway (Sfikas, 1991:312).
It is not difficult therefore to start guessing why the collaborators were never chased
or charged in Greece after the war was over, for these were the enabling factor for the old
monarchical agenda to continue in Greece suppressing all opposition. There are many things
to explore here that we will see later on in order to explain the poverty of legal prosecution in
the next chapter (chapter 6). But still we need to always remind ourselves why we will be
giving emphasis to these events; and that is because all these political tactics, provided the
ground for nationalism and authoritarian ideology to prevail in Greece. It was a regime that
was built on military grounds in the late 40s and 50s allowing nothing else but what we know
69 See here David Close’s explicit analysis of the right-wing politics in Greece as they were re-established in the
post war years, in his essay “The Changing Structure of the Right, 1945-1950” in Greece at the Crossroads: The
Civil War and its Legacy, 1995, pp 122-156.
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in Greece as ethnikofrosini (Greek “National Mindedness”) “establishing a repressive, anti-
communist post-civil war state” (Karakatsanis, 2001: 30). The left and its supporters were
seen as the enemy in the emerging political agenda of Greece and since the bourgeois agenda
was pro-fascist, consequences of Nazism, fascism and of the Greek Holocaust as an integral
part of the Greek history that had to be re-visited were totally ignored. All the
aforementioned were considered as an anathema to the new Greek nation that was emerging,
and the political and military authorities in Greece did not care about the collaborators at all
(ibid). The years and decades that followed came with persecutions, tortures, exiles, “martial
laws” and “emergency decrees” for those who resisted not only the Nazi ideology but the so-
called old Greece. Anything new and progressive was forbidden for it was considered by
definition communistic and anarchic. Mazower in this way reflects upon the post-war Greek
phenomenon with excellent understanding and transparency, arguing that “nationalism and
anti-communism went hand in hand” in order to secure order as well as saving the
Christian/Nationalist values of the state (Mazower, 2000:216).70
This political trend was not new in Greece. It existed before the war when monarchy
and the dictatorship of Metaxas in the 30s promoted “a fascist ideology, corresponding to the
nationalist chauvinism of the petty bourgeoisie to which Metaxas himself belonged” but
undoubtedly without social approval (Tsoucalas, 1969:54-55). The fascistic regime of
Metaxas had a tremendous impact on the Greek Jews. The political turmoil that prevailed in
the 30s changed dramatically the way in which the people saw the Jews. The dictatorship
along with the fascistic ideology of the Greek palace served to spread anti-Jewish sentiments
and propaganda in an agenda of “heavy censorship and control” (Dawidowicz, 1990: 469).
70 See here Mazower’s powerful analysis of the political and national trends in Greece after the war in his essay
“The Cold War and the Appropriation of Memory: Greece after liberation” in The Politics of Retribution in
Europe : World War and its Aftermath, 2000: 212-232.
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The Dictator Ioannis Metaxas rushed to externalise his unconditional love towards the Nazi
regime. The fascist leader stated:
“Since August 4th Greece has become anti-communist anti-parliamentary,
totalitarian State. Its agrarian and labour foundations make it plutocratic. Thus,
if Hitler and Mussolini were really fighting for the ideology they preach, they
should be supporting Greece with all their forces” (quoted in Tsoucalas,
1969:55).71
In order to summarize some of the aforementioned arguments, we could argue here
that there was a pressure to create a new society based on a strong nationalist identity that
supported the current political and social status quo. This trend was supported before and
after the war, thus the poverty of a just legal prosecution of the collaborators as well as the
mechanisms that preserved the agenda of Nazism was seeing as a seat-belt against any other
political movement. Since many Greek politicians and their Allies supported this political
development in Greece, responsibility was carefully suspended, and a number of
collaborators assumed power the following decades, as we shall see.
Political and Armed Collaboration
The collaborationist governments in Greece are classified as puppet governments
(Lemkin, 1944:191). The term “puppet” does not aim to reduce the responsibility of
collaboration among the quisling prime ministers, for all countries had the famous Vichy
Syndrome72 to a greater or lesser degree (Judt, 2010:808). Here, the use of the term puppet
aims at describing the nature as well as strength of sovereignty that these governments had in
relation to the Nazi decisions on a military as well as administrative level. In countries such
71 The coup of “4th August” 1936 refers to the collaboration of Metaxas with king George II. Both suspended
democracy by destroying the parliament and imposed barbaric laws. Metaxas sought to excuse his action
arguing that he wanted to change the course of history which was heading towards “anarchy” (Woodhouse,
1976:185, see also, Clogg, 2002:26-27).
72 Rousso, 1991.
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as France, Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia, Luxemburg and the Netherlands, the Nazis
appointed or else “installed occupation administrations” and “quasi-independent
governments” in order to implement their totalitarian laws. In contrast, countries that
officially allied with Hitler, such as Bulgaria, Italy, Albania (Italian Protectorate), Hungary
and Romania we can no longer speak of puppet governments for they are classified as axis
countries or axis governments, while Czechoslovakia, Austria, and the General Gouvernment
were annexed to the Reich (Heberer, 2011:41-42). Raphael Lemkin gives a precise definition
of the “puppet government” and differentiates it with the “puppet state” during occupation in
Europe. He argues that:
“The puppet government is organised as a cabinet with a prime minister or a
president as the head. Its activities are controlled by the occupant. The puppet
governments have essentially retained the local authorities (with the exception
of agencies whose members are elected by the population) and are using them
for the administration of the country. Puppet governments now function in
Norway, in the part of Yugoslavia organised by the occupant as Serbia, in
Greece, in France (Pétain and Laval) and, with certain special restriction, in the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Puppet states are to be distinguished
from puppet governments. A puppet state is an entirely new organism created
by the occupant, whereas in a puppet government only the governmental
functions are a creation of the occupant, the original state having been in
existence before the occupation. Slovakia and Croatia are examples of puppet
states” (Lemkin, 1944:11). 73
However, even among the puppet governments we can see substantial differences and
those between France and Greece are quite enlightening. Despite the fact that both countries
have been classified as puppet governments and undeniably the quisling prime ministers
collaborated, yet the conditions under which these governments were installed are different.
73 Another example of a “puppet state” was the small fascist republic of Salò in Italy. Here, the puppet state of
Salò did not show any sympathy to the Jews, despite the fact that in some Italian occupied regions deportation
was not allowed. Salò “adopted a charter which deprived Jews of citizenship and declared the Jews to be an
‘enemy nationality’” (Steinberg, 1990: 7).
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In France we cannot speak exactly of installation of a puppet government, for the Vichy
Government sprung from the Third Republic which was supported by the French people prior
to the occupation, gaining constitutional legitimacy. Once the country fell, the French cabinet
did not resign and capitulated with some loud exceptions such as that of Reynaud’s who
issued his resignation informing Churchill that “many members of the government were
inclining towards an armistice” (Jackson, 2003:104). In fact Reynaud’s resignation not only
ensured Pétain’s leading wheel, but confirmed the growing opposition against the former’s
politics as more and more governmental figures – “the majority” – were ready for armistice
with the Nazis (Jackson, 2003:138-139; see also Greene, 1970:127). This political majority
(now a Pétain majority) was authorized with French votes, as the “deputies voted for Laval’s
proposal giving all powers to Pétain by a vote of 569 to 80” (Dank, 1974:31).
The opposite occurred in Greece. Once the Axis troops invaded, the country was left
literally ungoverned as the royal family, the government of Papandreou, and the remaining
parties fled to Cairo (Lande, 2000:162). The Government of Papandreou did not recognise
the authority of the Nazi administration unlike the majority of the French administration that
chose to remain in France and follow Pétain and Hitler.74 Chris Woodhouse wrote in the
Apple of Discord the following: “The Rallis Government had no constitutional standing; its
leader had been formally deprived of his Greek citizenship by the legitimate government in
Egypt; the members of the Security Battalions had been publicly warned by the Greek and
Allied authorities...” (Woodhouse, 1948: 96). Unlike Greece, Milton Dank declares in his
opening remarks of his book The French against the French , that “France was not the only
defeated and occupied country, but it was the only one in which collaboration with Hitler was
74 Of course there were some exceptions. Some political figures from the collapsed Third Republic abandoned
France to avoid treason decrees from Pétain (Lemkin, 1944:180). However the majority as previously stated
sited with Pétain and Hitler.
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official policy and in which tens of thousands of the occupied eagerly served the conqueror
against their fellow country-men” (Dank, 1974:5).
The people of ungoverned Greece found representation in the Provisional
Government or else the “Mountain Government” of EAM/ELAS that was set up to represent
the will of the people (Lande, 2000:162). It was then, that the Nazis appointed the three
collaborationist governments in Greece as we shall see in the next section, for there was no
legitimate political body to represent the official Nazi policy. Despite the fact that in this
chapter we attack the Greek royal family for its genuine dictatorial agenda, and the
Papandreou Government for provoking the Greek resistance and for using the collaborators
after liberation so as the former to come back in power and destroy the political influence of
the resistance, the comparison between the political leadership of Greece and France during
occupation is provided to show how both responded once the Nazis invaded their territories.
On the first level of Greek collaboration there were three governments who signed the
agreement of capitulation with the Nazis. The first quisling prime minister was Georgios
Tsolakoglou and his cabinet along with the bureaucratic mechanism that supported it. He
signed an agreement of national obedience with the Germans on the 26th April 1941, hoping
that in this way he will save the “national” and “ethnological” character of his nation
(Fleischer, 1995a: 353-354). A few days before, on the 20th April, he ordered all the forces of
the Greek Army to give up their arms and go home, after signing a letter with the German
Commander Dietrich an unconditional surrender. In the book he wrote while at prison,
Georgios Tsolakoglou sought to excuse his collaboration with the Nazis on the grounds of
saving the young generations of Greece from a “certain slaughter” and from a war that was
already lost. He even dared to say that his “decision to capitulate was the bravest of all man’s
acts” (Tsolakoglou, 1956: 140-141, 131,134). His government contained a small group of
seven politicians, some of which were Konstantinos Logothetopoulos (Professor of
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Gynaecology) and Nikolaos Louvaris (the Dean of Theological School). His government
soon weakened and many resignations were issued. One of the chief Nazi personnel in
Greece, Altenburg, considered Tsolakoglou a weak card that would not be able to fulfil his
responsibilities and soon was replaced by Logothetopoulos. Within a year there were three
replacements, with the last one that of Ioannis Rallis in 1942. The latter was considered more
capable for the Nazi machine as he wanted to restore the “collaborationist regime” in Greece
and destroy the massive resistance (Fleischer, 1995a: 354-355, 360, see also Woodhouse,
1976a:51). For that reason, Ioannis Rallis in 1943 formed the “Security Battalions”, which
was a brutal army force also known as “Germano-tsoliades” that was under German control.
This Nazi collaboration army was designed to provoke and destroy the Greek resistance.75
They were considered part of the Evzones (the royal guard of the palace), heavily equipped
with a nationalist agenda and a rhetoric of an anti-communist crusade, using exclusively Nazi
arms to fight people’s movement. Many nationalists volunteered and entered the Security
Battalions as their size was boosted by the fanatic support and collaboration of the police
force (Kostopoulos, 2005:16-17).
Again, like Tsolakoglou, Ioannis Rallis tried to excuse his collaboration with the
Germans on the basis of saving the Greek population from a worldwide war which was
impossible to be won by a small destitute population like the Greeks and the latter would not
make a difference by building a resistance (Rallis, 1947:21). One of the most brutal members
of Security Battalions was Dionysios Papadogonas, who had in his possession by 1943 “1000
trusty national-minded men” in order to fight EAM/ELAS. The Security Battalions were
stationed in numerous parts of Greece apart from Athens, such as Salonika, Tripoli, Meligala,
Crete, and in many other regions, spreading terror to local populations (Kostopoulos, 2005:
18-23). Another well known figure of the Security Battalions was Georgios Papadopoulos
75 Woodhouse here suggests that Rallis’s Security Battalions were invented first by the dictator Pangalos
(1976a: 52).
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who appeared in the Nazi units in the city of Patras (Peloponnese). The former fascist
Dictator who ruled Greece in 1967-1974, not only survived the judiciary but the Greek
political system kept him alive deliberately throughout the decades in order to fight the left-
wing resistance, and later with the help of CIA, the Greek royal family and the Greek
intelligence formed a double coup d’état (royal and military) on the grounds of saving the
country from the Greek Left (Kostopoulos, 2005:146-147).
Furthermore, other armed forces with a highly nationalist and Nazi agenda were the
units of Georgios Poulos. Georgios Poulos was the leader of the anti-Semitic EEE whose
forces targeted communists and Jews. As we already mentioned in chapter 2, this Nazi party
was formed in the late 20s; they were destroyed and later re-formed with the rise of Hitlerism
(Dordanas, 2006:117-120). Poulos’s Nazi beliefs were so fanatic, that he volunteered to work
as a German spy and as a “Sonderkommando 2000”. Although EEE was not popular in
Greece, yet, Poulos with his support from the Wermacht units committed murders “of
unpredictable savagery” in Salonika and in other parts of Northern Greece. His unit was
attacked many times by the arms of EAM/ELAS destroying more than a third of his power
(Mazower, 1993:338-339).
Poulos is also known for his collaboration with Max Merten who was one of the three
architects of the destruction of Salonika Jewry. Poulos helped Max Merten to carry out
bestial deeds against Greek and Jewish civilians and confiscated numerous Jewish properties
and stores who took them as a gift from Max Merten (Dordanas, 2011:402-404). He
collaborated with members of the Security Battalions who in turn worked for Nazi officials in
order to build “an anti-communist front” in Greece and attack the resistance (Dordanas,
2006:129). We will come back later to Georgios Poulos and Max Merten in the next chapter.
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Another known collaborator who was involved in the destruction of Greek Jewry in
Salonika was Vasilis Simonides. According to Andrew Apostolou, not much attention has
been given to this figure. Vasilis Simonides was one of the two administrative chiefs and
central governors of Salonika who was not charged for collaboration. He played the
bureaucratic key role for the decisions made against Salonika Jews and although did not take
decisions for himself, yet his name and signature was present in every paper work in the city
of Thessaloniki. His name and “stamp” gives undeniable evidence that he formally accepted
and approved the Anti-Semitic decisions in the town (Apostolou, 2000:176; same in Rozen,
2005:127). In chapter 6 we will see that he escaped the judiciary.
Furthermore and concerning collaboration, there were also other small (supposedly
independent) groups that were on the side of the Nazis. For instance, in northern areas of the
country such as the periphery of Greek Macedonia, many small organisations stationed in
Salonika collaborated with the Germans. Their excuse was that they were fighting the
communists; a danger which was thought to last longer than the Nazi occupier. The
communist party in Greece accused them of collaboration, and in particular they accused the
organisation of PAO (an ultra-nationalist/ anti-communist group)76 of turning a blind eye to
the Germans and not attacking them (Woodhouse, 1976a: 146-147). In fact Woodhouse
argues that the region of Greek Macedonia was hostile to the minorities who were situated
there, and so hosted many nationalist and collaborationist organisations. Woodhouse
furthermore declared that the Nazi authorities exploited the “Slavo-Macedonians”, the
“Vlachs” and “Tsams” who lived there, and used them to provoke the Greek population,
while the latter minority (the Tsams) was slaughtered and almost eradicated by the resistance
of EDES, after Zervas openly accused them of collaborating with the Germans in order to
secure their privileges in the region (Woodhouse, 1976a:148-149).
76 PAO stands for “Panellinios Apeleftherotiki Organosis” (National Greek Liberation Organisation).
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The size of armed collaboration in Occupied Greece which included many groups that
we already mentioned along with smaller independent groups numbered “between 25,000 and
30,000 men”. It was a size which yet could not be compared with the anti-Nazi force of
ELAS which alone started with 35,000 arms excluding the size of the remaining anti-Nazi
groups such as EDES and EKKA (Kalyvas, 2008: 132). In 1944 and towards the end of the
war, ELAS had 100,000 arms in its possession (Stafford, 1980:196) Last but not least;
another collaboration scheme that was independent but developed mainly after the war was
the organisation “X”. This organisation was headed by the anti-communist, ultra-nationalist
and para-statist Colonel Georgios Grivas. He was a para-statist as he had connections with
the political world of Greece flirting with other collaborators and the police. He was also
responsible for the killings of many people during the events of Cyprus, before Archbishop
Makarios II fell (as he attempted to overthrow him) and the Turkish troops occupied illegally
the north side of the island (Byford, 1959:39-40).
The action of “x” will be understood better in the forthcoming sections of this chapter.
However, we tried to give to the reader at this stage a first taste of the mechanism of
collaboration in Greece, so as to be able to follow the rationale in the remaining sections,
where we will come back to these issues. To be able to understand the politics of
collaboration as well as the legal aftermath in Greece, we need to understand the political
dynamics that prevailed within the resistance and see how the latter shaped both the future
politics as well as the legal aftermath.
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The ELAS – EDES conflict and the British Foreign Policy
Perhaps we need to see first closely the everyday atmosphere that marked Greece’s
aftermath. In order to do so, we will continue exactly where we stopped in chapter 4, namely
the Distomo Massacre. We left deliberately unattached in the previous chapter, a small part of
our interview with Giannis, whose father was a member of the ELAS and who fought the
Nazis outside Distomo (in the village of Stiri). In doing so, we wish to give to the reader a
first taste of the political terrorism that was prevailing in Greece. When I asked Giannis to
describe to me what happened to his father after the tragic events of Distomo in 10 June 1944
and once the Nazis left the country, he said that the “worst consequences” for the partisans
came precisely after the war was over.77 He argued that the partisans were betrayed many
times by locals in the villages who worked together with the collaborators and the “para-
statists” in order to find and arrest the partisans of ELAS. A number of locals provoked the
partisans with questions: “why do you resist? Stay here and be quite! Germans are friends
and won’t hurt us if we remain quite!” Giannis told me that his house was set on fire two
times as an “act of revenge”, and once the civil war broke out “literally everyone who took
part in the resistance was considered an enemy of the state” (Giannis, Distomo, 29 September
2009). He declared that:
“[...] after the war, the State was consisted mainly by Greek Collaborators with
the help of the British and the Americans of course. Those who should have
been prosecuted in the first place, such as the Nazis and their collaborators, as
it happened throughout Europe; here in fact, the State gave these people
badges. [...] The severe consequences for the families who fought Nazism
77 The “worst” came for the partisans after the war, not because the conditions of the war were better before the
end of the war, but because after the Varkiza Agreement, the partisans gave up their arms to the British. Since
the Greek and British authorities disarmed only the leftists, the right-wingers and the collaborators now chased
them unarmed. Thus, without arms the partisans suffered the “worst”. Keith Lowe argues that one of the most
serious mistakes ELAS made was to give up their arms as well as to sign the Varkiza Agreement, for “once
disarmed, former andartes were no longer in a position to defend themselves, and were often mercilessly
pursued by their enemies” (Lowe, 2012:310).
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came afterwards in the civil war. For example, my father after the famous
events of December 1944 in Athens, he disarmed after the Varkiza Agreement
and received a diploma. Disarmed as he was, he returned back to his home in
Arachova, were a group of “dosilogoi”78 (collaborators) were waiting for him
and beat him severely. They broke his teeth and he was nearly in coma. They
took his war diary, his military diploma of ELAS and everything else! And all
these happened to my father who had no idea what the KKE or Soviet Union
were. So basically my father fought the Nazis, left his house, risked everything,
came back home with holes in his boots, hungry to death, and the reward was
that he was considered an enemy of the Greek State. At least, this is what
happened in Greece” (Giannis, Distomo, 29 September 2009).
So why all these things happened in Greece and why there was no legal prosecution?
It is important to mention the political developments within the resistance forces as well as
the nature of the politics inside and outside Greece. EAM/ ELAS resistance was winning
public support from very early in the war and the culminating point was October 1943 when
ELAS and nationalist EDES officially started open conflicts in many parts of the country
(Fleischer, 1995b:224-25; see also Sarafis, 1946:139). The sudden and severe clash between
the armed bands of resistance made Leeper send a telegram to the Greek Government in
Cairo and the British Foreign Office in 16th October 1943 that the ELAS/EDES were
officially in open civil war, urging the political forces to support the right wing resistance of
EDES (FO 371/37206 R: 10268 ). The first conflict in the years 1943-1944 known as the
“first round” between the ELAS and EDES bands occurred in a poisoned political
atmosphere that one can easily detect the early signs of the civil war. The leaders of ELAS
were informed about the hostility of EDES and called their guerrillas to be ready for a
counterattack, while Zervas from the other camp was sending many letters and reports to the
78 Dosilogoi (plural) or dosilogismos (adjective) is the official word in Greek language for collaboration which
does not only imply collaboration, but literally means “giving” people to the hand s of the enemy.
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Greek government in Cairo accusing ELAS’s leader, Ares Velouchiotis79, for preparing
Greece for the “dictatorship of the proletariat” (Fleischer, 1995b: 225-226).
However, in the beginning of the partisan war against the Germans both groups were
working very well together against the Nazi regime, although coming from different
ideological backgrounds.80 EDES was right-wing/ nationalist and loyal to the king whereas
the political body of the ELAS, that is EAM, was communistic in its core but very centrist in
its majority as it attracted people from various political parties of the left and centre
(Woodhouse, 1982:50).
Both Napoleon Zervas (leader of EDES) and Ares Velouchiotis (leader of ELAS)
agreed from the very beginning of the war not to recruit people from territories that the one or
the other were controlling and therefore their relations until 1942 remained extremely
“warm” (Fleischer, 1995a:246). Zervas was controlling a small part of Epirus (North West of
Greece), while the rest of north, central, and south Greece was controlled by Velouchiotis. In
October 1st of the same year, British saboteurs of (SOE) fell in Greece to support military aid
and food, and in order to help the resistance against Nazism. Among the chiefs of the British
Mission were Christopher Montague Woodhouse (known as “Chris”), Brigadier Eddie Myers
(chief of the allied mission in Central Greece), Wallace (political advisor of Myers) and J.M.
Stevens. All worked together remarkably well and one of the most successful operations in
Greece was to blow up Gorgopotamos Bridge in 25 October 1942 (Fleischer, 1995a: 245-
247). Apart from the Gorgopotamos Bridge operation ( “Operation Harling”), the most
successful anti-Nazi sabotage occurred two years later, when the Greeks and British attacked
the Germans in Penios River (in the province of Thessaly), resulting to 950 Nazi casualties
79 Ares Velouchiotis (war name). Ares’ real name was Athanasios Klaras.
80 It was after all one of Churchill’s callings, that is, all resistance bands irrespective of their political beliefs
should unite together against the Nazi occupier (Gerolymatos, 2005:117).
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among which 450 were dead. In this successful operation, Germans themselves argued that it
“was the greatest disaster in Greece since the occupation”. 81
The early signs of conflict however between the ELAS and EDES came when the
British Generals decided to go on together with EDES in the war. Ares Velouchiotis in his
attempt to establish connections with the British, asked Brigadier Eddie Myers (SOE) to
leave an open “link” with them in case they wanted extra food and ammunition. Myers gave
him “an abstract” answer, arguing that most British had to leave Greece and station in Cairo
and only Woodhouse would supervise Greece following EDES. The discomfort of ELAS
increased when BBC emphatically reported the sophisticated and highly successful operation
of the British and EDES in Gorgopotamos Bridge, without mentioning anything about
ELAS’s men who took part in the operation and were greater in numbers (Fleischer, 1995a:
246-247).
Furthermore, and concerning ELAS’s disappointment towards the British, General
Sarafis (chief of ELAS, who preceded Ares Velouchiotis) in his book ELAS: Greek
Resistance Army, criticized Chris Woodhouse for taking the initiative in October 1943 to
send more men of EDES in some parts of Epirus which were controlled by ELAS in order to
strengthen their power there, breaching territorial agreements and without the consent of
ELAS. In fact Sarafis did not understand why the British operated in this way since all
resistance bands along with the Allies were working efficiently against the occupiers in
different regions, and all together when necessary. However the aforementioned operations
were catalytic for starting a war between EDES and ELAS (Sarafis, 1946:139). It was
catalytic, for securing and not entering the territories of each partisan band - as Brigadier
Myers argued - was a pre-condition and a “formal agreement” between the different guerrilla
81 HS 8/899: image 6, S.O.E. Activities, Summary for the Prime Minister, Quarter: January to March 1944.
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bands and the Middle East (Myers, 1985:130). As ELAS’s chief Stefanos Sarafis wrote in his
wartime memoirs:
“In my opinion it was really from political motives that major Chris and Miller
had ordered these operations: they were trying to establish Zervas throughout
Epirus so that when he had built up strength they could use him against ELAS.
These endeavours on the part of the British and Zervas caused continual
friction, and this eventually led to the clash between ELAS and EDES in
October 1943. It is remarkable that they chose the very moment when ELAS
was involved in operations against the Italians and Germans throughout
Greece” (Sarafis, 1946:139).
From the very beginning of the war, the British showed exceptional interest in
Napoleon Zervas and his EDES unit, although they were aware that the Greek population
found support on ELAS. However, Zervas himself did not wish in the beginning to join
mountain resistance, as he preferred to stay in Athens. In fact Chris Woodhouse in his book
The Struggle for Greece 1941-1949, argues that the Foreign Office and the SOE literally
struggled to convince Zervas to form a resistance organisation. They had to employ methods
of bribing in order for Zervas to go to the mountains, such as when they offered him “twenty-
four thousand gold sovereigns”, but still he refused (Woodhouse, 1976b:29; same in Lande,
2000:165). On the same matter, Fleischer argues that not only Zervas was bribed to organise
a resistance, but there was a general tendency men from the right- wing bloc to be hesitant to
organise themselves against the Nazis, and in fact many collaborated with the Nazis, as we
shall see (Fleischer, 1995a:317).
The profile of Zervas was very controversial to the eyes of many, as he was involved
in many coup d’états before the war82, and the final ultimatum from SOE came when they
82 In fact, many officers around “900” joined EDES organisation but who were involved in coups in the previous
decade, and who later were “replaced” by pro-royal figures since Zervas was gradually altering his political
profile in order to become clearly a pro-monarchist (see Veremis, T and Gerolymatos, A, 1991:112).
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threatened to accuse him of collaborating with the Germans unless he went to the mountains
(Woodhouse, 1976b:29). British Major Stevens in one of his reports to London made an
analogous remark concerning Zervas’s ambivalent past, arguing that apart from his war
effort, he was an opportunist and concerned more about his political profile later as a
prospective minister in the cabinet. Stevens from SOE reported to London that his suspicious
pre-war persona and “murky past is not forgotten by the Greeks”, and although he fought to
re-establish himself as a royalist and a hard opponent of the dictatorship, these attempts
“made people laugh” (Stevens, 1982:24).
Moreover and concerning British attitudes towards the guerrilla development in
Greece, Brigadier Chris Woodhouse himself argued in a very rare documentary (called
“Greece: The Hidden War”) which was banned in the United Kingdom after the copy was
destroyed in 1986 following revelations about the role of the British in Greece, that the
Foreign Office and the SOE preferred to have really small resistance bands in the Greek
region and all under British control. Such a policy however, created problems to ELAS which
was massive and “self-organised”. In fact Woodhouse in the same interview admitted that a
member from the Foreign Office at that time expressed his worries concerning the growing
size of anti-Nazi resistance, arguing that it would have been better if there was no resistance
at all in Greece and “that the best level of sabotage in Greece would be no sabotage at all”.83
83 See Woodhouse’s interview in the British political documentary “Greece: The Hidden War”. This very rare
documentary was first broadcasted in 06/01/1986 in the British Television and only once. The documentary
includes exclusive interviews from British Officers for the first time, revealing many hidden aspects of the
Greek resistance and the extent of British intervention in the Greek civil war. As a result the documentary was
not allowed to be shown again and the copy was destroyed. The remaining copy was found and bought by the
Greek Television (ERT), and was last broadcasted in April 2006 by the Greek Journalist Stelios Kouloglou and
his TV programme “Thematiki Vradia” (Thematic Night), see:
http://web.archive.org/web/20080229103239/http://thematikivradia.ert.gr/details.asp?id=2610&catid=3469.
The copy is in English with Greek subtitles and is now available to watch on you tube: (PART 1)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tXb5YkQeDM&feature=related, and (PART 2):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U3J4v4KNDQI&feature=related
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The growing size of the resistance in Greece scared the British as they feared that
their geo-political strategy would not be implemented in Greece. They had to find ways to
support an organisation (such as EDES) that could fit their agenda. D. J. Wallace’s report to
the Foreign Office in 4th September 1944 showed his reassurance that despite difficulties, the
British strategy will be fully implemented and that EDES was a safeguard of British interests
after the war was over in Greece. In this sense, Zervas and his resistance, was seen as a
“British creation” and an “instrument in our hands” (Wallace, 1982: 120). He further wrote to
London about Zervas that:
“He is holding securely a beach- head and an area, in which Allied troops
might be landed any time we wished or in which the Royal Greek Government
would be able, if need be when the time comes, to set itself up in Greece. All
this is an immense change from the time when we decided on this policy.
Zervas has in fact long ceased to be a liability; he has become an asset and is
capable of being a major factor in any general policy we wish to pursue in
Greece” (Wallace, 1982:121).
Although the British Officers recognised ELAS as catalytic for the anti-Nazi war
since it was massive and very well organised, it was the only way in which the British foreign
policy could be implemented, that is, by supporting EDES (Woodhouse, 1982: 80).
Woodhouse started to worry a lot when he understood that ELAS was winning the support of
the people for their anti-Nazi war and because towards the end of occupation it was
controlling the majority of the Greek land. Such a prospect would have gone against British
plans who wanted to bring the Greek king back and establish Right-wing politics, and
therefore their relationship with the Elasites started to break.84 Woodhouse understood
84 J.M. Stevens in one of his reports to London, argued that the British plans were difficult to be implemented
since there was “not one Right –wing organisation in Free Greece” or in the major cities, and that such a reality
would make it difficult for Britain to bring the king back. The alternative choice that could have been proved as
a “strong card” was the “pro-British” sentiments of the Greek civilians. To do so nevertheless, would require
very careful manoeuvres, for the British had to avoid being seen as the protagonists for bringing the king back
“against the will of the people” (Stevens, 1982:44-45).
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ELAS’s suspicions, knowing that they were operating against the partisans, and as the former
wrote: British “efforts were made in our interests and not theirs” (Woodhouse, 1982:92).
The clash between the two resistance bands continued for years, so too the British
policy. The only solution to sustain the above foreign strategy was to strengthen EDES with
ammunition against ELAS. And by minimising the strength of ELAS they would enable the
British troops to occupy later Athens and bring king George II in Greece. However, there was
a chain of misunderstandings between the British Government, the Greek Government in
Cairo and the SOE of how to do this. For instance, the Foreign Office suggested on the one
hand, to prepare Greeks for a referendum concerning king’s return to Greece, on the other
hand, they were aware that this could be accomplished with great difficulty given that Athens
would be under British occupation, and that therefore a clear and “fair” election or plebiscite
would be rendered impossible. In any case, the majority of the resistance would openly
oppose the return of the king as well as the Government-in-exile (FO: 371/37206 R: 10177,
11 October 1943).
On the other hand, the British Foreign Office was also puzzled as to how to deal with
the guerrilla bands of ELAS. They had two choices, that is either to decrease the ammunition
of ELAS in favour of EDES, or they even dared to think to preserve further Nazi forces in
Greece as well as Yugoslavia in a unified Balkan plan and “make things as uncomfortable for
them” as possible, even though they knew that the Left resistance in Greece was more
efficient against the Nazis than the Right (FO 371/37206 R: 10177, 11 October 1943). As we
read from the original copy of the British Foreign Office,
“6. As regards our policy towards the guerrillas, the Chiefs of Staff consider
that on military grounds we should not relax our efforts to contain as many
German divisions in Greece and Yugoslavia and to make things as
uncomfortable for them as we can. This conflicts with the suggestion that we
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should decrease our aid to the E.A.M., in favour of the E.D.E.S. From the
military point of view there should be no weakening of any group. Raising the
strength of the right wing groups at the expense of not increasing supplies to
the E.A.M would not be satisfactory from the immediate military point of
view, since material in the hands of the better organised left wing groups
produces better results”. [8...] They do not, however, consider the fact that we
will be providing relief for Greece will prove in the event either to be a
considerable factor in preventing disorders or a strong incentive to accept the
authority of the Central Administration. Every Greek would know that we
would never incur the odium of the civilised world by cutting off relief
supplies solely because of civil disturbances or of violent opposition to an
unpopular Government which we choose to support” (FO 371/37206 R: 10177,
11 October 1943).
The Foreign Office decided in the end that ELAS aid should be “discontinued”, and
that Britain should provide more arms to EDES, encouraging the Archbishop Damaskinos,
Napoleon Zervas and the Government-in-exile to sit down together and work towards
establishing a governmental scheme that would support the crown of king George (FO
371/37206 R: 10450; see also FO 371/37206 R: 10295).
Similar developments occurred in most European countries but not all had the same
postwar geo-political significance. However, Greece, postwar Poland and former Yugoslavia
would be three volcanic spots. First of all, with respect to Yugoslavia and Greece, it is very
interesting to see the similarities as well as differences. The previous two excerpts show not
only the militaristic and strategic policy of Britain towards the two countries, but it clearly
indicates that the development of guerrilla warfare in both countries was provoked. It is often
argued that Britain on the one hand supported the Left in Yugoslavia and on the other the
Right in Greece. The British Premier in the Parliament argued that “in one place we support a
King, in another a Communist – there is no attempt by us to enforce particular ideologies”
(Woodhouse, 1975: 118; see also Foot, 1999: 341; Foot, 1966: 129).
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But this was not so until October 1943. SOE heavily supplied with arms both
Mihailović and Tito (mainly the first) in Yugoslavia the first two years of the war, like 
Velouchiotis and Zervas in Greece and that the policy of both countries was “roughly the
same” (Woodhouse, 1975:17). The policy started to change in Yugoslavia and Greece from
October 1943. With respect to the former country as Brigadier Woodhouse argued, the
sudden change came as follows: “from being friendly towards Mihailović and negative 
towards Tito into the exact opposite” (ibid). But this change did not occur because Mihailović 
collaborated (for the British were well aware of the latter since 1941 and that alone caused
serious concerns85) but because Eden and Stalin already started secretly to talk about “spheres
of influence” way before the Yalta Conference in February 1945 and the Moscow Peace
Conference in October 1944. It was a year prior to that decisive conference that Eden
struggled to convince Stalin he wants Greece and in return Britain would pass Romania to the
hands of the Soviet Union as well as dividing 50% – 50% the influence of the Yugoslav
territory. The previous suggestions were finalised a year later in Moscow in 1944. The latter
agreement made Churchill not only to proceed carefully in Yugoslavia but to support only
Tito with arms because this is what he agreed with Stalin (Stafford, 1980: 178, Resis, 1978:
368). In contrast with Yugoslavia, Britain now had 90% of influence in Greece whereas
Moscow had the remaining 10% (Resis, 1978:368).86 The Balkan Percentages Agreement or
else the secret “naughty document” as Churchill named it, not only determined the military
and geopolitical strategy of the above Balkan countries, but the political ideology in the
aftermath (Lowe, 2012:295). That eventually gave absolute freedom to the British to pursue
any military policy they wished in Greece unlike Yugoslavia (since they shared it with
85 Barker, 1975:30, 34.
86 The Balkan “Percentages Agreement” was secretly signed between Churchill and Stalin during Moscow
Conference in October 1944. Written in a napkin, the “percentages” went as follows: Rumania 90% Stalin, 10%
others, Greece: 90% Churchill, 10% others, Yugoslavia: 50% -50%, Hungary: 50%-50%, Bulgaria: 75% Stalin,
25% others (Resis, 1978:368).
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USSR) so as to fit their post-war strategy. Thus, these contradictions in British foreign policy
between the two countries served Britain and USSR’s post-war strategy based on agreements.
Yugoslavia and Greece were not the only countries whose fate was negotiated at the
table. David Stafford declares that the SOE in 1944 relaxed their military and strategic efforts
in Nazi-Occupied Poland and Czechoslovakia as well, for “it was clear that both countries
would be liberated by the Red Army” and that they would be under Soviet influence after the
war was over, thus Britain stepped aside (Stafford, 1980:182). With regards to the
Mediterranean region and apart from Greece, SOE had also post war concerns over Italy’s
“Sovietisation”. However, the Allies and in particular the SOE received categorical
instructions from the British Foreign Office that it should “not be permitted to follow the
pattern of Yugoslavia and Greece” (Stafford, 1980:193). Thus by 1944, most SOE efforts
were put on Greece in contrast with the aforementioned countries, as Churchill’s visit to
Athens in 24 December 1944 indicated that Greece “was of a greater significance than
Alexander’s directive in confirming and furthering the British (and American) interest in
preventing the emergence of a postwar communist Italy” (Stafford, 1980:196). Yet, the
British were not happy at all with the previous decision concerning Italy. They feared that the
latter’s arms would reach the analogous Greek size of EAM/ELAS (100,000 arms) and that
alone would produce post-war revolution (ibid). Despite relaxing their scope in Italy, Eden
wrote to Churchill that: “there is much in this story which reminds me of Greece. We must
watch it carefully” (Davidson, 1981: 236).
SOE’s anxiety over Greece’s growing size of resistance is clearly contrasted with
France. SOE was really puzzled as to how and when to increase the arms of the French
Resistance, for in the first three years of the occupation, the French people did not show
enthusiasm on the resistance front and the latter was of a “doubtful value” (Cookridge,
1966:307). The SOE expressed worries that many “had accepted the Vichy regime, while
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others acquiesced in collaboration with the enemy” and although Charles de Gaulle was a key
military and political figure in the resistance to serve post-war interests of the Allies (the
right-wing bloc) he was a “one-man show, for a very long time” (ibid). However, in the “last
two years” of the war, the French resistance would grow substantially to present a “real”
subversive activity like Belgium and Norway (Judt, 2010:33).
What we see however in all countries, is that the Allies (West and East alike) and the
SOE tried not only to couple military and strategic interests but shaped political influence in
the post-war arena. And although the FO and SOE met challenges throughout Occupied
Europe, it was however in Greece and Yugoslavia that reconciliation of these multiple
interests became an unsolvable puzzle, because “elsewhere in Europe the problems of
aligning foreign policy objectives and the needs of strategy were much less severe” (Stafford,
1980:209). Because as Foot argued “the basic problem in Greece was far from simple - Greek
politics are notoriously complicated” (Foot, 1999: 340). By the end of the war however, and
after Yalta, Europe and the whole world would be clearly divided into spheres of influence,
as further agreements between Roosevelt, Eden, Churchill, Molotov and Stalin would ensure
their victories: from the West, “anti-communist”, “Christian- democracies” and from the
East, “communist People’s democracies” (Mazower, 1998a:231, 217). At the end of these
negotiations, Nazi-Occupied Poland and Greece would share one similar and yet opposite
characteristic; if Greece was the most crucial geo-strategic spot for the West, Poland would
be the most valuable geo-dynamic country for the Russians. No other communist country
under Stalin’s umbrella resisted the Soviets the same way as postwar Poland. Like in Greece,
when the Poles screamed for help, “there was no Western response....perhaps because
Churchill was not behaving very differently in Greece at about the same time” (Mazower,
1998a:261).
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The situation in Greece was critical, because the opposition was growing as we saw,
and because Churchill’s insistence to bring the king unconditionally put everyone into
difficult position, since political circles in Cairo, in Foreign Office and the SOE were more
aware of the internal political frictions in Greece than Churchill. In other words, they knew
more about the bitter feelings of Greeks towards the crown than anybody else. However, they
were indifferent as to what the people wanted. As regards to the Greek sentiments towards
monarchy and its bourgeois circles, J.M. Stevens reported to London that:
“87. Officially, the King is the most hated man in Greece except Metaxas. All
outward signs of monarchy have been removed by the EAM and EDES alike,
crowns on flags, uniforms etc [....] Their great justification for interfering in the
future of the Greek State is the maladministration of the past, and in particular
they concentrate on two instances: the manipulation of elections whereby the
King returned and the founding of the Metaxas dictatorship.
88. Their accusations against the King are that he came to Greece uninvited;
that he came pretending to be the friend of democracy and, in fact, intending to
rule dictatorially; that he intended to continue dictatorship after the war and is
preparing the Army in Egypt for that purpose” (Stevens, 1982:27).
These predictions came indeed true and the hostile feelings of the Greek people
towards a come-back of the old fascist agenda were disregarded. For Churchill’s “conviction”
that after the war “Europe had to return to the pre-war political status”, forced the British to
choose between either Churchill’s policy to support the monarchy “unconditionally” or
SOE’s initial plan, which was to recognize the demands and political rights of the guerrillas
of EAM/ELAS; the latter as we shall see was suppressed (Gerolymatos, 1991:104). These
post-war policies were problematic for apparently not all countries could go back to the old
agendas, since Greece was one of these countries whose old politics were openly fascistic and
dictatorial.
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All these on-going negotiations between the political elites as to how Greece would
develop politically after the war really marked the period between 1943-1944, for there was
an evident determination to bring the Greek monarchy back at all costs irrespective of the
hostility. One of the reasons why we are referring to these events is because king’s return was
seen with hatred not only among the people, but also among members of the coalition
government in Cairo as well as large sections of the Greek army in Cairo.87 King’s return
meant in clear political terms, the re-establishment of monarchy and the exercise of
dictatorial politics in the country, although the Left was winning the war as well as the
opinion of the people. In the crucial months of spring 1944 and before political unrest
reached its apogee in the autumn and winter of the same year, there was a serious uprising
among the forces of the army in Cairo as well who resented king’s return without a plebiscite.
88 Archbishop Damaskinos was suggested as an “interim” regent before king returned to
Greece. It was a choice that was more acceptable to the Greek public opinion given king’s
fascist past, yet a solution that Winston Churchill hated, although he accepted it in the end
and in 1945 Damaskinos was sworn as an interim regent (Iatrides, 1995: 9).
Along with the exhaustive exchange of letters between the political elite to decide the
future of Greece, the bitter civil war between ELAS and EDES was continuing in the
mountains but also in the cities. EAM/ELAS extended their disagreements with the British as
they were convinced that the referendum in Greece would not take place. EAM’s demands
were to give the right to the people to have a plebiscite and then to have fair elections
deciding democratically the future politics of Greece.89 The central committee of EAM was
87 FO 954/11B image ref: 195 (9th December 1944, From Foreign Office to Athens), many ministers from the
coalition of the Papandreou Government did not want the regency at all.
88 CAB 66/49/47, image ref: 0001: 6th April 1944, Telegram No. 215
89 “Aide Memoire”, The ELAS Central Committee 14 December 44 [Certified true Copy, Athens 15/12/44
(SD)], Filippos Dragoumis Sub-File 62.5: “Dekemvriana 1944” (December Events 1944), Gennadius Library,
Athens.
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not convinced that the above would be implemented as they had information that “para-
militarist activities” were now in full cooperation with the Middle East, wishing to take
control over the situation and attack the members of resistance. Therefore, they suggested
sending representatives to Cairo to discuss “their mutual plans for the future”; a demand
which was accepted by Brigadier Eddie Myers despite Greek Government’s disapproval
(Myers, 1985:119-120). This meeting would be a good chance for EAM to dissolve
conspiracy theories as to whether they would seize the power by force in the period of
liberation, for they expressed openly many times that they had “no political aims” after the
war was over and that it was always a band formed only for one purpose; that is to liberate
the country from all forces, and that is why it was a multi-party resistance including anyone
who wished to fight against the Nazis and Italians. Although Brigadier Myers was sharing
this belief too, he yet stated that its members were unaware and “ignorant” about the “core”
of the band which was communist and whose intentions were different (Myers, 1985:127,
129).
Apart from his belief, Myers knew at the same time that the whole issue of guerrillas
was much more complicated. His concern about the political peculiarities in Greece was
expressed many times in written reports to the Foreign Office and to Churchill, as he was
aware that many members of the resistance of EAM/ELAS were representing the political life
of Greece and many were employed in governmental positions. His decision therefore, to
bring a delegation to Cairo (consisting of Greek guerrillas) in order to decide how to reach
unity in post war politics was received with great disappointment among the political circles
of Britain too. Myers knew very well why it was important to bring the partisans into a
common table to discuss future decisions, since EAM was representing the will of the people.
However, he could not convince Churchill that EAM/ELAS was a progressive multi-party
scheme that could not easily be excluded from future politics, and that this exclusion, along
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with the reluctant British support to the Greek king would bring civil war (Myers, 1975:
160,162). As Myers wrote:
“One point I could not get into Churchill’s head was that the andartes were not
just ‘bandits’, but that they represented all types of Greeks, as well as many
Republican leaders. Sarafis had been Military Attaché in Paris. Tzimas had
been a Communist Deputy. Kartalis had been Finance Minister in more than
one Greek Government. Colonel Psaros was one of the most capable soldiers I
have ever met. There were many such others. They were not just ‘Tom
Wintringhams’, which Churchill had more than once called them. I could not
convince him that I was in touch not only with the andartes and the mostly
poor people in the mountains, but with virtually every element and every
thinking body inside Greece, including those in all big towns” (Myers,
1975:62).90
The anxiety concerning EAM/ELAS’s prospective role in the future politics of
Greece, overshadowed everything else. The debate as to whether the Left would have formed
a dictatorship or not after the war continues until today among the Greek political circles and
international scholars. Of course if EAM/ELAS had indeed seized the power by force we
would be here to criticize it, however we are here to reveal and criticize the mechanisms in
which the Right seized the power by force, and we cannot do so without mentioning specific
political decisions that occurred during and after Nazi Occupation. Brigadier Chris
Woodhouse admitted that fears regarding the role of the Left were exaggerated both by the
British and the Greek Government- in – exile. There was a general tendency to blame
EAM/ELAS for everything that was occurring in the Greek political scene, such as when
within the Greek Army in Cairo (which was later moved to Greece) a small faction formed an
“anti-fascist” movement. Every time however, this agenda was undermined they were
accusing the Left, hence the resistance (in politicians’ point of view) would have spoiled their
90 See here Myer’s essay “The Andarte Delegation to Cairo: August 1943” in British Policy towards Wartime
Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece, eds., Auty, P, and Clogg, R., 1975, pp. 147-166.
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future political plans (Woodhouse, 1976b:35). Although he was deeply involved in the
strategic attacks against the Left, Woodhouse admitted that:
“When mutinies occurred in the Greek forces, it was usual to blame the KKE,
although at least once royalist officers were the culprits. Communism was also
blamed for other causes of anxiety, such as the determination of the Bulgarians
to annexe Greek Macedonia, the provocation of German reprisals, and the
threat of anarchy in Greece. As rumours from the mountains seemed to confirm
the worst fears of patriotic conservatives, both republican and monarchist
leaders intervened against the Resistance. Two of Greece’s most senior
Generals, the republican Pangalos and the royalist Papagos, both discouraged
army officers from fighting in the mountains. The attitude of the Greek
Government in exile was similar: their earliest emissaries to occupied Greece
gave no hint of contemplating the guerrilla activities” (Woodhouse, 1976b:35).
Collaboration in the Resistance: the Zervas-German Liaison
Along with the political disagreements within and outside resistance, there have
been many recorded instances where the resistance band of EDES collaborated with the
Nazis so as to weaken ELAS. There were new conflicts between the bands of ELAS and
EDES while the former accused the latter of collaborating with the Germans. Indeed the
character of the royalist/nationalist EDES had been challenged and criticised many times
throughout their anti-Nazi War and the Foreign Office recorded many times some spurious
moves of Zervas with the Germans ( FO 371/37207 R: 11673, see also FO 371/37210
R:13842). The mysterious moves of Zervas remain a taboo today and a subject of controversy
as there are not many sources available to us. Yet, what is most certain is that Zervas made
some secret truces throughout the war with the Germans in order to fight ELAS, although he
was warned by the SOE not to deviate from the rules and in fact “forbidden” because that
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would have resulted into tremendous casualties “from unarmed population with severe
consequences” (Fleischer, 2006: 98-99; same in Alexander, 1982:13).
According to Hagen Fleischer who has mastered the German archives on the issue
of collaboration in Greece within resistance, Zervas not only made a truce with the Germans
for 10 days in the “first round” of civil conflict with ELAS in the fall of 1943, but the Nazis
as well were extremely careful “not to attack EDES” as both forces joined under a united
idea; the “anti-Bolshevik war” (Fleischer, 2006: 99). Other authors such as D. A. Lande
declare that for Zervas “it was no longer clear even which was the greater enemy – ELAS or
the German occupiers” (Lande, 2000:169). In fact what was to follow between the Germans
and Zervas was a secret pact where both camps exchanged information regarding the moves
of ELAS, under the supervision of Huber Lanz who was the General Commander in the
province of Epirus (Fleischer, 2006: 100-101).
A British Official in charge of Greece confirmed his knowledge about the secret
collaboration between Zervas and the Germans. In a rare released interview, Nigel Clive
(member of SOE) argued that:
“Zervas certainly had a means of contact with the Germans. He had at least a
couple of officers, who were members of EDES stationed quietly in Ioannina,
which was General Lanz’s Head Quarters; General Lanz being the General
Commander, and these officers were certainly in irregular contact with Lanz
and with Lanz’s stuff”.91
Woodhouse as well, confirmed that the relationship between Zervas and Lanz is
undisputed. There are German archives revealing Zervas’s connection with the authority of
91 Nigel Clive’s (SOE) interview in the British political documentary “Greece: The Hidden War”, see
information about the documentary:
http://web.archive.org/web/20080229103239/http://thematikivradia.ert.gr/details.asp?id=2610&catid=3469
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tXb5YkQeDM&feature=related
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Lanz in Epirus and in particular in the city of Ioannina (the city that approved the Jewish
deportations and collaborated with the Germans, see chapter 2), which was more than a
matter of truce in order to fight ELAS. On the contrary, it was a clear agreement of “general
armistice” with the Germans in the winter of 1944 until mid-summer the following year. The
bands of ELAS were aware of the Zervas- German affair and it was one more catalytic factor
to fuel the brutal civil war between ELAS and EDES. Woodhouse furthermore, declared that
ELAS too, although did not collaborate they had their own days where they stopped fighting
the Germans in order to preserve arms and attack EDES, but according to archives found in
Germany these incidents were “isolated and strictly local”. Given that there was a civil war
while Greece was occupied both resistance organisations attempted “cease-fires” with the
enemy in order to save arms and fire them against each other (Woodhouse, 1976b: 90-91).
On the other hand, the historian Hagen Fleischer points out that ELAS’s rivals tried to
invent stories about the latter’s possible contacts with the enemy. He argues that every
accusation made against ELAS was the product of the “propaganda of the Greek Right” and
many reports that were published were “fabricated” lacking any authenticity (Fleischer,
2006:102). However, he argues that ELAS too, in the region of Epirus where the unarmed
people suffered greatly, they stopped fighting the Germans in order for ELAS and EDES to
decide together what to do next. Another occasion where Fleischer reports incidents of cease-
fire between ELAS and the Germans, was when the Government of National Unity in Cairo
as well as British Lieut. Scobie “ordered” ELAS to stop fighting the Germans during the
transitional period when Athens was about to be liberated and Germans had to leave the
country, but this cannot be considered as collaboration since ELAS received orders from the
Allies. In order to prevent further bloodshed and acts of “retaliation” ELAS was ordered to
suspend further attacks. But apart from these limited strategic truces Fleischer argues, further
“accusations against ELAS are at least groundless” (Fleischer, 2006:103-104).
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Zervas’s case on the other hand was substantially different. The exegesis that
Fleischer gives is more serious than Woodhouse’s. He declares that Zervas exploited the
“card” of anti-communism that prevailed within the political circles of Britain and Cairo
(Greek Government). And by creating ambitious connections with all the camps, Zervas
successfully managed to strengthen his influence among Cairo and Britain in concert with the
Germans (Fleischer, 2006: 106-107). When EDES disbanded after the war, Napoleon Zervas
became a Minister of Public Order in 1947, exercising authoritarian and nationalist policies in
concert with the “white terror” of Right-wing gangs that was prevalent in the cities. Zervas
however, very soon had to resign after his name was mentioned in the Nuremberg Trials
(Mazower, 2000:216). Almost nothing has been written about this. It seems that many
archives have been destroyed, and there is still no proper file on Napoleon Zervas stored in
Greece.92 But there is no doubt that even diplomats from Moscow who although did not
interfere at all with the Greek Affairs since Britain was in charge of the latter, noticed and
criticized the stance of Zervas.93 The previous point was discussed among the circles of
Britain and the latter via Cairo sent the following to the Foreign Office:
“In conversation with members of my staff on 4th April, the Soviet Counsellor
spoke in favour of E.A.M. – E.L.A.S. and said that Zervas had wrongly
provoked civil war and had prevented agreement at recent negotiations. [...] As
E.L.A.S. was by far the largest body, he considered that it was up to Zervas to
fit in with its requirements. Zervas had not fought the Germans at all; all the
fighting was done by E.L.A.S. Zervas was compromised with the Germans by
the activities of E.D.E.S. in Athens”. 94
92 Although there is a file on Zervas stored in the General Archives of the State in Athens (GAK), however it
lacks any research interest, (see GAK, K 202 [ABE 806] Archive of N. Zervas). The Archivist on the other
hand, Dr. Eleftheria Daneziou in Gennadius Library in Athens, informed me personally in September 2011 that
the library already undertook the project of making a complete file on Napoleon Zervas, and it will be ready
possibly in a year’s time, so we will know more about Zervas’s connections, if any such relevant files survived.
93 CAB 66/49/47, Image ref 0001 (6th April 1944, No. 218, most secret – His Majesty’s Ambassador to the
Greek Government, Cairo to FO).
94 Ibid.
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Although Britain knew very well Zervas’s actions, the SOE and FO kept on
supporting him even though, his persona was also challenged by many MPs in the British
Parliament in December 1944. In the famous debate at the House of Commons in 11
December, members of the House such as Labour Acland accused Zervas for being a
“professional coudetatiste” and for having give and takes with former dictators such as
Marshal Pangalos. He further accused Winston Churchill of supporting a fascist regency in
Greece, not letting Greek people decide their own political future, attacking EAM/ELAS, and
giving arms to EDES and to a man like Zervas who was “in good terms with Nazi and
Quisling Authorities”.95
We will talk more about Churchill in the next section. In the next section we give a
brief account to the political and social events that paved the way for the collaborators to
remain in power after Greece was liberated, for these events are crucial to understand the
legal aftermath and why there were not many legal prosecutions against collaborators. Last
but not least, and concerning the issue of collaboration within resistance, some of the officers
of Psarros (leader of EKKA), were accused of collaboration too, as these soldiers were
incorporated in to the Nazi Security Battalions in order to fight ELAS (Fleischer, 2006:92).
They had connections with many organisations and under the full support of the Nazis. There
are other sources that reveal also connections between Zervas and the Security Battalions (see
Apostolou, 2005:284-285). And as we shall see in the following sections many men of EDES
and EKKA were merged in the Security Battalions to fight the EAM/ELAS during civil war.
The Prelude to the Legal Aftermath
Political tensions escalated in Greece during the liberation months (autumn 1944).
There were many attempts to bring peace and reconciliation between the opposing forces of
95 Filippos Dragoumis sub-file 62.5 “Dekemvriana 1944”, 11-12-44, Debate in the House of Commons, copy of
summary to the Greek Information Office (Gennadius Library, Athens).
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the resistance and the Greek Government in the transitional period under Georgios
Papandreou. The new government constituted a multi-party scheme aiming at reaching some
kind of unity between the different political voices that occurred throughout the war. In
Lebanon, on 20 May 1944, delegates from all Greek parties along with the British mission,
tried to form a new government. They decided that the new scheme should cover twenty four
members out of “fourteen parties”, without the presence of those who supported the
monarchy and those who collaborated because they “refused to sit down with Communists”
(Close, 1995a:108).
Although the leaders of EAM and KKE did not wish to join the new scheme, they
were pressured from all angles and accepted in the end to include six members in the new
Papandreou government. They were left without alternative, since the accusations made
against them (i.e. they accused Ares Velouchiotis of being responsible for the murder of
Dimitrios Psarros, leader of EKKA), in concert with a prospective refusal to join the
government would have fuelled the British voices who wanted EAM/ELAS to follow their
own road after liberation (Close, 1995a:109).96 Following Lebanon, there was another
agreement reached in Caserta (Italy) in 26 September 1944 in order to implement a stronger
operating mechanism against the Nazis. The agreement known as the Caserta Agreement,
foresaw that both EDES and ELAS were now under the command of British Lieut. Scobie
and the government of National Unity of Papandreou, and all bands should cooperate and
stop fighting each other. Moreover the agreement foresaw that the Security Battalions should
be disbanded -and until surrender- the resistance should keep on “harassing” them since they
were considered “instruments of the enemy”. Last but not least the agreement guaranteed that
no party should deviate and exploit their power while Greece was ungoverned in the fall of
96 Regarding the events at Lebanon Conference, Prokopis Papastratis in his essay “Papandreou and the Lebanon
Conference” argues that the conference aimed at including EAM leaders in Papandreou’s government in order
to minimize their “power” and influence (Papastratis, 2006:205).
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1944. In accordance with the agreement, General Scobie also attached a singed plan that
concerned the specific operational orders for each resistance band and their territories.97
So there was a need to reach some kind of unity, after the Germans left the country
avoiding a civil war. However, the problems did not only concern the civil conflict between
ELAS and EDES, but also the unresolved political anxieties of the Allies, regarding
EAM/ELAS’s prospective seizure of power by force in the period before the referendum and
the new elections. Although there was a pressure from the Greek public opinion and the
members of EAM/ELAS to have immediate elections and a plebiscite for the issue of
monarchy, the Foreign Office wanted to postpone both procedures until they controlled the
situation in Athens. They feared that the Papandreou Government would not last as it was a
temporary “service Government”, and that the elections and plebiscite should not take place
on November 1944; instead they wished to extend the period for another “seven months”.
The Foreign Office wanted to make sure that this decision was widely known as a Greek
decision and not British, thus to “counter the criticism that the Regent and the Greek
Government were determined to delay the plebiscite indefinitely in order to suit their own
ends” (FO/954/11C Image Ref: 121).
And this is where the serious political tensions appeared in Greece, as the
democratic procedures were postponed systematically. EAM/ELAS already had suspicions
that the plebiscite would not take place and as a matter of fact the elections took place two
years later in 1946. They were not willing to lose their power, as they knew that para-
militarist Right wing groups such as the “x” and the Security Battalions were in full
operation, spreading terror in the streets of Athens and other major cities and villages in
97 Copy of Caserta Agreement attached in appendix. See also attached to Caserta the “Précis of Operational
Orders Issued by G.O.C. Forces in Greece” (Filippos Dragoumis sub-file 62-5 “Dekemvriana 1944”),
Gennadius Library, Athens; see also Churchill, 1985:248-249.
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Greece. Every day – and between October and December 1944- the communist newspaper
Rizospastis was publishing reports and pictures of murdered people by far-right groups and
collaborators. Anti-fascist and anti-Nazi demonstrations were organised every day by the
committee of EAM with slogans “People’s power! Death to the Traitors! Revenge! Athens of
EAM is Celebrating the Big National Anti-Fascist Day” (Rizospastis, Sunday 29/10/1944).
The KKE and the Committee of EAM were demanding from the Greek Government to clear
the streets from fascists and arrest all the collaborators, for they were slaughtering unarmed
men and women in every neighbourhood that was organised by EAM/ELAS (Rizospastis,
Thursday 12/10/1944; Sunday 5/11/1944).
The western fears about a potential socialist government in Greece, which started to
develop in 1943 when EAM/ELAS was winning the war against the Nazi Germans, reached
its apogee in November and December 1944. The Foreign Office speculated that the country
would fall under Stalin’s influence, and they had to make sure that Greece remained within
the Western orbit.98 In fact Greece was to remain with this slogan (or conspiracy) amid cold
war until the fascist colonels fell in 1974, and one can see the tragic similarities between the
Greek and Spanish development after the war where both countries fell into civil war and
both fell victims “of draconian measures against the Left” (Sfikas,1997: 88). Greece
however, never received help from Stalin, and the latter based on negotiations, gave his word
to Winston Churchill that he would not interfere in the Greek affairs (and indeed he did not).
The Soviet Union confirmed “there is no contact between Moscow and E.A.M”99 thus, there
was no possibility to receive arms from them and strengthen their position in the cities or in
the mountains.100 However, Churchill’s policy on EAM/ELAS did not soften. Although
98 CAB/65/47/7 Image Ref: 0001, 9th August 1944, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs [W.M. (44) 103 RD
CONCLUSIONS], MINUTE 1, CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX.
99 CAB 101/250 Image Ref: 20, To Mr. Macmillan (Caserta), T.2134/4, 19.11.44.
100 In fact the communist movement in Greece was largely supported by the communist Balkan states especially
Tito’s Yugoslavia, from which ELAS received arms, see Woodhouse, 1961:18.
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Greece did not cooperate with the Soviets, Churchill feared that a potential socialist
government approved by the people would have spoiled his future strategic plans, and he had
to make sure as he stated, that once the Germans left the country “there should be no political
vacuum in Greece” and therefore “it is most desirable to strike out of the blue without
preliminary crisis. It is the best way to forestall the E.A.M” (Churchill, 1985: 247-248, italics
mine).
December Events 1944: the Beginning of the Authoritarian State
In order to make sure that Athens remained under his control, Churchill ordered an
increase in the strength of British troops (between 8,000 -10,000) in Athens and strengthened
in this way the army of Papandreou. Churchill was aware that by increasing the British arms
in Athens automatically meant for EAM an act of provocation and an “imminent” uprising
(Churchill, 1985:250). He wrote to Foreign Secretary on 4 November:
“In my opinion, having paid the price we have to Russia for freedom of action
in Greece, we should not hesitate to use British troops to support the Royal
Hellenic Government under M. Papandreou. 2. This implies that British troops
should certainly intervene to check acts of lawlessness. Surely M. Papandreou
can close down E.A.M. newspapers if they call a newspaper strike. 3. I hope
the Greek Brigade will soon, and will not hesitate to shoot when necessary.
Why is the only one Indian brigade of the Indian Division to be sent in? We
need another eight or ten thousand foot-soldiers to hold the capital and
Salonika for the present Government. Later on we must consider extending the
Greek authority. I fully expect a clash with E.A.M., and we must not shrink
from it, provided the ground is well chosen” (Churchill, 1985:250).
In order to dominate Athens with royal and British troops without initiating a civil
war, Churchill and Papandreou called to disarm all resistance bands except however the
“Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Squadron” (Churchill, 1985:251). The EAM protested
205
against the decision not to disband the royal troops (because as we have explained earlier the
royal army now consisted men of Security Battalions), and proposed that if these bands were
to remain, a small power of ELAS and EDES had to remain too. The proposal was not
accepted after all 101, and the six ministers of EAM who were part of the National Unity
Government issued their resignation. What followed was a called demonstration from the
central committee of EAM to its supporters as an act of protest on the 3rd December, which
was forbidden by Papandreou. The EAM feared that keeping the royal troops in action would
automatically mean a forced transition to an unwanted monarchy in the face of pro-fascist
king George II (Churchill, 1985:251; Gerolymatos, 2005:149).
Despite banning the demonstration it went on any way, and thousands of women, men
and children from all ages gathered outside the Greek parliament in Constitution Square
(Syntagma) in central Athens to protest but also to celebrate for their liberation. Let us not
forget that Greece supposedly was liberated at that time. People’s slogans in this otherwise
festive day were “Down with Papandreou, Down with Intervention, the Collaborators must
be judged...” (Gerolymatos, 2005:147-151). The police tried to leave Syntagma Square clean
from protesters, but thousands of demonstrators were coming from every corner of Athens.
The area was now full of policemen and unarmed protesters, while the British troops
remained armed in the corners. The police started to fire “whenever demonstrators tried to get
up and escape” while the British troops remained there watching (Baerentzen, and Close,
1993:85). The result was “24 deaths and more than 100 badly injured citizens”, while the
next day the para-statist ultranationalist group “X” joined the police to continue the attacks
against the ELAS supporters. The next day (4th), EAM supporters called a general strike in
Athens and Piraeus that brought Attica to a standstill and many people attacked police
101 Papandreou and Lieut. Scobie wanted to keep these two bands armed and disband all the rest in order to
incorporate the former to the regular army. EAM was against such decision for that would have destroyed the
political balance of the arms, although later EAM/ELAS was compromised and one of the ELAS’s chiefs,
Siantos signed an agreement to give up their arms (Baerentzen, L., and Close, D. H, 1993:83).
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departments as a form of reply to the killings. The two-day demonstrations marked the
beginning of the official war between ELAS and the British troops as General Scobie ordered
“ELAS to evacuate Athens within two days” (Tsoucalas, 1969:85; Stavrianos, 1949:250).102
Churchill wrote to General Scobie on the 5th December 1944:
“[...] 2.You are responsible for maintaining order in Athens and for neutralising
or destroying E.A.M.-E.L.A.S. bands approaching the city. You may make any
regulations you like for the strict control of the streets or for the rounding up of
any number of truculent persons [...] But do not hesitate to fire at any armed
male in Athens who assails the British authority or Greek authority with which
we are working [...] Do not however hesitate to act as if you were in a
conquered city where a local rebellion was in progress [...] We have to hold
and dominate Athens. It would be a great thing for you to succeed in this
without bloodshed if possible, but also with bloodshed if necessary”.103
Churchill wrote in his book that the nature of the letter was “strident in tone”, and he
had to make sure that General Scobie will not hesitate to act fiercely and keep Athens clean
from the leftists (Churchill, 1985:252). In Downing Street, some officials wanted to keep the
events out of the British public eye, however they panicked after journalists from British
newspapers who witnessed the killings during the demonstrations on the 3rd December,
attacked openly British and Papandreou’s decision to support unconditionally the right
wingers. Although they tried to hide the events in Britain, yet British reporters’ accounts
could not be easily undermined.104 What followed was weeks of terror in the streets of Athens
as both camps were firing at each other. In our point of view it was a fatal mistake from the
part of Papandreou and Churchill not to disarm all bodies and especially the Security
Battalions. As we mentioned, the Greek Government wanted to create a new national army
102 Because of the dramatic casualties that occurred in the first days of December 1944, Georgios Papandreou
issued his resignation, but Churchill instructed Leeper to convince Papandreou for the opposite even if he had to
“tight him in a chair”( Gerolymatos, 2005:162).
103 FO/954/11B, Image Ref: 154, From Foreign Office to Athens, 5th December, 1944, see also appendix 4 the
full copy.
104 FO 954/11B image ref: 156, Downing Street, 5th December 1944.
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(mainly consisting of royals) that would restore order in the capital and in the major cities.
The fear from both sides was evident, for on the one hand the right-wingers believed that the
great size of ELAS would be used to bring a communist regime of a Stalinist type, whereas
the Left was aware that allowing to create a distinct body of troops in Athens would be used
as a mediator for monarchy to be restored and impose once again authoritarian politics in the
Greek political arena (Gerolymatos, 2005: 148-150).
Although in the beginning it seemed as a tactical mistake of EAM/ELAS to refuse to
give up their arms, for they gave a good reason to the British to believe that they would seize
the power by force, and their intervention would be justified in this ground alone, yet ELAS’s
suspicions were rational and indeed true.105 That is, by disarming ELAS, the right-wingers
would receive arms from the Greeks and British thus violating the Caserta and Plaka
agreement which foresaw the end of civil strife and the disbandment of all bodies. The leftists
accused the government of Papandreou of trying to impose a “right wing dictatorship
supported by the British” and by not disbanding the “Sacred Squadron”, the “National
Army”, the “Mountain Brigade” and the “Security Battalions”, ELAS made clear they would
not give up their guns either, demanding at the same time the British troops to leave the
country.106
The fights between ELAS, the British and the Greek royalist army continued for
weeks. ELAS proposed truce with the British on the 10th of December in order to ease the
tensions and allow “the smooth and democratic development” of Greece but with certain
conditions. We found the copy of the proposed truce (“Aide Memoire”) which was sent to
Scobie by the Central Committee of EAM/ELAS. The latter accepted to withdraw its forces
105 A very good analysis of ELAS’s tactical mistakes during the crisis of December 1944 and the disagreements
with Papandreou is provided on Loulis’s book The Greek Communist Party 1940-1945, especially the sub-
section on “The Outbreak of the Demobilization Crisis. The December Revolt”, 1982:162-187.
106 See Dragoumis’s telegram to London Embassy, 27 December 1944, Protocol No. 22750, in Filippos
Dragoumis sub-file 62.3 (9-102) “Politika-Politiaka” (Political-Civic), Gennadius Library, Athens.
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provided that the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Squadron will be withdrawn too, but most
importantly that the Nazi Security Battalions will give up their arms (for they were still
armed), and send them to prison “until tried by the Judiciary”. ELAS also accepted that the
British should remain in Greece but only within the limits of Caserta Agreement, and allow
the country to prepare itself for democratic elections, without external involvements.107
The truce seemed to be fair, but Scobie rejected their peace agreement as he wanted
“unconditional surrender” from the ELAS and this led to a tougher stance from the part of the
latter. The British policy by mid of December brought turmoil in the British public opinion as
well as internationally, as a great number of British MPs voted against the intervention in
Greece (Tsoucalas, 1969:87-88). The policies fuelled not only many MPs in the House of
Commons as well as international media, but also a large faction of British troops in Athens
who were ordered to fight what once were their allies. Many British soldiers in fact were
working class citizens and members of the Trade Union in the UK and found it really difficult
to carry out these policies. The British Union expressed their worry about the tragic situation
in Greece, emphasising the importance of letting Greece have free elections and give
armistice to “our generous and heroic Greek Allies” (Thorpe, 2006:1080-1081).
Indeed, Churchill’s decision to get involved in to a war with ELAS received an
unimaginable criticism inside and outside the House of Commons and in particular as to the
way in which he made an unconditional alliance with Zervas against ELAS, and the decision
to disband only the latter. Throughout December, there was a constant bloodshed in Athens,
as both camps carried out horrific crimes, and undoubtedly from the part of ELAS; while the
total cost in the first two days alone was “40 more deaths and approximately 70 wounded”
107 “Aide Memoire”, 14 Dec 1944, The ELAS Central Committee, Certified true copy, Athens 15/12/44,
Filippos Dragoumis sub-file 62.5 “Dekemvriana 1944”, Gennadius Library, Athens (see also a copy in the
appendix); see also FO 954/11/B Image ref: 160 (From Foreign Office to Athens, 9th December 1944).
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(Gerolymatos, 2005: 157). Both sides took hostages while the British “imprisoned left-wing
or republican officers and soldiers in various detention camps in Africa and the Middle East”
(Mouzelis, 1976:59). A number of British MPs (during the vote of confidence for Churchill’s
decision to intervene in Greece) such as Independent member Driberg, accused the former of
not doing anything in the first days of the shootings, and for being indifferent to the presence
of the fascist organisation “X” who tried to control the situation. Labour member Seymour
Cocks on the December Events argued that the indifference of the British troops to the
killings during EAM’s peaceful demonstration “served only to associate Britain with what
everywhere condemned as fascist action”.108 While Labour Acland challenged his party’s
reluctant stance to take seriously what the Greek people found in their support to
EAM/ELAS, arguing:
“...was EAM/ELAS effectively making resistance to enemy and working
smoothly over all country showing considerable performance already and great
promises for future? Now EAM has million members. Paris radio last week
said two million and added ‘when organisation has two million in population
smaller than Belgium it can’t be said that it’s something apart from people’.
EAM/ELAS organised successful strikes against Germans, liberated vast areas,
ran hospital workshops and military training colleges. They won support of
bishops in Kozani and Achaia both of whom said it liberated areas...” 109
While, Independent Member Driberg argued that even Papandreou (although highly
responsible for these dreadful events) admitted that prior to any crisis, the ultra right-wing
groups wanted to fuel a civil war with the Left, and Driberg accused the Greek Right, the
royalists and the British for being equally responsible for the civil war, accusing Churchill’s
vote of confidence on the Greek affairs as an “unworthy piece of blackmail”. Labour member
Parker furthermore, accused the British government of supporting the Government of
108 11-12-44, Debate in the House of Commons, copy to the Greek Information Office, Filippos Dragoumis sub-
file 62.5 “Dekemvriana 1944”, Gennadius Library, Athens.
109 Ibid.
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Papandreou which was however not constitutionally elected, postponing the elections, and
spreading “propaganda” in the British media that their presence in Greece aimed at giving the
“Greek people the right to choose their own government”, however, they were doing the
opposite. In doing so, the British policies disappointed a large section of the British public
opinion. Furthermore, Independent Member Harold Nicholson’s remarks were, that if one
armed band had to disband then all should too, stressing that ELAS refused to give up their
arms, knowing that all the right wing groups including the Nazi Security Battalions were in
full armed operation.110 Of course Georgios Papandreou and apart from the British policy,
was highly responsible for all these events too. Haris Vlavianos rightly suggests that
Papandreou provoked the demonstration of EAM a day before it went ahead in 3 December
1944, hoping in this way that the ministers of EAM would resign and go home. Thus
Papandreou, was equally responsible for destroying the political unity of Greece, and his
decision made the centrists and socialists “to back the communists” (Vlavianos, 1989:188).
Conclusion
As these political issues were unfolding in Greece in the liberation months, the
escalation of violence terror and extreme nationalism was ready to take place. The political
decisions in Greece shaped the legal system, for as we shall see the residues of Nazi
collaboration was not only supported by the Greek State, but they escaped the judiciary and
of course they assumed new powers. Chapter 5 aimed at linking the Greek Holocaust, with
the political issues that were developing in Greece. These issues go hand in hand, as the one
cannot be detached from the other. We viewed the categories of collaborators who supported
the Nazi brutalities, against the Jews but also against the resistance, in concert with the
development of western interests in Greece that played catalytic role in destroying the unity
of the resistance, and as we shall the political unity in the aftermath.
110 Debate in the House of Commons, London 12/44, Copy to the Greek Information Office, Filippos Dragoumis
sub-file 62.5 “Dekemvriana 1944”, Gennadius Library, Athens.
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Chapter 6. The Legal Aftermath in Greece: The Parody of the Courts
Introduction
This chapter discusses critically the way in which Greece responded legally to the
Nazis and their collaborators; it notes the small number of trials that occurred in Greece, and
discusses the politico-diplomatic reasons for this. Last but not least, this chapter closes with
an unknown file case of a Nazi official that was responsible for the destruction of Salonika
Jewry, and yet escaped the penal system. Since the politics of far-right thrived the following
decade and actually until 1974, with a few years break in the 50s and the 60s until a new coup
d’état was set up, we can understand that there was little room for the Greek State as well as
the Greek society to acknowledge its deeply imbedded problems; that is to prosecute the
doers, give attention to the memory of the Jewish Holocaust, thus reflecting upon the
political, historical and social consequences as a whole, since the regime left its traces for
many decades in Greece. Post-war Greece did not deal seriously with the results and the
consequences of Nazism, but was mainly preoccupied with how to deal with communism, at
the cost of saving Nazi collaborators who in fact secured positions in the post-war political
arena (Iatrides, 1995:10). At the same time however, we are providing a comparative analysis
to understand how elsewhere in Europe legal justice responded in order to see similarities and
differences.
Prolegomena
As we have seen in chapter 5, the events in December 1944, practically prepared
Greece for many years of authoritarian politics as the Right came to power and the
collaborators remained in full operation. David H. Close was right to argue that from 1946
elections until the Junta fell in 1974, “a system of apartheid was in force which turned much
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of the population into second-class citizens” (Close, 2002: 27).111 The battle for Athens
clearly set the tone of what was to follow. The brutal murders from both sides, the escalation
of violence that was heading towards a civil war along with the imminent shadow of the cold
war, gave the opportunity to the collaborators to “erase their traces” once and for all in
Greece. The emphasis now shifted on communism and the collaborators secured their agenda
as well as their survival in new and polished administrative positions (Dordanas, 2011:36).
The failure to impose legal prosecutions en masse on the collaborators became the
norm after the betrayal of the Varkiza Agreement. Two months after the December events,
there was a peace agreement in February 1945 that foresaw that all armed units in Greece
should disband, ELAS would receive amnesty, and the collaborators/ Security Battalions
would be legally charged for perpetrating murders and bestial slaughters (Tsoucalas,
1969:92). The ELAS fighters gave up their arms and were not allowed to take part in the new
government.112 The Varkiza Agreement was betrayed for although some leading figures of
EAM secured amnesty, however the citizens who supported the movement and the guerrillas
became victims of the Nazi Security Battalions and the gangs of “x”, introducing the well
known period of Greece; the “White Terror”. The latter was the period where systematic
terrorism became a routine in the cities of Greece, chasing and imprisoning followers of
EAM/ELAS as both the Greek Nazis (Security Battalions) and the units of Grivas (“x”)
formed an alliance against the Left (Tsoucalas, 1969:92-93). Knowing that the amnesty
failed, a number of left guerrillas did not give up their guns and continued the civil war
against the nationalists and royalists in the mountains until 1949. One of those was the chief
111 These issues will be theorised in chapter 7, as we will look critically the post-war Greek state and how the
politics of extreme right and nationalism, paved the way to educate the political consciousness of the people on
the basis of national-mindedness forgetting thus the Jewish Holocaust too; a historical element that referred to a
multicultural Greece, which was seen as an anathema to the newly nationalistic state that was developing.
112 Most of the ammunition was handed over to the British, but a small amount was secretly preserved , see Joes,
1992:21.
213
of ELAS, Ares Velouchiotis, who was expelled from the party for not signing the Varkiza
Agreement and for having refused to give up his arms (Tsoucalas, 1969:93).113
From 1945 onwards, laws that were prevalent during the fascist dictatorship of
Metaxas were re-introduced. For example, politicians from the Right Bloc suspended laws
regarding freedom of speech and freedom of press, while journalists, editors and free-lance
reporters from the progressive newspapers Rizospastis and Eleftheri Ellada were threatened,
chased and beaten severely. Policies and legal codes that were imposed during Nazi
Occupation by the collaborationist administrations of Tsolakoglou and Rallis in Greece
“remained in force” until the official civil war ended, thus supporters and sympathisers of the
Left were legally now prosecuted or murdered. The period of terror especially in 1945-1946,
was as evident as now the citizens in Greece had to sign the famous “πιστοποιητικό 
κοινωνικών και πολιτικών φρονημάτων” (“Certificate of Unimpeachable Socio-political 
Convictions”), otherwise the punishment was jail or exile (Richter, 1986: 125-127).
The Legal Prosecutions: Nazi Perpetrators and Greek Collaborators
Starting with the Nazi perpetrators, this section departs from the fate of Brunner and
Wicliceny, who were the key perpetrators in the destruction of the Salonika Jewry and
provides further information with respect to the Nazis who were stationed in Athens. It
continues with an extensive analysis of the legal fate of local collaborators, and finishes in the
last section of this chapter with the prosecution of Max Merten. As we saw in the second
113 Concerning the events that followed as a result of the betrayal of the Varkiza Agreement, Nikos Zachariadis
(General Secretary of KKE) said the following: “...we were passing from armed struggle to mass political
struggle and also since the dual nature of the regime, which in essence was one of EAM and ELAS, had in the
whole of Greece been checked, thanks to the armed intervention of the British on behalf of the Right, and thus
our movement not only passed to the opposition, but fell under a regime of the most savage and scurrilously
murderous terror” (quoted in Vukmanovic, 1985: 83)
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chapter, Wisliceny and under the instruction of Eichmann travelled to Greece and settled in
Thessaloniki to carry out the Jewish policy (Kouzinopoulos, 2005:92). During the Nuremberg
Trials, in the Morning Session of the Twenty-Sixth Day (Thursday 3 January 1946) Dieter
Wisliceny testified that he was responsible for carrying out the Jewish deportations in
Slovakia and Hungary, and that in 1943, Eichmann sent him to Greece. Along with the newly
arrived Brunner they managed to concentrate “about 50,000 of Spanish descent” in Salonika
and 4,000 from the rest of Greek Macedonia. 114 He tried to pass the blame on Brunner, when
Wisliceny told the Judge that he was not there when the “action” took place:
Lt. Col. Brookhart: “Altogether how many Jews were collected and deported
from Greece?”
Wisliceny: “There were over 50,000 Jews. I believe that about 54,000 were
evacuated from Salonika and Macedonia”.
B: “What is the basis for your figure?”
W: “I myself read a comprehensive report from Brunner to Eichmann on
completion of the evacuation. Brunner left Salonika at the end of May 1943. I
personally was not in Salonika from the beginning of April until the end of
May, so that the action was carried out by Brunner alone”. 115
Wisliceny confiscated all the belongings of the Jewish community, worth
280,000,000 Drachmas. He stored the amount in a “common account” at the National Bank
of Greece, and after deporting and annihilating the majority of the victims at Auschwitz, the
money was transferred to the account of the German Military Administration. 116 According
to Kouzinopoulos, Brunner proved to be faster in implementing not only the deportations but
also the processes of extermination. He sent to the crematoria with his “own initiative”
groups of Jews not only from Greece but from other countries too in order to fill in the gaps
114 This valuable information is part of the complete testimony of Dieter Wisliceny during the Nuremberg Trials
Proceedings Volume 4, Twenty-Sixth Day, Thursday 3 January 1946, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law,
History, and Diplomacy, Yale Law School : http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/01-03-46.asp. Some sections of the
trial have been also translated in Greek by Kouzinopoulos, 2005.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
215
or else the “numbers of transportation that were scheduled” (Kouzinopoulos, 2005:97).
Overall, and under his own personal initiative as previously suggested, he deported and
exterminated 44,000 Jews from Thessaloniki, 47,000 from Vienna, 23,500 from France, and
14,000 from Slovakia (Kouzinopoulos, 2005: 98). Unlike Wisliceny who “was arrested in
Bratislava and executed in 1948”, Brunner escaped from postwar prosecution
(Kouzinopoulos, 2005:92). From 1945 onwards the authorities all around the world tried to
find him. There was another SS officer with the same surname (Anton Brunner responsible
for the Jewry of Vienna), whom the authorities for a long time thought they were related. The
latter was sent to the gallows but Alois Brunner escaped (Kouzinopoulos, 2005:100-101). He
changed locations the following decades, from Vienna to the US, from Prague to Munich,
when at some point he was arrested by the American authorities after been found by Czech
partisans. He remained for some time imprisoned without however revealing his real identity
(Kouzinopoulos, 2005:102).
Even since he was fugitive, but was found again in Damascus. The Syrian
authorities arrested him in 1960 for selling narcotics, but as Kouzinopoulos declares, he was
soon released after he revealed his identity, securing ever since the government’s protection.
Despite being found by the Israeli Secret Service, he again escaped murder after two failed
bomb attacks, and Brunner secured an even tighter governmental protection (Kouzinopoulos,
2005:105). The European Parliament in the early nineties accused the Assad regime of
protecting a butcher of thousands victims and until now he is still wanted by the world wide
authorities, while in 1980 sources indicated that he was still alive in Syria (Kouzinopoulos,
2005:110-111, 115). Other Nazis however who were involved in the destruction of many
European Jews apart from the Greek Jewry, such as Walter Blume was found guilty for his
crimes during the Nuremberg Trials, but the court did not investigate his role in Greece and
in particular Athens . His sentence changed from “death”, to “life imprisonment”, serving in
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the end only three years behind bars (Mazower, 1993:374). Other key Nazi perpetrators
involved in Greece such as General Lohr were seized by the Yugoslav partisans, “tried in
Belgrade”, and sent to the gallows in 1948. Furthermore, SS Lanz (Commander in Ioannina),
Speidel and Felmy, “were tried at the so-called ‘Trial of the Southeastern Generals’ at
Nuremberg, and served prison terms of seven to ten years”, while Waltern Schimana
“committed suicide in prison in Salzburg in 1948” (ibid). As we have argued in chapter 4, no
Nazi was held responsible for any massacre in Greece, and Distomo was not the only case,
but the massacre in Kommeno in Epirus among many others. Last but not least, Nazi Herman
Neubacher stayed behind bars only for a year despite receiving a twenty-year verdict, while
“an ambitious young intelligence officer called Kurt Waldheim, stationed in Greece for the
last eighteen months of the war, rose to become Secretary-General of the United Nations and
President of Austria” (Mazower, 1993:375).
Regarding the sensitive subject of collaboration, although the Greek Parliament
passed a law that guaranteed the implementation of prosecutions for those who collaborated,
such as the quisling governments, Nazi spies, the Security Battalions, members of the police
force and Greek Nazis, yet very few were prosecuted. The collaborators who fell under the
last category were sentenced systematically “but very few” received death sentences. The
argument behind the lenient treatment of the other categories was justified on the ground that
collaborators were fighting against communism, which was considered “a crime worse than
collaboration with the enemy” (Richter, 2006:294-295). As a result, the majority of the
collaborators continued to live their lives without worrying about anything, since their anti-
communist beliefs justified their murders (ibid). After the Varkiza Agreement, the Greek
authorities instead of imprisoning the collaborators and the Security Battalions, they sent to
jail at least 80,000 supporters of EAM/ELAS while the majority of collaborators escaped
prosecution. In particular, during 1945, Mazower declares that “only 2,896 of 16,700 held in
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September 1945 were convicted of collaboration; by January 1951 they numbered only 1,275
out of 28,000 prisoners” (Mazower, 2000:215).
One of the reasons for the slim number of imprisoned, lies partly from the fact that
the British troops slowly and gradually were releasing numbers of Security Battalions from
the prisons of Averoff and Goudi and re-baptised them members of the National Army or else
“Regular Army”. The latter in turn remained in full operation to fight members of the ELAS
in 1945 and 1946 (Gerolymatos, 2005: 258-259). Hondros in his essay “’Too Weighty a
Weapon’: Britain and the Greek Security Battalions, 1943-1944”, argues based on
intelligence papers, that during the war, British officials were really puzzled as to how to deal
with the Security Battalions. One the one hand they wanted to “denounce” them since they
were Nazi groups but that would mean that they would support EAM/ELAS which was an
anathema for their foreign policy, while on the other, they could secretly support the
Battalions and “denounce EAM/ELAS as a terroristic minority”. However, British plans
changed as EAM accepted to be part of the service government of Papandreou, thus made
both British and Greek politicians to officially denounce the Nazi Battalions in October 1944
(Hondros, 1988: 38-39).
However after denunciation, the British incorporated a large section of Security
Battalions in the Greek royalist army. During the revolt of December 1944, a number of
Security Battalions were released from prisons to chase EAM/ELAS without discrimination.
This argument in fact reveals how the legal system operated in general amid cold war. The
latter’s conspiracy rhetoric along with the inability or “unwillingness” of the Greek
authorities to handle the leftist prosecutions rationally, left open room to every kind of ultra-
nationalist and fascist group to kill, persecute and exile every person who was considered a
leftist. Of course, any progressive element in the Greek social life during the post war years
was considered by definition communistic for the ultra-right wing politics that prevailed
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during and after occupation (Gerolymatos, 2005:256-257). Another factor that contributed to
the escape of many collaborators of the Security Battalions was that during the liberation
months (October-December 1944), and in order to escape prosecution many former
collaborators sought refuge to the army of EDES. During the war their relation with some
sections of EDES was often “discreet” and “intimate”. These moves were frequent especially
in the province of Epirus in contrast with Central Greece and Thessaly for the latter regions
were controlled by ELAS (Kostopoulos, 2005:52-53).
A number of collaborators and members of the Security Battalions, who did not
end up in the new national army or EDES, were captured by ELAS. One of the most famous
battles between the partisans of ELAS and the Security Battalions occurred in south
Peloponnese, after the partisans chased them in Tripoli and Kalamata, and cornered them in
the small town of Meligala (Mazower, 1993:358). Until today, former relatives and members
of the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn pay annual tribute to the dead collaborators. 117 Mazower
declares that prior to the events in Meligala, the collaborators executed thousands in
Kalamata while Greece was still occupied. Thus local people and ELAS’ men took revenge
by killing all collaborators in the region in September 1944 with every weapon they found
(Mazower, 1993:358). As the author suggests,
“Numbers were exaggerated, but in the tense, excited, vengeful atmosphere
the reality turned out to be violent enough. After all, up to 1,500 people had
been executed in the Kalamata area during the German occupation, and
thousands of homes had been burned. Battalionists had carried out a last
round of reprisals only a few weeks earlier, and now the victims sought their
revenge [...] As soon as they were marched into the main square, frenzy
onlookers broke loose of the ELAS civil police and in ten minutes beat some
of the prisoners to death, and strung the others up from lamp-posts”
(Mazower, 1993:358).
117 http://www.enetenglish.gr/?i=news.en.article&id=1474
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Keith Lowe suggests that unlike Holland, Belgium, Norway and Denmark, in
Greece, Italy, parts of France, and Eastern Europe as a whole, neither the resistance nor the
local population invested upon the legitimacy or efficiency of the local authorities in purging
the collaborators and the “reasons” were “political”, taking many times “the law in into their
hands” (Lowe, 2012:149). Tony Judt would have agreed with Lowe on the issue of
collaborators and the failure of purging them in the aftermath. Despite the fact that Judt
recognised the inefficiency of post-war trials everywhere in Europe – and in the West -
France, Italy and Greece were paradigmatic examples, yet he considers the latter as a “unique
case” and “a revealing one” (Judt, 2010:48). He argued, that “despite a significant level of
wartime collaboration among the bureaucratic and business elites, post-war purges were
directed not at the Right but the Left” and that the “purges and trials in Greece were thus
blatantly political” (Judt, 2010: 48-49).
Furthermore, in the province of Greek Macedonia and especially Salonika, the
limited number of prosecuted collaborators was even more embarrassing, although in this
particular region the Security Battalions committed perhaps the most terrible crimes on local
populations. A great number survived the judiciary as they escaped with other Nazis in
Germany, while others (about 26%) who faced severe accusations vanished from the earth.
There was also another category of people who collaborated, namely those who worked in
pro-Nazi Greek press. The majority of Greek journalists for instance who worked in the
German controlled newspapers were accused of collaboration and many faced sentences.
Many of these propagandists tried to excuse their capitulation with the enemy on the basis of
“fear and not by any lack of patriotic feeling” (Haida, 2000: 52-53).
Furthermore, other cases escaped secretly the judiciary as they were frozen in 1946
due to the civil war and the coming elections, since the authorities feared it will taint the
outcome of the vote. People who were charged for financial collaboration such as the
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technocrats of the banks, only 20 of them were sentenced in 1945 and just 59 the following
year. Hence, their sentences were changing all the time with the excuse that the jails lacked
space, while many escaped by paying their sentence (Haida, 2000:50, 44). Other cases in
Thessalonica that involved collaboration were ethnic minorities such as the Bulgarians. Given
that there was a lot of antagonism between the Bulgarians and the Greeks (since Northern
Greece during Axis was also occupied and illegally annexed by the Bulgarian Army) many
people from these minorities collaborated with the enemy and murdered Greeks. The severity
of these sentences increased as the Greek authorities feared that the Bulgarians will raise the
issue of “Macedonian Autonomy” (Haida, 2000:49). As we have already discussed in chapter
2, Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace (Greece) during occupation was illegally annexed
to the Bulgarian Government and the Bulgarian citizens were acting in accordance with the
Bulgarian Authorities. Yet, many accusations against some Bulgarians civilians were
fabricated and “exaggerated”. These exaggerations one may suggest reflected Greece’s
anxieties over its borders since they have been challenged during the Balkan Wars, thus
“public opinion in Macedonia was quick to tar all Slavic-speakers with the same brush”
(Haida, 2000:56; see also chapter 2). As Haida writes,
“Slavic- speakers were accused of a variety of offenses, often on the basis of
rumour, conjecture, exaggeration, and even sheer malice, as the witnesses’
depositions reveal. Someone might be considered a “Bulgarian” because he
was the butcher who provided the Bulgarians with their meat, because he
happened to be related to a known collaborator with the Bulgarian authorities,
or because he was having an affair with someone of Bulgarian descent”
(Haida, 2000:56).
The small number of trials attracted Europe’s attention criticising the Greek
judiciary for lack of transparency and flexibility towards collaboration. The British and U.S
American authorities criticized the legal failure in Greece, attacking at the same time the
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newly elected Government of Tsaldaris in 1946, for its “authoritarian and undemocratic”
character, not prosecuting the Nazis and making prisons a left-wing concentration camp
(Haida, 2000:54-55). Of course there is an irony here, for the British – and since they
promoted their own agenda in post-war Greece- they were all too aware what their policies
would bring about in the end, since legal justice was impossible via a far-right government
which they chose to support. In fact, many British “representatives” accused the British
government for supporting this Greek leniency towards the collaborators (Haida, 2000:56).
As Haida declares:
“...the British parliament also took a particular interest in the progress of the
trials, and MPs frequently submitted questions to government representatives
criticizing them for supporting the Greek government in its attempts to secure
light sentences for well-known collaborators. In a report to the British
ambassador to Athens in later 1946, the consul general in Thessaloniki
intimated that the British authorities were being strongly criticized by some of
their compatriots for their attitude on the issue. The report also revealed that
the inhabitants of northern Greece were unanimous in their support for the
exemplary punishment of the collaborators; and it made no secret of the
partiality of the judicial authorities” (Haida, 2000: 56).
Nevertheless, there were some groups who faced severe sentences. One of the
Greek Nazis, who was tried along with his unit, was Georgios Poulos. As we already
mentioned in the section of (“Political and Armed Collaboration” in chapter 5), Georgios
Poulos was considered an extremely dangerous criminal and an open advocate of Nazism. He
was known for his anti-Semitic sentiments, for his flirtatious support towards the National
Union of Greece (EEE), and for slaughtering unarmed civilians. His nationalist Nazi unit
carried out perhaps one of the most ferocious murders in occupied Greek Macedonia
(Dordanas, 2006:190). He never hesitated to exhibit his pro-Nazi persona and was in contact
with many agents in Cairo and the Wermacht units. While Greece was occupied, he travelled
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to Germany giving propagandistic and raving speeches against the Greek resistance. He tried
to attract as many people as possible in his unit to fight on the side of the Nazis during
Occupied Greece (Dordanas, 2011: 151-152).
Poulos was hiding in Germany when the U.S army arrested him. He asked from the
American and German authorities to be tried in Greece, hoping he would convince the Greek
authorities he was fighting on the side of the national patriotic front and against communism
and that his actions were driven by his need to serve his country; it was a motto that all
traitors used in order to save themselves. His application was accepted and was sent to
Greece to be tried in 1947 by the Military courts of Salonika. As one may suspect, he “denied
all allegations” that were made against him arguing that he never attacked the “nationally-
minded” Greeks but only the Greek communists (Dordanas, 2011:153-155). He was also
accused of espionage by the court of Thessaloniki, but was “dropped”, and his case continued
in the Special Courts of Collaborators. His file case was extremely long as he and his armed
unit were involved in systematic murders against unarmed civilians such as Jews, Greeks and
Bulgarians (ibid).
Stratos Dordanas examined his file case in Thessaloniki, and argued that the Greek
authorities hesitated to charge all men of his unit, since many saw refuge in the National
Army of Greece during the December Events and in the Civil War. In the beginning, the
Greek court decided that all 206 men of Poulos had to be sentenced for collaborating with the
Nazis, but the verdict changed (Dordanas, 2011:158-160). The court hearing started in 2
December 1947 and on the 11th the court gave the death sentence to Poulos, but only 20 of his
men were sentenced. In 11 June 1949, Poulos was taken to Goudi Prison and was executed in
the firing squad (Dordanas, 2011:167-169).
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Others who faced strong sentences (though not all served them in full) were the
Quisling Prime Ministers (Georgios Tsolakoglou, Konstantinos Logothetopoulos, and Ioannis
Rallis). All three were sentenced to life imprisonment, although Tsolakoglou initially was
sentenced to death. The second was set free in 1951, while the third (Rallis) died in prison in
1946 (Laughland, 2008:160). Laughland suggests, that up until now, no one has found any
trace of documentation concerning the trials of the quisling prime ministers, as all files were
“destroyed” “six months” after the end of the court proceedings and no author, historian or
journalist ever studied these records (Laughland, 2008: 161). Two men who were part of the
quisling government of Logothetopoulos but escaped the judiciary in Salonika were Vasillis
Simonides and Athanassios Chrysochoou. These two men were highly involved in the
destruction of Greek Jewry but the legal system treated them indifferently. As we discussed
in chapter 2, Vasillis Simonides and Athanasios Chysochoou, were the main bureaucrats in
the administration of Salonika who however escaped legal prosecution. The quisling Prime
Minister Logothetopoulos (in order to escape charges against the Jewish community of
Salonika), declared that he was not informed by Vasillis Simonides and “did not keep his
superiors in Athens fully informed as to what was happening to the Jews” (Apostolou,
2000:179). Apostolou declares that unfortunately not many archives and files exist so as to
know, how much Simonides was in charge of the situation or whether he was there signing
the German orders (ibid). Even if he took charge of things or he was just a bureaucrat, the
responsibility remains. There were many bureaucrats in Occupied Europe who did not
execute any Jew, but they approved these actions by certain bureaucratic decisions and
certain signatures. The Eichmann case is a good example here, and Arendt’s analysis of his
trial reveals that a normal citizen as Eichmann who did not touch a single Jew yet “had a key
position in the whole process”, and thus was highly responsible (Arendt, 2006: 152). With
this logic, many bureaucrats in Greece escaped the penal system and there are no archives
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unfortunately that show what happened in other major cities where local authorities
collaborated in one way or another to deport the Jews.
However, to go back to the case of Simonides in Salonika, Apostolou declares, that
Wisliceny (and based on letters) informed the PM Logothetopoulos about the situation in
Salonika, and that a representative signature or approval must have taken place. However,
there are no sources available that explain what kinds of decisions were taken and what
Simonides, Logothetopoulos, Altenburg and Wisliceny discussed about. But it leaves no
doubt that Logothetopoulos was all “too aware of the atrocious conditions in the ghettos and
on the first deportation trains” (Apostolou, 2000:182). Ironically, not only Simonides escaped
the judiciary, but his fellow colleague in the central administration of Salonika, Athanassios
Chrysochoou. The latter, became a member in the Greek Government of Papandreou before
and after the December Events of 1944 (in the liberation period). As we saw in chapter 5, this
Government was built with Greek and British encouragement so as to minimise the power of
the left in the next coming elections (Apostolou, 2000:176).
These categories of collaborators that we just discussed, at least the majority
escaped the penal system or faced soft sentences. What is important to highlight here, is that
these categories of collaborators guarded the social and political machine in Greece and
entered the following decade the political system of the country (i.e. bureaucracy, army,
administration) in order to bring order and suppress the left; yet, what they achieved was a
“national schism” (Karakatsanis, 2001:27). In order to make sure that Greece remains right-
wing, the hard-core nationalist Tsaldaris Government entered the Greek Parliament in 1946
with a highly ambivalent outcome. The Greek sociologist Costas Tsoucalas criticised heavily
the outcome of the vote but also the procedure as such, for the elections took place under
terroristic warnings to those who would not support the Right in the ballots. Thus half of
Greeks (both from the Centre and the Left) did not go to the polling stations for they knew
225
the result would be rigid and the whole electorate process a “farce” , while the members of
KKE and the EAM committee decided to “abstain” from the elections. The decision of the
Left not to go to the polls gave satisfaction to Bevin, who exercised “veto” to those leftists
who reconsidered and applied for candidates. The same period, the referendum over the issue
of the crown took place with an “expected result” as again approximately half of the
electorate stayed home, while monarchy came back and George II returned from Britain
(Tsoucalas, 1969:96-97).118
“Thus British policy had met with complete success. While the British found
their military allies in the extreme Right and collaborationist groups, who they
had carefully preserved, armed and used against the ELAS, the political allies
were sought among the progressive and republican pre-war political circles,
who would be able to pose as conciliators and moderates. Papandreou,
Plastiras, and Sophoulis were successfully called upon to play this role [...] The
double structure of power, democratic in the political facade but Royalist-
fascist in the forces of coercion, which was gradually built up from 1943, was
to be a crucial factor in the future. For the construction of the new Army as an
autonomous entity, not subject to governmental authority, did not end with the
termination of the civil war. Despite the fact that the right wing was in power
between 1952 and 1963, the army remained ‘untouchable’” (Tsoucalas, 1969:
97-98).
Concerning the 1946 elections, it is widely known to many Greeks today that the
whole process was based on “fraud” and that the conditions under which the elections took
place were indeed terroristic. Sedgwick claims, that although they sent Western observers to
monitor the procedure, it is widely believed that the outcome was rigid and that the abstain of
the majority of the left and centrist voters was 9.3 % out of the overall 15% of the voters
118 See analytically on the elections of 1946 the powerful essay of Mavrogordatos “the 1946 Elections and
Plebiscite: Prelude to Civil War”, 2006:308-340.
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which showed the “strength of the anti-national Left-Wing” movement in post-war Greece
(Sedgwick, 1948: 490).
Criticism: Greece at the ‘centre’ of the Cold War
Greece failed to deliver justice and bring into courts the Nazi-collaborators. The
State used the slogan of the communist threat to divide the Greek population by covering at
the same time the crimes of the collaborators. In the literature that is available and examines
the post-war politics many authors fell into the same trap unfortunately. The anti-left
syndrome that was developing amid cold war created a country with extreme “polarizations”
(Close, 1993:156). Hence Nazi collaboration became an issue of secondary importance. In
this sense, many sought to excuse their crimes as well as the presence of fascism within the
administration in the post-war politics in the name of the communist threat. This thought
however (in our point of view) created tolerance to Nazism and to the proper legal
prosecution of the collaborators.
Thus we are confronted with a major ideological problem. Throughout our research
concerning the politics of collaboration in Greece, we have observed two schools of historical
explanation concerning the Greek affairs. The majority of authors and we are naming only
few, such as Mark Mazower, Hagen Fleischer, Heinz Richter, Stratos Dordanas, Costas
Tsoucalas and many others critically attacked the Greek and British policy in order to
understand how Greece developed during but also after the war not only legally but socio-
politically as well. Heinz Richter for instance (who in our point of view was perhaps the
strictest in tone) attacked the British foreign policy for not providing the air and space in
Greece to decide for their own politics and thus did not help to prosecute the collaborators,
for “only with the help of the British could be accomplished”. While at the same time Richter
deconstructed the “myth” that the Greek Left would have seized the power by force or that
they were thirsty for the “third round” after the Varkiza Agreement (Richter, 2006:302-303).
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The other camp sought to excuse the rise of fascism and authoritarianism in the
socio-political infrastructure because the alternative choice to the Greek political scene was
communism; and that their followers were extremists. William Hardy McNeil for instance, in
his book The Greek Dilemma, seemed to favour the former as a choice, arguing that since the
centrist politics were totally destroyed, the British politics had to choose a king who was
fascist and a right-wing administration that was extreme (McNeil, 1947:223). As he argues:
“In real or imagined emergency, rather than go under the Communists, the men
of the Right would try to establish a dictatorship such as the one Metaxas
wielded before the war; and would employ the full power of the police and
Army to repress the threat from the Left. Such an event would prove highly
embarrassing to the British and American Governments. Both have preferred a
Centre which does not exist; but between extremes have chosen to support the
Right within certain limits. Should the Right, facing emergency, set up
authoritarian government, the Western Powers would find themselves faced
with the problem whether to support what would practically be a Fascist State.
Only if communism fades away and becomes what it was before the war, an
irritant but not a threat, will the probability of a dictatorship from the Right
disappear” (McNeil, 1947:223).
At this point we wish to make a critical remark, namely, that the author forgets that
the political Centre was never destroyed and in fact it did exist and that what the west
considered as communism was actually something else; it was the people and political
leaders from many progressive camps that sought to subvert the old political guard (i.e.
monarchy) which went hand in hand with fascism. What McNeil failed to realize was that
both the Left and the Centre were against the return of a fascist regime in the face of king
George II. His book yet was written in the middle of the civil war in Greece (and hence on
the eve of cold war), and clear understanding of the events was impossible. To be precise, the
centre only got weak (but still alive), when the western politics supported at all cost a
monarch who was unwanted among even the majority of centrist politicians. What remained
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therefore as the only option was in fact to furnish the king with a fascist cabinet since no one
else approved him. Not to mention that the real centrist politicians were now part of the
coalition scheme of EAM. We must bear in mind again that the EAM was not communistic in
its totality, but included also social-democrats, liberals, republicans, supporters of Venizelos,
even some royalists who left the royalist bloc as we have stated already many times, and this
left-wing coalition scheme was well known inside and outside Greece (Bowman, 2002:74).119
Although there were ideological differences between the various political camps, however
during the civil war that started in 1946, these differences vanished to some extent, given that
the “officer corps” who took charge of the Greek politics, became a “homogenous body
committed to authoritarianism and monarchism, anti-communism and anti-republicanism”
(Gerolymatos, 2009: 7).
In other words, the military factor that entered all aspects of political life in post-war
Greece considered dangerous all political trends apart from the Right and not just
communism. While the Centre – and when we talk about the Centre we refer to the Greek
political figures in Cairo and their coalition scheme while in exile - seemed to be divided
precisely because the king was unwanted, even though the Cairo leaders provoked the Left at
the same time since they feared they will lose their power, and they too spread accusations
against EAM/ELAS (see for example the “Speech to the Nation” by Georgios Papandreou, in
October 1944, where he accuses EAM/ELAS for all the ills of the Greek Society).120
However, it was the right-wing forces of the monarchy that weakened the centre, for
every time the centrist politics were coming back in the Greek political scene, the monarchy
119 The newspapers of United Kingdom of the time, from the most conservative to the most progressive and
radical, were highlighting precisely the democratic and progressive character of the EAM and its political
openness, see Filippos Dragoumis sub-file 62.5 “Dekemvriana 1944”, London 28 December 1944, No. 3706
(summary of the British Press, copy to the Greek Information Office), Gennadius Library, Athens.
120 See “O Logos pros to Ethnos” (The Speech to the Nation) by Georgios Papandreou, October 1944, in
Filippos Dragoumis Sub-file 62.2 “Apeleftherosi Oct-Dec 1944” ( Liberation Oct-Dec 1944), Gennadius
Library, Athens.
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destroyed the unity of the political parties and always organised coups for the regency to keep
its power. It was a scene that we saw during Metaxas dictatorship in the 30s when the king
destroyed the unity of Venizelos and called the army to take hold, suspending the Greek
constitution as we already mentioned before. And it was also a scene that was re-played in
the mid 60s when the coalition scheme of the centre of Papandreou regained its power while
the right was losing. During the mid sixties the new king Constantine II disagreed with
Papandreou as to which ministers will take which office, creating many years of political
instability, leading the king to collaborate with the Generals to form a coup in 1967. Of
course this was one of the many reasons that led to the dictatorship, since Constantine also
accused Georgios Papandreou’s son, Andreas, for his left wing affiliations and beliefs that he
developed while teaching at Harvard University. However, Constantine was undoubtedly one
of the most responsible figures for the martial regime along with the support of some of
Washington circles, the Greek Intelligence (KYP) and CIA from which Dictator
Papadopoulos undoubtedly received a graduate degree (Tsarouhas, 2005: 7, 8-9; same in
Close, 2002:152; same in Woodhouse, 1985:7-8).
It is not in the scope of this thesis to talk about the military dictatorship, but serves to
show how the collaborators through the exercise of right-wing politics survived and in fact
took decisions for the future of Greece, with the excuse that they wanted to save Greece from
communism. A very good example to support our argument is that of General Markezinis
who was appointed as an interim General in the last year of junta before democratic
restoration. Markezinis entered the politics in the late 40s under the head of General Papagos.
He had very good connections with the Greek royal family, and he was the personal and
“trusted” advisor of Greek king Paul and very good friend with his wife queen Frederica
(Frederiki), who undoubtedly was the most hated woman in Greece (Close, 1995b:149). All
these personas sprung in the 40s and re-appeared in Greece the following decades, playing a
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crucial role in the politics of Greece. Hence, as we saw in chapter 5, Dictator Papadopoulos
too, collaborated with the Germans during 40s (as he was a member of the Security
Battalions) and later suspended parliamentary democracy with king Constantine forming a
coup in 1967 (see Kostopoulos, 2005: 146). The ground was cooked for many decades (under
the shadows of cold war), and as Karakatsanis declares, from the late 40s until 1967 it was “a
coup in the making” (Karakatsanis, 2001:29).
To go back however and based on the previous argument, we can see that the British
support for monarchy during the Second World War created political disintegration inside
Greece. For it was the hostility towards monarchy and vice versa that weakened the centre
and this can be understood by the numerous resignations from the Papandreou government
that occurred during the spring and autumn of 1944. The politicians in Athens and Cairo
could not agree who would eventually fit the agenda of the king and who would bear the cost
in working with the regency. The plethora of files from the Cabinet Papers of London that we
examined, reveal precisely what has been previously said; namely that king’s prospective
return made a whole dynasty of bourgeois politicians to fall into resignations such as that of
Sofoulis and Tsouderos sending even telegrams to London declaring that the Greek king does
not respect the political changes in Greece, accusing him of “playing with fire”.121
Whoever tried to reconcile his political career with his support to monarchy was
labelled a “fascist”, as in the case of Georgios Papandreou (the eldest). The latter was openly
accused by many British MPs in the debate at the House of Commons in 12 December 1944,
as well as attacking Churchill’s handling of events during the battle of Athens. One of those
MPs was Labour Seymour Cocks who argued that Papandreou was the ultimate “evil genius
121 CAB/66/49/47 Image Ref: 0001, The Greek Crisis (April 1-25, 1944), see telegraphs No. 198 (3rd April
1944), No. 199 (4th April 1944), No. 215 (6th April 1944), No. 217 (6th April 1944).
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of Modern Greece” as he refused to disarm the collaborators and fight ELAS, while at the
same time, Labour John Dugdale openly labelled him a “fascist and reactionary”.122
There are many political peculiarities that are often ignored but must be seen as an
integral part of the socio-political woes of Greece. The geo-political element played a
dramatic role in understanding the motives of the cold war. People’s struggle within EAM
did not only imply war against Nazism but years of agony to subvert fascism, nationalism,
and to fight for freedom and civil rights which were totally ignored during occupation and
amid cold war. Apart from the political antagonisms that prevailed in Greece, it is addressed
by many authors that Greece’s people’s movement has been suppressed by politico-
diplomatic interests. Greece’s crucial geopolitical location along with the intervention of the
British policies and U.S policies (the latter took over after 1947), made the country one of the
crucial epicentres of the cold war (Woodhouse: 1977:124).
But the ultimate consequence of western strategy was felt mostly on the social and
political fabric of the country, as people’s need to turn a page in the Greek politics and bring
social - democratic and progressive laws were translated as anti-Greek, anti-patriotic and thus
communistic. This kind of polarisation that we discussed in the previous paragraph, escalated
in Greece of course after the agreement of Churchill and Stalin to divide Europe into spheres
of influence thus any attempt of revolting against the existing situation was “doomed” to fail
(Eudes, 1972: 249).
Other authors however, such as Stathis Kalyvas in his essay “Armed Collaboration in
Greece, 1941-1944”, give attention more to the anti-communist agenda of the collaborators
than the Nazi one. He declared that if the leftists did not take such a hard line, the Security
Battalions would never have been introduced into the armed life of Greece, and thus not
122 Filippos Dragoumis Sub-file, 62.5 “Dekemvriana 1944”, Foreign Office, London 12-12-44, Copy of the
debate in the House of Commons to the Greek Information Office.
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many people would have followed them (Kalyvas, 2008:135). This argument is problematic,
for Kalyvas fell under the same trap as many Greek politicians who excused collaboration.
And this tolerance brought very few Nazis in the courts of justice. Irrespective of someone’s
personal political affiliations or whether someone during Occupied Europe was simply an
anti-communist (which is perfectly accepted) this alone cannot explain or excuse the great
number of participation of people in the Security Battalions. For us there is no question that
the bands of ELAS followed many times an extremely hard line, but what Kalyvas forgets is
that ELAS was not fighting only the Nazis, but the nationalists. Kalyvas argues, that many
defeated forces of EDES and EKKA who joined the Battalions did it to protect themselves, to
fight communism, and someone who fought on the side of collaborators did not necessarily
mean that he/she was a Nazi sympathiser (Kalyvas, 2008: 134). 123
With these generalisations Greek History was hidden for many decades, and this
silence was preserved or helped to preserve fascism and nationalism in the decades that
followed. In fact the nationalists, who fought the Left, were fighting against freedom because
the latter was suppressed for decades as these nationalists issued dictatorial and oppressive
laws for the majority of the population.
The “Merten Affair”: The trial and release of the Nazi Maximilian Merten, a systematic
study from diplomatic papers.
We left at the end of this chapter the most sensitive file case that concerned a Nazi
who was responsible for the Jewish destruction in Salonika, in order to understand how
indeed the political atmosphere that we explained throughout this chapter shaped many legal
decisions. One of the most peculiar trial cases that occurred in post war Greece, where a Nazi
war criminal sentenced to 25 years in prison, but only after serving a few months of his
123 The same argument is suggested also in Kalyvas’s essay “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War”, 2004:117.
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sentence was set free, was Maximilian Merten. Max Merten, a lawyer and member of the
Wermacht Units, was one of the three responsible architects for the Jewish deportations in
Salonika in 1943. Along with Wisliceny and Brunner, he designed to carry out the Jewish
policy in the Greek northern region (Rosenbaum, and Hoffer, 1993: 146; see also chapter 2).
The Merten case is really unknown in Greece although the former’s case file is stored in
Greece and in the Public Record Office with the number (FO 371/153018 RG1661/1,
RG1661/2, and RG 1661/3). While carefully examining the file, one can suggest that it
resembled more of a scandal between two countries than a legal case of a Nazi war criminal.
It was considered as the most important war case in Greece, since Merten was the only
German Nazi who tried by the judiciary inside the country and he was one of the three key
perpetrators of Salonika Jewry. However, as we shall see, he was freed on the grounds of
other socio-political and economic reasons that were cooked by the Greek and German
political elite.
Straight after the war, Max Merten escaped prosecution and returned back to
Germany, although he was arrested by the U.S Americans in 1946. Both Greek and German
authorities agreed to be freed and return back to his country, in an attempt to ease the tensions
between the two countries and built a new relationship; this time based on good economic
transactions. Greek elite for that matter was Germany’s new post-war financial client.
However, by bringing new Nazi criminals into publicity in Greece would have spoiled not
only Germany’s post war profile but also the need to forget the bitter chapter of collaboration
and move on. On the other hand, the Greek government as well profited from this rhetoric,
for not only the country needed economic stability after so many decades of severe poverty
and hunger but in this way many ministers, officials and bureaucrats in Greece would escape
the danger of possible allegations for “widespread collaboration” (Spiliotis, 2000: 293-294).
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Constantine Karamanlis (the eldest) who became a Prime Minister in 1958 after his
conservative party (ERE) won the elections, agreed with Germany to form new economic ties
and suspend all Nazi war crime cases that were pending and give them all to Germany. The
latter wanted to forget its Nazi past, while in Greece, the political atmosphere of the cold war
that was emerging made Karamanlis very worried that possible officials and political figures
from his Right bloc would be accused for dark transactions with the Germans during
Occupation and that would give the impetus for the leftist party (EDA, post war EAM
sympathisers who escaped prison) to win the majority of the seats in the next political round.
What was agreed between the two countries was the following: Germany gave a loan to
Greece in order to boost its economy, and in return Greece agreed to stop further charges
upon Nazi war criminals with a new legislative law (Spiliotis, 2000:296-297).
Two years before the implementation of the new legislative law, in 26 April 1957,
Max Merten was accidentally arrested by the Greek Authorities when he travelled to Athens
to testify for another court case. He was questioned for his position in Salonika, admitting for
being responsible for the murder of many Greek anti-Nazi fighters, for concentrating 9,000
Jews in Eleftheria Square in 11 July 1942 and for sending thousands of innocent souls to the
death camps of Auschwitz (see also chapter 2). He was found guilty of his crimes and was
sent to Averoff prison for 25 years; however he was set free after staying behind bars only for
a short period of time (Der Spiegel, No.40/1960). A report of British Embassy in Athens
arguing that Merten was set free after staying in prison for a few months and after “a
considerable pressure from the German Embassy in Athens and was expected to remove a
possible source of friction between the two countries and to pave the way for the further
economic penetration of Greece by the Federal German Republic” (FO 371/153018 RG:
1661/1 B).
235
Upon his release, he travelled to Germany giving an interview to the German
magazine Hamburger Echo which was also published in Der Spiegel in September 1959.
Max Merten openly accused ministers of Karamanlis Government for collaborating with the
Germans. He declared in particular that while Merten was in Occupied Salonika, he had a
secretary named Mrs Doxoula Leontidou, who was in fact the niece of Constantine
Karamanlis, and his niece was “then engaged to and is now married to M. Makris, the Greek
Minister of Interior” (FO 371/153018 RG:1661/1).124 He further reported to the German
magazine, that although both men were resistance fighters for two years – in the period 1942-
1943, Karamanlis and Makris were also German spies. As a reward for their cooperation with
the German authorities they received a store (selling silk) which belonged to a Jew from
Salonika who was deported to the concentration camps. Merten argued that the niece of
Karamanlis (Mrs Leontidou) lied to the Greek authorities when she argued that she never
worked for Merten, and that she only met him a couple of times. He declared that she was the
one sending him information concerning the operations of resistance against the Nazi troops
such as that of Gorgopotamos Bridge. He further declared that the Greek Government
suspended all criminal cases that were pending against any Nazi or collaborator after they
received a loan of “300.000.000” Drachmas from the German Government, and that he had a
picture where Merten had posed with Karamanlis, Makris, and Leontidou (RG:1661/1 A and
B). The Greek Government denied all allegations of Merten, and declared that everything is
propaganda and “figments of a sick mind” (RG: 1661/1/A). The Greek cabinet wrote to the
Embassy of Bonn that none of his accusations were true as neither Karamanlis was in
Salonika the period in question nor he knew the accused minister or his wife until 1956
(RG:1661/1/A).
124 See also, Kouzinopoulos, 2005:122-123.
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Once the news reached the Greek public press, there was a political turmoil inside the
Greek Parliament. The Greek Minister of Interior M. Makris threatened to sue Merten for his
false allegations, while Merten argued that he had valid “proof” for all that, and he would
soon visit Greece to confirm these. He also accused the Greek judge who sentenced him to 25
years to prison, Mr. Toussis, for hiding important information during his hearing after he was
“bribed”. He further accused Mr. Marshal Themelis (under-secretary of Ministry of Defence)
for giving “hostages for him during occupation”, and that he has collected all this information
from the British Foreign Office (RG: 1661/1 B, and D).
The British Foreign Office rushed to report that all these allegations made against
them were totally invalid, however the British officials panicked when Max Merten further
said that he was holding a list of Greek collaborators concerning the Jews of Greece that took
from an archivist who worked at the National Archives in London and Merten’s lawyer, Dr.
Posser, now had them in his hands (RG: 1661/2). The Foreign Office wanted to check the
authenticity of these German files stored in London, and asked an expert archivist from
Germany to make copies of the micro-films (FO 371/153018 RG:1661/2). 125
Following a full investigation of the originality of the German archives, the German
Government found absolutely no evidence that such a list exists and that Merten’s
accusations lacked any credibility. The former also stated that the list available concerned
only information about the Greek Jews in the Italian controlled zone, while the Foreign
125 They suggested that it was better for the Foreign Office not to make any official statement about these files,
since the German Government “confirmed” to the British that indeed the files were stored in London, and it was
better “to deny the existence of any such list, if possible, and to secure the early return of the German archivist
without publicity, if in fact he arrives” and inform the Greek Government too (FO 371/153018 RG: 1661/2).
Otherwise, if this issue went public, the Foreign Office would “stress that the documents in the Public Record
Office are open to anyone” (RG: 1661/2 B).
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Office further confirmed that the Public Record Office indeed gave a copy to Merten’s
lawyer, Dr Posser (RG 1661/2).126
The Greek Government furthermore, in an effort to save itself from further publicity,
suppressed all copies of Der Spiegel that covered all the allegations of Max Merten against
the Ministers of Karamanlis. The debate in the Greek Parliament continued for at least five
days, and the ministers who were involved in the Merten case tried to defend themselves. The
Minister of Interior M. Makris for instance, defended his wife (Doxoula Leontidou) arguing
that she did not know Merten, but that she worked “as a typist in a civil office, dealing with
the supply of petroleum products, which had come under the direction of Merten’s civil
administration” and that if she was Merten’s secretary, many people from Thessalonica
would have come out in public to “confirm this”, but no Salonikan recognised her as his
secretary (RG 1661/3). Regarding the allegations made against Minister Makris, he himself
argued in the Parliament, that the Salonika Bar Association confirmed that there was another
man named Makris, who was a lawyer in Salonika and was indeed a Nazi collaborator but he
is not related to him. Makris showed a letter to the Parliament supposedly “signed by Merten”
that the Jewish properties were gifted not to Karamanlis, the Interior Minister and his wife
“but to two women entirely unconnected to them”. But the British Embassy in Athens left
“some doubt” on the originality of this file concerning the Jewish properties (RG 1661/3).
126 However, once the news reached Greece; they sent shockwaves in the Greek Parliament. The politicians from
the leftist party EDA demanded that the minister of Interior Mr. Makris, Marshal Themelis and the whole
cabinet resign. Fearing that this event would bring a new slap to the Greek Government, Karamanlis wanted to
call for elections earlier than 1962, especially when the leftish EDA was winning in the opinion polls, and if the
Left had won the elections the mechanisms of provocation were ready to take hold. As we read from a report
that was sent to London by the British Embassy in Athens in October 1960: in the prospect of a Leftist victory
in the next elections “the Army was organised and determined to take over” (RG: 1661/3). Mazower declares
what is already known to us, namely that Karamanlis secured his position in 1962 with “rigid elections”
although there were “revelations of the wartime collaboration of senior ministers” (Mazower, 1998a: 317). We
also need to remind ourselves that while the Merten case went public damaging the Karamanlis administration,
Greece was entering at the same time a 5 year political crisis until the military tanks entered Athens with the
coup of 21 April 1967.
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The case was suddenly closed for Merten. In one report written by the British Embassy in
Athens, stated the following:
“The question remains, how could an affair so petty in itself assume such large
dimensions that it overshadowed in this country for the time being everything
else, even Mr. Khrushchev’s performances at the United Nations? How could
such squalid allegations, virtually unsupported by any evidence, have been
allowed to create a major political incident? Was there in fact something
hitherto unrecognised behind it all? and if so, what was it? Did somebody
stimulate Merten to make his allegation? [....] Some people are now even
suggesting that Monsieur Karamanlis allowed the agitation to continue and the
newspapers to go on publishing the scandals so that he could, by providing
them false, reinforce his position and possibly introduce new legislation to curb
the newspapers” ( RG 1661/3).
However, in our own point of view, there are other more important questions that
have not been answered by anyone. What was exactly that thing that fuelled this scandal, and
why did the Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, if indeed his ministers were clean from
accusations, pass this new law suspending all war crime cases? Did he want to save his
cabinet past? What was exactly the role of the German Government in all this and why the
latter fought so hard with the Greek authorities to release Merten? Why did British Officials
choose to remain silent when in fact it was the Public Record Office that furnished Merten
with documents? Was there any list of collaborators after all, and if so, did the German
Government had information and hide it? Who profited from this case? Did the victims of
Merten deserve to see at least this criminal so involved in the Salonika Jewry prosecuted?
What is most certain is that Max Merten although sentenced to 25 years by the
Greek Military courts, enjoyed a free and clean life until his death. We chose to stay in this
case much more, not only because it is one of the biggest Nazi cases in Greece although
extremely unknown, but because it really captures the very essence of our critique throughout
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this chapter. Namely, that there was a plethora of political mechanisms in Greece and in
Europe that sought to hide elements that would bring light to the issue of collaboration.
Spiliotis suggests that the case of Merten shows “the lack of seriousness of German justice in
prosecuting war criminals” and as regards to Greece, “the compliant attitude of the Right
toward the Germans could easily be presented as a continuation of wartime collaborationism”
(Spiliotis, 2000: 297). In doing so, justice did not take place to the eyes of public opinion and
most importantly to the eyes and memories of the Jewish victims. The new legislative law
suspended further Nazi war cases. There is a file stored in the General Archives of the State
(GAK) from the Athens Court that lists a number of legal cases pending for Nazi war
criminals between 1961 until 1968, and these file cases never opened in Greece.127 Last but
not least, the most comical and yet tragic event took place upon Max Merten’s return to
Germany; not only he was free from the charges made against him, but he “received
compensation from the German government for time spent in Greek prisons” (Spiliotis,
2000:299).
Authors who investigated also the file case of Max Merten such as Susanne-Sophia
Spiliotis, criticized Hannah Arendt for failing to read properly the story behind the case of
Max Merten and for hasting to accuse the Greek population for being indifferent to the
Jewish victims, and that Merten’s case in Greece was ‘unique’ in Europe (Spiliotis, 2000:300,
see also Arendt, 2006:189-190).
Spiliotis although recognised that Arendt was unaware about all the truth behind the
Merten case, since the files “were only opened in 1990”, however the term “indifference” to
characterise a whole population for the treatment of Jews, was insufficient and rather unfair.
The Karamanlis administration did not take seriously Merten’s record and his involvement to
127 GAK, ABE 1246, File 7: “Fakelos Ekremon Aitiseon Nazismou 1961-1968” (Nazi Pending Applications
1961-1968).
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the Jewish deportations, and that the scandalous treatment of the case was seen as an
anathema and disrespect for the Jewish victims, however, it does not explain anything about a
case where political and financial aspects were on the table (Spiliotis, 2000: 299-300). The
Merten Case is not “unique” in the history of the European trials; on the contrary, it shows
exactly how (at least a part) of de-Nazification and pacification took place, that is, by hiding a
whole Nazi dynasty behind the carpet for financial and politico-diplomatic reasons, and
certainly Germany and Greece were among these countries. And of course Arendt, was
neither aware that Merten was compensated by the German political elite and that his release
was the outcome of a corrupt agreement between two governments (Greek and German). This
case in our point of view is not unique, but in fact paradigmatic to understand how the
system of collaboration survived in post-war Europe and without doubt in Greece.
And indeed the European picture was not so different either, though in percentages as
we shall discuss, Greece had the “lowest” rate of convictions not only in Western Europe but
in the former Eastern bloc (Pendas, 2009: 355). There was a significant shrinking of the trials
everywhere and many authors argue as we shall see that certain political events in front and
behind the Iron Curtain shaped legal decisions too. But politics was not the only factor that
decreased the numbers of convictions in Europe, but there were real and substantial legal
inefficiencies. For up until the Nuremberg Trials, crimes of that scale, namely, genocidal
crimes and “crimes against humanity” were new to the legal lexicon, and as Robert Fine
argued, the scale of atrocity during the second world war revealed a “radically new form of
criminality” (Fine, 2000a:297). The legal breakthrough was when the Nuremberg Charter
included in the legal vocabulary the term “crimes against humanity”, for now not only it
closed legal holes of the past, but included above all minorities such as the Jews who fell
victims of systematic attack and extermination by Nazi Germany. It signified a new moment
in history of European trials, for now not only crimes against specific communities were
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seriously considered but raised the importance of criminalizing not “states” but “individuals”.
The latter for the first time were put in front of court in the same way as Nazi leadership: they
were “responsible not only for crimes against humanity but for all crimes under international
law” (Fine, 2000a:294). As Robert Fine declares:
“It established a link between people and their actions by treating ‘cogs’ in the
Nazi murder machine as perpetrators and thus as responsible human beings. It
stated that service to the state does not exonerate any official in any
bureaucracy or any scientist in any laboratory from his or her responsibilities as
an individual. It removed from perpetrators the excuse of only obeying orders.
It held those who sit down behind desks planning atrocities as guilty as those
who participated directly in their execution. Not least, it signified that atrocities
committed against one set of people, be it Jews or Poles or Gypsies, are an
affront not only to these particular people but to humanity as a whole” (Fine,
2000a:294).
Here, what we see is a real and substantial effort to judge Germany’s Nazi
perpetrators for their deeds and towards particular communities such as the Jews. At the same
time, the European countries had to deal with another headache, namely the local
collaborators of each individual country either at the expense of Jews or upon other local
populations for political purposes especially when postwar Europe was experiencing civil
wars or conflicts. For every trial or its postponement was a political statement especially
amid cold war. Here, a comparative analysis may help us have an overall view of European
trials and how some countries faced different or similar problems.
Pendas suggests that there were different historical periods that courts saw both an
increased and decreased rate of convictions. In Western Europe (namely in countries under
the western sphere of influence), the “lowest” rate was found in Greece with 2% rate of
conviction, that is, “14 convictions out of 800 indictments/investigations”, while the
“highest” rate of conviction was found in Holland with 41% rate of conviction. The gap
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between East and West Germany is quite impressive, as east of Berlin the rate of conviction
was 33%, while west of Berlin the rate reached just 6.4%. Furthermore, Czechoslovakia’s
conviction performance was 48%, 40% in Slovakia, while the Soviet Union had the “highest”
European conviction rate of 50% (Pendas, 2009:355). There are certain explanations for this
variety of conviction rates all over Europe. The case of Greece is already explained
throughout this chapter, and I believe that the political background of the story already rings a
bell, for after the war many European courts took a real political turn. In the Soviet Union for
example, the legal reply to the Nazis and collaborators became a political matter and the
“Stalinization of justice in Eastern Europe over the course of the 1940s clearly did undermine
the due - process protections for defendants and likewise increasingly politicise judicial
practice” (ibid). But if Moscow and the Eastern countries “politicised” the trials and went
through fast speed sentences, while the West took seriously the “due-process protection” and
treated the accused with a “fair” tone, it cannot explain why the Netherlands had such a good
performance in contrast with other western European countries, such as Germany and Greece
(ibid).
Both the cold war and the period of denazification played a crucial role in shaping the
trials and the memory of the war. West Germany in this respect resembles the Greek case for,
like Greece, the former was pressured to be democratised as well as punish the Nazis, yet
these former Nazis were “a significant bloc of voters” for postwar leadership (Herf, 1997:
203). Herf suggests that in West Germany, one could not expect both justice and memory,
and at the same time achieve victory in the “national elections”. Something was suppressed
here as well, and it was memory that suffered from this cunning compromise (ibid). On the
same issue Herf continues by arguing that:
“Democratic renewal went hand in hand with silence and the forgetting of a
dark past. Too much memory would undermine a still fragile popular psyche.
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The Cold War and anti-Soviet politics which focused attention on Soviet
actions after 1945 rather than Nazi warmaking between 1941 and 1945,
reinforced this line of thinking [...] More democracy in this situation, could
entail less denazification, less purging, fewer trials for perpetrators of the
Holocaust and war crimes, and less reflection on that history from the political
leadership” (Herf, 1997:225-226).
Tony Judt echoes the previous thought, arguing there was a generalised “hypocrisy”
and “cynicism” in Western Europe as to the way in which legal justice and punishment of
collaboration took place (Judt, 2000:297). Of course this is not to suggest that there was no
punishment at all, for the Nuremberg Trials, did demonstrate the ability of the legal system to
achieve justice; it is a view that not only Judt shares, but we as well. However, certain
amnesties that occurred both in Germany and Austria after the war, pushed the Nazis back to
the social, administrative and political fabric as more than “500,000 former registered Nazis”
came back on track (ibid). This attitude opened the Windbags of Aeolus, for if a great number
of Nazis were safe now, who would sit down and judge the collaborators all over Europe? If
the Germans and Austrians were guilt-free why should not be the same for the collaborators
in rural Peloponnese? Tony Judt in this respect may give us the answer: “If Austria was
guiltless, then the distinctive responsibilities of Non-German nationals in other lands were
assuredly not open to close inspection” (Judt, 2000:296).
There were certain parameters that made things even more complicated. Here, we do
not have all the answers but mainly we present the legal insolvability of the matter. For the
courts now dealt not only with the Nazi criminals or else Germany’s perpetrators, but the real
enemies within, namely the plethora of collaborators in each country (Pendas, 2009: 356). As
Pendas suggests:
“Collaboration posed a different kind of problem than did German atrocities.
The distinction between perpetrators and victims was often difficult to draw
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clearly. On the one hand, there were cases in which the difference between the
perpetrators and the victims was political (as in crimes against resistance
groups). Emphasizing such political distinctions risked extending the de facto
civil war of the late war period in the postwar era. On the other hand, when the
crimes in question had been committed against ethnic minority groups (e.g.,
French or Dutch collaboration in the genocide of the Jews), any recognition of
the minority’s suffering undermined the majority’s claim to be innocent
victims of the Germans. Both situations made it difficult to prosecute
perpetrators in the long term. Situations of inter-ethnic civil war, as in
Yugoslavia, obviously posed even more serious challenges. Moreover the scale
of collaboration was often so vast that a genuine thorough purge would have
been untenable” (Pendas, 2009:356).
On the eastern front, as we analysed, the trials were politicised, but here too, like
Greece (but with an opposite political ideology), people were purged and executed en masse
without always a fair trial. Laughland suggests that after the “Percentages Agreement”, the
Soviets took absolute control of the Balkan Peninsula except Greece. And if as we just saw in
this chapter, Britain and later the US controlled politically and military Greece, and gave
freedom to the far-rightists and collaborators to purge the leftists, the opposite occurred in the
neighbouring countries. In the latter countries such as Bulgaria, the Soviet advance was
coupled with massive executions as all men by 1944, were treated as “political enemies” and
therefore as “fascists”. The first round of executions sent 3,000 collaborators to the firing
squad as “war criminals” and literally the “entire political class was wiped out” (Laughland,
2008:154). By 1945, further “10,000 verdicts in 131 trials” sent thousands to death, and over
30,000 – 40,000 murders occurred “without any pretence at legal process” (Laughland,
2008:155). As Laughland argues,
“Indeed, the political nature of the purges was perhaps clearest in the
prosecution and conviction of Dimitar Peshev, the vice-president of the
Bulgarian National Assembly, who in March 1943 had sent a letter to Prime
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Minister Filov signed by forty-three out of the country’s one hundred and sixty
members of parliament saying that it was quite unacceptable to accede to the
Germans’ demands to deport Jews. His protest was astonishingly successful,
and Peshev has been posthumously credited with almost single-handedly
saving the lives of Bulgaria’s 48,000 Jews. But he was no Communist, and so
he was soon prosecuted by the people’s courts and was sentenced to fifteen
years in prison (although he was released after a year and a half for good
behaviour). Twenty of the deputies who signed his letter in 1943 were
sentenced to death by the same tribunals” (Laughland, 2008:155-156).
The difference however between Bulgaria and Greece, is that it was the anti-Nazi
fighters that were chased, whereas in Bulgaria it was the majority of collaborators that were
chased; For Bulgaria as Jan Gross declared was a “loyal Axis member” (Gross, 2000: 17). It
may have saved 48,000 Jews (as we just saw in the previous paragraph) in its region but sent
to death the Jews from the Greek territories they illegally annexed such as parts of Thrace and
Greek Macedonia (see chapter 2). What perhaps here Laughland overlooked was what we
emphasized in the second chapter, namely, that Bulgaria and many other axis countries of the
eastern Balkans went through forced assimilations as they were “eager to kill only certain
groups of Jews” and save others in a form of “political expediency”, in order to boost the
national numbers and their ethnic-homogeneity (Browning, 1978: 110-111; see also chapter
2). In other words, it was opportunistic strategy and not philosemitism.
At the same time however, Laughland rightly suggests that the difference between
Greece and the communist eastern countries was that in the latter, the “communists wanted
blood, but in Greece, at least, they did not get it” (Laughland, 2000:168). Thus, we are
sceptical to promote symmetries or mathematical analogies. This approach may not serve well
appropriate critique as to the political peculiarities of each country and there is a risk to breed
cynicism as well. If we do so, we will fail not only to appreciate the political injustice of each
country, but we will trivialize Greece’s unfair and undemocratic treatment of its people. We
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will also fail to see that in this symmetry, they were still some countries in the West and the
East that performed in the legal aftermath better than others. One of these examples as we saw
was the contrasted cases of two Western European countries such as Greece and Netherlands,
for the former had the “lowest” 2% rate of conviction and the latter had the “highest” 41%
rate of conviction (see again Pendas, 2009:355). But according to Tony Judt, it was not only
Holland that performed well, but Norway and Belgium (Judt, 2010:45-46). In the former:
“The entire membership of the Nasjonal Sammlung, the main organisation of
pro-Nazi collaborators, was tried, all 55, 000 of them, along with nearly 40.000
others; 17,000 men and women received prison terms and thirty death
sentences were handed down, of which twenty-five were carried out [...] In
neighbouring Belgium many more deaths sentences were passed (2,940), but a
smaller percentage (just 242) carried out. Roughly the same numbers of
collaborators were sent to prison but whereas the Dutch soon amnestied most
of those convicted, the Belgian state kept them in prison longer and former
collaborators convicted of serious crimes never recovered their full civil rights”
(Judt, 2010:45-46).
What is meaningful then to add in our discussion is the political asymmetry of postwar
development of each country, at least on the western front. All western countries suffered
greatly after the war, but not all faced extreme political leadership. All countries fell into civil
conflicts, and as Pendas argued, these conflicts were in danger to turn into real civil wars if
there was no immediate denazification (Pendas, 2009:356). Before drawing some differences
between the western countries, we do acknowledge at the same time a general civil war
atmosphere all over Europe. According to Dan Stone, all countries ended up killing one
another at a local level and no country escaped from civil conflicts; Poles, Greeks, Yugoslavs,
French, Rumanians, Italians and so on, while the Jews were still chased, murdered and
persecuted in the Eastern bloc (Stone, 2014:3-4).
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“By the end of the war, the Allies were in effect promoting what the Nazis had
advocated in the 1930s: ‘ethnic homogeneity as a desirable feature of national
self- determination and international security. Purges of collaborators - often
carried out by people who themselves had dubious pasts – resulted in tens of
thousands of deaths before the return of governments - in –exile, most of which
had sat out the war in London [...] DP camps, especially housing Jewish
survivors of the Nazi camps and of postwar anti-Semitic violence in Eastern
Europe, were a blot on the Eastern European landscape until more than ten
years after the war. Violence and civil war continued in many parts of Europe.
Communist authorities did not put down the last pockets of nationalist
resistance in Poland until the early 1950s; civil war in Greece precipitated
British withdrawal from Great Power status and permanent American
intervention in the shape of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan” [...]
(Stone, 2014:4).
However, on the western front (and if we exclude Portugal and Spain from this
comparison as they were not occupied during Axis Europe but experienced a chronic, barbaric
and lethal dictatorship until 1970 and 1975 respectively like Greece in ’67-‘74), it was in the
latter that civil conflicts as elsewhere, developed into real civil war after the 40s.128 This
situation perhaps explains the “lowest” conviction rate of Greece on a European level and
especially in the western region (Pendas, 2009:355). While, as earlier suggested in this
chapter, Tony Judt argued that the problem of collaboration and the soft trials occurred
everywhere in Western and Eastern Europe, but the Greek scale was “unique” (Judt,
2010:48). Keith Lowe wrote that “it was not only in Greece that the ‘democratic’ government
128 I do not think that Greece shared characteristics with Spain and Portugal despite the fact that all three
countries experienced military juntas. Greece was to share profound similarities with the above countries,
mainly after the mid 70s. Tony Judt rightly suggests that despite the fact that Greece became a full NATO
Member in 1952, and took position in the West-East geo-sphere; all three Mediterranean countries would share
characteristics with Turkey, Yugoslavia and the “developing world” in terms of “standards of living” for a very
long time and not with other western European countries. In other words, the western alliance (i.e. NATO) did
not guarantee Greece an early prosperity or saved her from dictatorships, like Spain and Portugal unlike Western
Europe (Judt, 2010:504). It did not guarantee prosperity for the existence of NATO in the above countries,
presupposed such models of leadership, for the Mediterranean Sea was seen as a Western passage to the East. It
was after all one of the reasons why Karamanlis after the end of dictatorship “pulled” Greece out of NATO for
seven whole years, as an act of “protest” to the USA for openly backing the junta, for failing to protect her under
NATO regulations, and for failing to protect Cyprus from illegal invasion and occupation (Judt, 2010:510).
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mirrored the behaviour of the Communist governments of eastern Europe....but it was not
quite so extreme as it was in Greece” (Lowe, 2012:360). Most western countries turned their
back to the left-wing fighters and purged them in the aftermath while keeping a large section
of collaborators safe. This “‘trial of the resistance’, as Italian historians call it, occurred in
several countries after the war – but nowhere was it as harsh as it was in Greece” (Lowe,
2012:312). Because,
“The Greek civil war was to have profound effects for the rest of Europe. It
was the first and bloodiest clash in what was soon to become a new, Cold War
between East and West, left and right, communism and capitalism. In some
respects, what happened in Greece defined the Cold War. It not only drew the
southern boundary of the Iron Curtain, but provided a stark warning to
Communists in Italy and France, and indeed all over Western Europe, about
what might happen if they were tempted to try and seize control129 [...] it was
the situation in Greece that proved to be the catalyst. The Greek civil war was
therefore not merely a local tragedy, but an event of truly international
significance. The Western powers recognised this, and seemed prepared to
endorse almost any injustice as long as it held communism at bay” (Lowe,
2012: 312-314, underline my emphasis).
Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, we have examined very carefully the socio-political
mechanisms that led to the legal aftermath in Greece. This chapter was crucial to understand
the political developments in Greece before during and after the war was over which shaped
the vast majority of legal decisions against the collaborators. We also saw how the latter
profited from the well prepared right-wing Greek State and how the British Foreign Policy
played a dramatic role in shaping these outcomes. Last but not least we analysed many still
unknown elements of Greek History regarding collaboration such as the legal case of Max
129 Of course Keith Lowe expresses his own view with regards to the question of the temptation of the Greek
Left to seize power. We do not share the same view on this, and we have explained all too analytically the
reasons in chapter 5.
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Merten who was undeniably one of the most responsible perpetrators for the destruction of
the Jewish community of Salonika, and how the Greek and German legal system with certain
negotiations failed to deliver justice to the doers. This chapter was crucial in order to
comprehend the next chapter, namely to see how the political and social context in post-war
Greece played a catalytic role on the Memory of the Holocaust. This particular volume aimed
at linking the Greek Holocaust experience with the overall political experience that was
developing in Greece. The politics of collaboration and the legal aftermath in Greece works
as a reference point to theorise in the next chapter so as to see how the memory of the
Holocaust failed in Greece. As we shall see, the undemocratic and nationalistic State that
developed in post war Greece gave no room to comprehend and welcome the Holocaust into
people’s collective memory, as the country entered a new era of aggressive and nationalist
politics that were driven by the cold war suppressing people’s democratic rights. Any
political alternative that was driven by the people’s movement was considered anti-patriotic
and a threat. It is the latter values that we will seek to challenge in the following chapter and
how the Greek Holocaust as a result remained a neglected issue too.
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Conclusion
This chapter considers the outcome of the war in the memory of the Greek
Holocaust. I am looking at how the rise of the authoritarian and nationalist state in Greece,
suppressed people’s rights, political beliefs, freedoms but also education. As we discussed in
the previous chapters, namely - the legal aftermath and the politics of collaboration – these
parameters entered the social and political infrastructure of the Greek State, introducing a
new wave of persecutions and terrorism in order to “control the masses” (Mouzelis, 1976:58).
The first part considers the stories of the Jews who came back from the camps but also from
the mountains of Free Greece. The Jewish survivors were pre-occupied with the rapid
political developments and they share with us the effects upon their community. In the
second section we discuss restitution and how the State responded to the issue of the Jewish
properties by drawing and criticizing similar developments elsewhere in Europe. While later
we touch upon the issue of collective memory and history in order to see how Greek society
responded to the memory of the Holocaust. What followed in Greece after the war were
martial laws, silence and oppression. The Greek State until the fall of the Dictatorship in
1974, emphasised on the Greek identity, and the political oppression that prevailed, affected
everyone including the Jews who came from the concentration camps. Everyone who
challenged the new status quo of the State was in danger to face exile, prison or death, and
thus the Greek Holocaust was treated indifferently. We will see that even after the restoration
of Democracy, in 1974 and after the transitional years to democracy, in the 80s, the Greek
State still failed to incorporate the Jewish Holocaust in the national memory of the country.
All these things will be touched together so as to trace and awaken our socio-political and
analytical tools in order to make an appropriate critique.
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The Greek Jews are Back
Moments of relief and happiness were drowned in survivors’ faces once they came
back. Soon these emotions would be substituted by feelings of neglect and forgetfulness. Dr
Matarasso remembers for instance that the first Greek Jew who escaped the terror of
Auschwitz and came back in Salonika was the Athenian Leon Batis. He arrived in the middle
of March 1945 in the northern city and everyone seized to meet him. All the remaining Jews
of Salonika once they heard the rumour that he is alive and that he escaped the Nazi horror,
rushed in to talk to him. They wanted to know what happened to friends and relatives
(Matarasso, 1948: 65). Leon Batis looked very pale and tired as he had to cross so many
countries by train and sometimes by foot. Everyone who saw him was anxious to know more
details, about the situation in the camps, but Leon Batis was worried about the fate of his own
family. He asked the locals how far Athens was from Salonika as he wanted to return to the
capital. Instead of receiving an answer, he was bombarded by questions as they wanted to
hear and learn everything from him. Batis said that his life will be recorded one day as he
literally saw everything in the death camps and his story cannot but be “published” or
“filmed” one day (Matarasso, 1948:65). He further declared that he almost went crazy
towards the end of his captivity but he was lucky as he was rescued by Polish partisans
(Matarasso, 1948:66).
The few Greek Jews who survived the terror of the Nazi camps, were longing to come
back to their country. No one however thought that upon their return, they would enter a
completely destroyed and divided country; a community (Salonika) that no longer existed,
and a remaining one (Athens) with neighbourhoods under armed political terror (Lewkowicz,
2000: 247-250). These changes affected the Greek Jewry. As we have seen in chapter 5 and
chapter 6, the political affairs that developed in the 40s played a negative role in the process
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of liberalization of the country, not only constitutionally but socio-politically since the
enforcement of far-right and militaristic politics became institutionalised, giving amnesty to
the collaborators who in fact participated in the newly elected government of Tsaldaris. The
composition of the government was fanatically right-wing, welcoming all kinds of terrorists
in parts of social and administrative life (Richter, 1986:522). The laws that were imposed
were driven by the events of December 1944. Although many fighters of ELAS were
imprisoned, however the laws now extended beyond crimes and involved a sensational
number of people. The law which remained applicable for many years, involved now all the
population that was involved with the left-wing resistance or were sympathetic to the left
(Iatrides, 1972:257). Not to mention, that at the same time very few extreme right-wingers,
royalists, fascists, and collaborators were imprisoned, for the vast majority of them, took the
control of the streets (Eudes, 1972:248). Some politicians of the centre such as Sofoulis and
Tsouderos in Greece made the following remarks concerning the fascistic atmosphere of the
time:
“The campaign of terror instituted throughout the country by the extreme right
after the events of last December is growing worse every day. Its nature and
extent are now such as to make life impossible for non-royalist citizens, and
preclude any thought of proceeding to a free plebiscite or to elections. The
extreme right-wing terrorist organisations, of which the most important were
partially armed by the Germans and collaborated with them in every way, have
not only not been disarmed or prosecuted but are still collaborating openly with
the forces of law and order to stifle every vestige of democratic thought” (quoted
in Eudes, 1972: 248).
The Jews of Greece were strongly affected by these post-war policies, especially
those who took part in the resistance. Although the Greek State issued new laws in order to
recognise the “full civil rights” of the Jews as well as re-building the communities from
scratch, however the emergence of civil war along with multiple earthquakes that occurred in
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the 40s and 50s made things even worse. The civil war, in fact had tremendous consequences
for the Jews of Greece. Since the whole society was divided politically, the Jews faced new
persecutions as most of them were left-wingers and supported the resistance of EAM/ELAS
which saved “many Jews during the Nazi occupation”. Even the Jews who did not have
strong political sentiments, they faced charges too as they were “treated as enemies” of the
state (Plaut, 1996:74). As Plaut argues:
“Many of the Holocaust survivors belonged to the leftist EAM/ELAS camp,
the same resistance forces that helped save many Jews during Nazi occupation.
Nonpolitical Greek Jews were treated as enemies and taken as prisoners during
the civil war, merely because of their association with the EAM during the
Second World War. As the fighting intensified in 1948-49, the royalist press
represented Marxism as “a whole Jewish intrigue” in which every Jew was
either a Communist or an agent who spread heresies to weaken the Greek-
Orthodox church” (Plaut, 1996:74).
Another example that explains the hard-core nationalist line of the Greek politics and
the effect upon the Jews is that of the story of Moisses Michael Bourlas, who was a member
of EAM/ELAS. He faced severe consequences after the Varkiza Agreement and during the
civil war. He was disarmed based on the agreement, but since the treaty was betrayed and the
collaborators were in full armed operation, many left-wing Jews were chased and imprisoned.
In his book Ellinas, Evraios kai Aristeros (Greek, Jew and Leftist), remembers the charges he
faced upon his return from the mountains. He declared that back in Salonika, the police and
many traitors entered his house, took everything he owned and he was then thrown to prison
(Bourlas, 2000:82-83). It is interesting to see the similarities between Bourlas’s story and the
story of Gianni’s father we interviewed in the village of Distomo, for he as well and upon his
return, was tortured by the collaborators and confiscated everything from his house (see
chapter 4). Bourlas was questioned in prison, but later was sent back home. However, when
he understood that a new wave of violence was about to begin in the streets of Greece after
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promoting new far-right politics by the “Greek” and the “British Governments”, he decided
to join again the resistance and help the most poor people by participating in the left-wing
youth of EPON (Bourlas, 2000:83). Bowman declares, that many Jews who took part in the
resistance of EAM/ELAS had to leave Greece amid civil war as many indeed were chased,
“imprisoned” or “shot” (Bowman, 2002:76).
Furthermore, during the summer months of the same year, when the right wing state
became more tough and violent, Bourlas along with fellow Greek citizens were imprisoned
and harassed by the police forces. However, he faced the most violent physical abuse since he
was “a Jew” (Bourlas, 2000:87). In his memoir, he declared that most of his relatives were
lost in the concentration camps of Nazi-Occupied Poland. He and his father fought together
throughout the war with the bands of ELAS. His father fought with great courage but died
after he was caught in the late 60s by the Dictatorship of Papadopoulos. He was sent to the
islands of exile and died after receiving systematic “tortures” from the guards of the prison
(Bourlas, 2000:199).
The scene in the cities was the same, since the implementation of ultra right-wing
politics of Tsaldaris created a phobic nation irrespective of one’s political beliefs. Laws of
Metaxas Dictatorship were revived while as we have seen in chapter 6, Napoleon Zervas
(leader of EDES who became a minister of Public Order) transformed police officers into
new battalion units and were used to arrest people in order to give names of former fighters
of EAM/ELAS, and of course any suspicion of going against the laws of the “country, family
and religion” one was severely punished (Close, 2002: 28, 26-27). These emergency laws of
509 and 516 (that persecuted the left) went tougher after the Truman Doctrine and everyone
who did not obey to these laws was charged ad hoc for supporting the “Bulgarian Pan-
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Slavism” (Eudes, 1972: 359).130 When the British foreign policy gradually withdrew from
Greece in 1947 in the middle of the Greek civil war, and the U.S. policies took over with the
Truman Doctrine, political decisions went even more extreme. The doctrine declared a war
against communism, aiming at making Greece “self-supporting and self-respecting
democracy” (Murtagh, 1994:36-37).
Until 1974, every citizen who was not “ethnikofron” (National minded) was likely to
face even death sentences. As Karakatsanis declares:
“...the formal exclusion of the left from public life was enforced by a large
police bureaucracy that engaged in systematic surveillance of hundreds of
thousands of citizens and kept dossiers (fakeloi) on them. Until their abolition
in 1974, these dossiers placed suspected leftists into various categories of threat
to the state – categorising them as ethnicofrones of the first grade (Epsilon
one), the second grade (Epsilon two), ‘Alpha’ leftists, ‘Beta’
cryptocommunists, ‘Gamma’ dangerous communists, and ‘Chi’ unknown – all
in an attempt to eradicate leftist influences and to secure the loyalty of the
masses to the established regime” (Karakatsanis, 2001: 30).
Restitution
This political oppression that prevailed in Greece affected the Jews who came back
from the Nazi concentration camps and tried to establish themselves in the cities and
especially in Salonika. However, they were oppressed too as they had to swallow
“unwelcome issues of national and ethnic self-definition” (Mazower, 2000a:19). The Greek
State made some first steps to incorporate the history and experiences of the Jews in the
Greek collective memory as late as 1990 but without much success (ibid). When the Jews
came back from the death camps, they faced dramatic changes as the new centre of the
130 See also Close, 1993: 159-161; Close, 1995a: 150-155.
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Jewish community was now Athens and not Salonika. In 1946 some 10,000 Jews lived in the
capital, but very soon the number started to drop, as many fled to Israel until 1951, while
others were imprisoned in the islands of exile for their political beliefs. By the end of the 50s,
the number of the community was decreased even more; approximately to 6,000 Jews
(Lewkowicz, 2000:248-249). These falling numbers show how much unwelcomed the Jews
were in the aftermath and once they came back from the concentration camps.
Upon their return, the Greek State acted irresponsibly and indifferently concerning the
issue of the Jewish properties. Before analysing the issue of restitution, it is worth to mention
that the erasure of Jewish existence in the city of Thessaloniki, as we discussed in the second
chapter started from the big fire of 1917, where the central district of the town was
completely destroyed. According to Demosthenis Dodos, this area was mainly inhabited by
the Jewish community, however Eleftherios Venizelos never tried to rebuilt the city for the
community. What he did instead was to push the Jewish community out of the centre, and re-
design the city according to his own national aspirations (Dodos, 2007:54-55). The most
catalytic event that signified the end of the Jewish presence in the city of Thessaloniki was in
December 1942, when the Nazi official Max Merten and the Greek collaborator and “Central
Governor of Macedonia” Vasilis Symonidis, pulled out the central Jewish cemetery and took
it out of the ancient walls of the town. It was considered not only a gigantic project in terms
of its cost, but had a “political” meaning as well. The area of the old Jewish cemetery covered
“550,000 square meters and had approximately 500,000 graves” (Molho, 2007:33). The
project foresaw the complete destruction of the cemetery; the transfer of the human bones,
and the use of the material for other causes. According to Rena Molho, today some of these
stones “furnish kinder-gardens, bars, and restaurants in luxurious touristic hotels in Cassandra
of Chalcidice”, while the empty cemetery was about to house a few years later the campus of
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the new university, namely the Aristoteleion Panepistimio Thessalonikis (Molho, 2007:33-
34).
When the Jews claimed back their properties the Greek State closed the doors to them.
Some 600 Jews applied for their properties but only 60 applications were accepted, as many
collaborators confiscated them illegally during and after the war, and the State made no effort
to give to the Jews what they owned. On the same argument, Molho rightly criticizes the
Greek State for refusing to give the properties to the people who owned them. It shows how
the state abandoned the Jews and their rights to be and belong in the Greek society. This
irresponsibility contributed once again to the process of “pushing away” the “Jewish
genocide from the national collective memory”, as if these victims (who after all, as we saw
in chapter fought on the side of their fellow Greeks) were not part of Greece (Molho,
2007:38-39). According to Lewkowicz, “the survivors returned to a city where their homes
and their shops had been taken over by Orthodox Greeks, and all Jewish synagogues (except
one) and other educational and cultural establishments had been destroyed by the Germans”
(Lewkowicz,2000:247). The refusal to give to the Jews their properties meant in simple terms
that they were not welcomed and not recognised in the country. Numerous buildings, schools
and synagogues “were sold in order to create income”, and although in the 50s and early 60s
the community tried to start all over again by establishing new educational centres, the
introduction of the military regime in Greece in 1967, cancelled in a night all Jewish efforts
to re-build a new community. All major councils shrunk their members, however, and this is
fruitful for further critique; the previous “measure was put in effect in 1975, following the
first elections after the dictatorship”, whereby “the rabbinical council was abolished” and the
“official language of the council...was changed from Ladino to Greek” (Lewkowicz,
2000:249). Today the city of Thessaloniki erased every trace of Jewish existence. There are
neighbourhoods that once reminded us that there was a historical community who lived there.
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Buildings, squares, historical cemeteries and schools are all gone now (Lewkowicz,
2000:250).
The issue of Jewish properties in post-war era was not a uniquely Greek phenomenon.
The negation of restitution was a real problem for the whole of Europe as it was coupled with
systematic post-war anti-Semitism. Mazower suggests that when the European Jews returned
either from the mountains or from the concentration camps, they became victims again of
homelessness. Throughout the continent, “their pre-war homes were generally occupied by
others, their possessions gone” (Mazower, 1998a:219). As the author writes:
“In fact the number of Jewish refugees swelled after the war, as around
220,000 Jews from eastern Europe moved westwards. Anti-Semitic pogroms in
Poland during 1946, with dozens of dead, accelerated this movement [...] West
European anti-Semitism barred doors to Jewish DPs that were opened to Balts
and East Europeans. Thus the numbers of Jewish refugees on the continent
continued to increase until 1948 when the creation of the state of Israel and the
US Displaced Persons Act allowed most of them to leave Europe” (Mazower,
1998a:219).
The neglect and indifference did not end with the fall of Hitler. Most European Jewish
communities were annihilated, but those who survived faced systematic attack, racism and
hatred in the aftermath. According to Lagrou, the disappearance of the Jewish culture in
Europe was apocalyptic, for if one takes the example of Romania which used to have the
“third largest Jewish community”, by the end of the war and in 1948, the Jews “reduced to
one-sixth” (Lagrou, 2005:4). Despite the fact that France and Hungary would be two
exceptional cases, whereby “a sizeable” number of Jews had survived, an anti-Semitic and
polemic attitude of local people towards the survivors prevailed. For the survivors naturally
tried to claim their properties, and when they did, massive protests against them took the
streets of Paris with banners “France to the French” (Lagrou, 2005:7). One the one hand,
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postwar Europeans closed the doors to survivors by refusing to give their houses back, on the
other, there were Eastern countries such as Poland where pogroms and mass slaughters were
committed against the Jewry; the “Kielce Pogrom of 4 July 1946” was one of the many
atrocities that occurred in the aftermath Europe (ibid). And as we saw in the last section of
chapter 4, numerous slaughters and pogroms occurred as a result of resentment, hate and
revenge and the Jews were once again one of the central victims of this ferocity especially in
countries such as post-war Poland, which according to Lowe, was “the most dangerous
country for the Jews after the war”, for only in a year, and roughly after liberation until 1946,
Poland lost 1,500 Jews approximately due to political and ethnic conflicts (Lowe, 2012:203).
With regards to the Jewish property in a European context, Lowe writes that:
“The plunder of Jewish property during the war had taken place in every
country, and at every level of society. The comprehensive nature of this
plundering was sometimes quite astounding. In the old Jewish quarter of
Amsterdam, for example, the houses were stripped of everything right down to
the wooden window and door frames. In Hungary, Slovakia and Romania,
Jewish land and property was often divided up amongst the poor. Sometimes
people did not even wait until the Jews had gone. There are examples in Poland
of acquaintances approaching Jews during the war with the words, ‘Since you
are going to die anyway, why should someone else get your boots? Why not
give them to me so I will remember you?” (Lowe, 2012:197-198).
According to Toscano, Italy’s laws to reintegrate the Jews back to the Italian society
seemed a little bit more fruitful and certainly better than other countries such as Greece. This
of course does not imply that the Italian society did not confront similar problems. From 1944
until 1947, a whole process of returning the properties to the Jews started and to some extent
it was achieved. The implementation of these laws included both restitution and
compensation. The latter case involved examples where whole villages or cities were
destroyed or bombarded (Toscano, 2005:151-152). Many Jews however as elsewhere
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received a lot of disappointment as they had to fight for their properties with legal means.
Despite similar problems, “documents show that these laws did indeed result in the substantial
return of property taken from Jews in compliance with law number 126 issued in 1939...”
(Toscano, 2005:153). A case that caused conflicting outcomes was the property issue in the
former fascist republic of Salò. Here, despite the fact that “the movable property” was
returned to the survivors without any bureaucratic difficulty, it did not however give back
buildings and homes that were taken away from the survivors by the Nazis and Italian Fascists
(Toscano, 2005:154). Further north, in the Netherlands, Kristel suggests that the Dutch Jews
“had trouble relating to a society that had failed to protect more than hundred thousand of its
people from the Nazis” (Kristel, 2005:141). Post-war reintegration came with indifference and
“hostilities from Non-Jews”, thus many Jews left to Israel (Kristel, 2005:145).
Memory and History in Greece
The poverty of the holocaust memory in Greece can be felt not only in the legal
system, but in education too. After the restoration of democracy, there were very few
attempts to touch upon the issue of the Jewish holocaust. Only after 2000, the educational
system made its first but very poor attempt to incorporate the holocaust in the historical
curriculum. Before the last decade, only a very small section on the European holocaust was
included in the last year of high school, but nothing concerning the Greek Jews and their
history in Greece before, during or after the war (Vasar, 2007:90). What is more, only during
the last decade did Greek academia get involved in researching that particular area of the
Second World War, but the students in the schools and the universities, unless they were
interested themselves, did not get a proper grasp of the war and certainly did not learn about
the Greek Holocaust. Even the curriculum of history in the Open University in Greece at least
up until 2006, only “5 pages” discussed the Second World War; “three” pages discussed the
261
resistance, “two” pages referred to the civil war, “while the genocide was absent even as a
footnote” (ibid).
Although many Greeks today know very well the events that occurred throughout the
decades, however these events are not part of the official education. Hagen Fleischer declares
that even the number of human casualties during the war is still not clear. Although there is a
“clear picture” with respect to the deaths among the Greek armed forces, yet the losses of
unarmed civilians during occupation, during the December events and civil war, remain a
puzzle and the sources so far have not been thoroughly “reliable” (Fleischer, 2009:218).
With respect to the Greek Holocaust, again, we could argue that it is the responsibility of the
Greek State to incorporate the Jewish Holocaust in its educational system, and to abandon
traditional and nationalist lines of education. The question remains what the new generations
learn today and how it is possible to preserve the memory of the Jewish Holocaust.
One of the reasons why we chose to provide an analysis of the political and social
conditions under which the populations of Greece found themselves in the aftermath, was
because this socio-political context stigmatised the memory of the Holocaust. The Jews of
Greece and their fate were systematically ignored as the overall experience of the war was
denied as well. The nationalist and ultra-authoritarian state that was developed created an
atmosphere of silence, retreat and oppression. Especially in the fifties and sixties, the social
and educational system was anachronistic and completely censored. What is interesting to see
here, is that the post-war development of Greece was found in the absence of any reference to
the war. This poverty of memory is highly interrelated with the ultra nationalist state that
developed in Greece after the war, suppressing people’s rights, and because during the
months of liberation (as we saw in chapter 5 and 6), the forces of extreme right and the
collaborators shaped post-war politics, and in fact liberation in October 44 did not last at all
262
but new rounds of war occurred (Fleischer, 2009:218). Alkis Rigos in his essay “E Mnimi kai
I Simantiki tis” (The Memory and its Importance), asks:
“But how really can we celebrate this commemoration day in Greece of 1945,
when at the same historical moment various members of the Security
Battalions collaborators of Nazism constituted the dynamic lance of the
national state against the persecuted communists and against any progressive
element? How to honour the epos of resistance against fascism, when the
largest and most significant faction of resistance was constituted by the left-
wing EAM? How and who will talk about the horror of Nazi concentration
camps, when the state of national-mindedness was opening in Makronisos the
first postwar European concentration camp?” (Rigos, 2007:20, translation
mine).
This argument is crucial to understand the logic of this thesis, and why we decided to
follow this chain of events especially in the last two chapters after giving an analytical
account of the Jewish Holocaust in Greece. It is to emphasize and criticize the conditions
under which Greece came in and out of the war, how resistance was oppressed and
persecuted, how the political and social infrastructure was built, and what was the effect upon
the memory of Greek Holocaust. All these political and social developments constituted the
facade of Greece and must be seen together. What Rigos emphasises here is the inability of
the Greek state to address its own history when the former was the product of silence,
oppression, and authoritarianism. It is our duty therefore, to unleash these “selective silences”
and focus on the memory which is not only a means of understanding the past, but an “active
mode of existence” (Rigos, 2007:20-21).
The Greek state not only failed to include the Holocaust in the process of collective
memory, but at the same time the system of authoritarianism negated the very process of
liberalization after the end of the war. Costas Tsoucalas echoes Rigos’ thought, arguing that
this also affected the educational system. His analysis bares the traces of a conservative
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pedagogy which extended far beyond the forgetfulness of the Holocaust. He declares in his
book The Greek Tragedy, (and here it is interesting to see that his book was published in
1969, in the worst year of Greek dictatorship), that the educational system (especially on the
secondary level) focused almost exclusively on the “national identity”, the Christian
Orthodoxy and its values, and on the ancient Greek language131; all of which were mandatory
on a daily basis (Tsoucalas, 1969:117). On the other hand, up until the 50s and 60s, the
picture at the universities was even worse as the study of sociology and Marxism was “of
course an anathema”, Darwinism was declared as the product of “dangerous subversive
ideas”, while the study of the second world war was totally absent and philosophy “ended”
with the works of Kant (ibid). In this way, Tsoucalas suggests that:
“The purity of the language was protected in the name of anti-Communism,
and so was Christianity as an obligatory social framework. Any fundamental
criticism of social, moral or legal institutions was banned or kept for better
days. The new Constitution, promulgated in 1952, preached liberty of
conscience and declared the separation of State and Church-but opened with
the words: ‘The dominant religion in Greece is the Eastern Orthodox Church
of Christ’. Religious marriage is the only form that one can legally contract in
Greece. Significantly enough, it was not the Church – whose power is
minimal – that imposed this new theocracy; it was the conscious choice of the
groups in power” (Tsoucalas, 1969:118).
The national and religious identity of Greece shaped social and political institutions
which suppressed however the identity and history of the minorities in Greece including the
Jews. These values became the canon in the following decades and until the end of Greek
junta. As a matter of fact the emphasis on the Greek Orthodoxy remained in the political
vocabulary of many Greek politicians even after the restoration of democracy in 1975
(Stavrou, 1995:39). One of the prominent politicians who kept religious ethics and nationalist
131 The argument here is given to criticize those in power who used, abused and politicized ancient Greek
language in order to impose a particular nationalist agenda.
264
values close to political life was the former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis who in
one of his speeches in 1981 declared that:
“The nation (ethnos) and Orthodoxy ....have become in the Greek conscience
virtually synonymous concepts, which together constitute our Helleno-
Christian civilisation” (Quoted in Stavrou, 1995:39).
These nationalist values that shaped much of the Greek agenda after the war had a
catalytic effect on people’s memory of the Jewish Holocaust for it referred to something other
than the imposed Greekness. It is really important to make an analogy with what was
happening in the following decades in other parts of the world concerning the incorporation
of Jewish Holocaust in the European Memory. The scientific and academic community
outside Greece found an immediate interest in studying the events of the Holocaust as early
as 1960. Many authors systematised the terror of Auschwitz and the fate of the European
Jewry via key figures of Frankfurt School (i.e. Adorno), and undoubtedly Hannah Arendt’s
contribution in understanding the holocaust as well as the evil doctrine of Nazi totalitarianism
through the key terms of ‘radical evil’ and ‘banality of evil’ and through a valuable collection
of books and essays helped us to comprehend the history of the Jewish Holocaust as well as
it’s memory (Vasar, 2007: 69). In Greece, not only they were not interested about the study
of the Holocaust within academia, but a number academics as such from 1944 until the fall of
junta were thrown away from their positions for being progressive and radical ( Papastratis,
2000: 64-67).
However, collective memory in postwar Europe was not so different either. Tony Judt
suggests in his essay the “Past is Another Country” that all countries faced similar problems.
There were many civil and ethnic conflicts especially in Eastern Europe, and many countries
sought to focus on certain myths in order to forget their past (Judt, 2000:295). Jan Gross
argued that if only one takes into consideration Poland and look at how the country has
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addressed the memory of the Holocaust one will be evidently shocked (Gross, 2000a:75).
This indifference did not correspond only in the aftermath but also during the 90s when an
opinion poll gave the following results:
“When a random sample of a thousand Poles was asked in 1993, ‘Do you think
that during the war the Jewish nation suffered as much as the Polish nation, or
more, or less?’ 6 percent of the respondents answered that the Polish nation
suffered more, 32 percent that both nations suffered about the same, 12 percent
that they could not compare, and 3 percent that they could not tell. Thus
apparently, fifty years after the war, over half of the Polish society does not
know that Polish Jews were wiped out during the Holocaust” (Gross,
2000a:75).
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Reassessing the relevance of Hannah Arendt’s thought
The issue of restitution and collective memory in Greece raises another final issue,
namely the relevance of Hannah Arendt’s thought on nationalism, nation-states and
citizenship. One could conclude here that the treatment of Jewish properties in Europe, but
most importantly in Greece, reflects the continuity of a nationalist project that did not stop
with the introduction of the nation-states. Countries sought to complete the project of one
blood/one nation/one religion rhetoric in the aftermath Europe. As we have discussed in
chapter 6, Dan Stone made a significant remark with regards to what allied nations launched
in the after-math of the Holocaust, namely ‘ethnic homogeneity as a desirable feature of
national self-determination and international security” (Stone, 2014:4). This has been
pictured further with post-war pogroms in Eastern Europe, poor legal response of
collaborators throughout Europe, and with the issue of restitution everywhere. In the case of
Greece, both the forgetfulness of the Holocaust and the indifference of the Greek authorities
as to the Jewish properties reflect the hard-core nationalist line the country took the following
decades, and Jews were again subjects of discrimination. These were also symptoms of
nationalism and nation-states that started in Europe decades before the Nazi Occupation.
This thesis aimed to address the loss of rights of Jews during Occupied Greece, and
how with the formation of the nation-states earlier in the European continent the minorities
such as the Jews became stateless. The contribution of Hannah Arendt’s thought on
nationalism, nation-states and citizenship that we discussed in the first chapter set the
foundations of our analysis throughout the remaining chapters; namely a journey of Jewish
tragedy after the fall of empires, the rise of flags, the rise of anti-Semitic propaganda, the rise
of national identity restricted to borders, the rise of Hitler’s ideology that led to the
discrimination and extermination of the Jews, and how even after the end of the Second
World War, Greece continued that nationalist project that pushed the Jews away from the
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national collective memory. The nation-states as Arendt suggests in The Origins of
Totalitarianism failed to protect the equal rights of minorities and their equal legal
representation (Arendt, 1968:290). Because:
“...these new states this curse bears the germs of a deadly sickness. For the
nation-state cannot exist once its principle of equality before the law has
broken down. Without this legal equality, which originally was destined to
replace the older laws and orders of the feudal society, the nation dissolves into
an anarchic mass of over- and underprivileged individuals. Laws that are not
equal for all revert to rights and privileges, something contradictory to the very
nature of nation-states. The clearer the proof of their inability to treat stateless
people as legal persons and the greater the extension of arbitrary rule by police
decree, the more difficult it is for states to resist the temptation to deprive all
citizens of legal status and rule them with an omnipotent police” (Arendt,
1968:290).
Final Thoughts
The political failure of the nation-states to protect the rights of minorities, explain also
the negation of Jewish rights in the decades that followed. This thesis departed from these
ideas in order to explain how these changes affected the Jews of Greece. The nationalism that
prevailed in the country explains further their changed position in the Greek society (i.e. from
the fall of empires to the nation states), the anti-Semitic laws that discriminated them, and
their participation in the Greek resistance. Furthermore, this thesis described the experience
of Greek Jewish prisoners in the camps of Auschwitz, and their will to live and resist along
with their European fellow prisoners. We have also described the politics of collaboration in
Greece, by raising the issue of Greek responsibility, the politics of resistance, whether there
were attempts to save the Jews, what was happening in the mountains of Free Greece
(through the account of Distomo massacre), and how post-war politics affected restitution,
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memory and legal prosecution of Nazis and collaborators. This volume aimed at analysing
the Jewish Holocaust before and after the war was over within a particular society, Greece.
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1945), (Deputy Foreign Minister – G. Papandreou Government, Politics, Cairo – Athens
1943-1945).
Sub –file 62.2, “Apeleftherosi Oct-Dec 1944” (Liberation Oct-Dec 1944):
-“O Logos Pros to Ethnos” (The Speech to the Nation) by Georgios Papandreou Oct 1944.
Sub-file 62.3, “Politika-Politiaka, Synenoiseis Kyvernisis kai Vasilia, Oct-Dec 1944”
(Political-Civic, Negotiations between the Government and the King, Oct-Dec 1944):
- Confidential telegram to the British Embassy, 10/12/44.
- Dragoumis’ telegram to London Embassy, 27 December 1944, Protocol No. 22750
Sub-file 62.4 :“Ekthesin dia tin Esoterikin Katastasin tes Ellados (July-Aug 1944)” (Report
on the Internal Situation of Greece, July-Aug 1944):
-“Peri Katastrophis Distomou” (About the Catastrophe of Distomo), 18 November 1944, To
Washington B’ Embassy.
Sub-file 62.5 : “Dekemvriana 1944” (December Events 1944):
- Churchill: Press Conference, December 27th 1944.
- Debate in the House of Commons, 11/12/44, London, Copy of summary to the Greek
Information Office.
- Debate in the House of Commons, 12/12/44, London, Copy of summary to the Greek
Information Office.
-Copy of “Caserta Agreement” 26 September 1944.
-Précis of Operational Orders Issued by G.O.C. Forces in Greece (Attached to Caserta
Agreement).
-“Aide Memoire”, 14 Dec 1944, The ELAS Central Committee, Certified true copy, Athens
15/12/44.
- London 28 December 1944, No. 3706 (Summary of the British Press, copy to the Greek
Information Office).
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3. PRO FO: (accessed via the Academy of Athens: K.E.I.N.E Research Centre, and the
Public Record Office, London)
Foreign Office (London):
FO 954/11B, Image ref: 154 (From Foreign Office to Athens, 5th December, 1944)
FO 954/11B Image ref: 156 (Downing Street, 5th December 1944)
FO 954/11/B Image ref: 160 (From Foreign Office to Athens, 9th December 1944)
FO 954/11B, Image ref: 189 (From Foreign Office to Washington, 17 December, 1944)
FO 954/11B, Image ref: 195 (9th December 1944, From Foreign Office to Athens)
FO 954/11C, Image ref: 121 (Mr. Macmillan’s telegram No. 670 and your telegram No. 999
and 1000 of April 18th : Greek Policy)
FO 371/153018, RG 1661/1 (Greece 1960, Subject: Nazi accuses Greek Cabinet Ministers of
being wartime agents)
FO 371/153018, RG 1661/2 (Greece 1960, Subject: Merten Affair: German Government has
informed Greek Government that H.M.G holds a list of Greeks who collaborated with the
Germans during Occupation in Greece. Archivist being sent to inspect the document)
FO 371/153018, RG 1661/3 (Greece 1960, Subject: “Merten Affair”, topic of a four-day
debate in the Greek Parliament, October 12-15)
FO 371/37206 R: 10268
FO 371/37206 R: 10177, (11 October 1943)
FO 371/37206 R: 10450
FO 371/37206 R: 10295
FO 371/37206, (Mr Shone, From Cairo to Foreign Office, 15 October 1943)
FO 371/37206 R: 10293, (17 October 1943)
FO 371/37207 R: 11673
FO 371/37210 R: 13842
Cabinet Papers (London):
CAB/65/47/7, Image Ref: 0001, 9th August 1944, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs [W.M.
(44) 103 RD Conclusions], Minute 1, Confidential Annex.
CAB 66/49/47, Image Ref: 0001, (6th April 1944, Telegram No. 215).
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CAB 66/49/47, Image Ref: 0001, (6th April 1944, No. 218. Most Secret, His Majesty’s
Ambassador to the Greek Government, Cairo to FO).
CAB/66/49/47 Image Ref: 0001, The Greek Crisis (April 1-25, 1944), Telegrams: No. 198
(3rd April 1944), No. 199 (4th April 1944), No. 215 (6th April 1944), No. 217 (6th April).
CAB 101/250, (Churchill to General Wilson [Italy] and Mr Leeper [Athens], 08/11/44)
CAB/101/250, Image Ref: 20, (Response to Telegram No. 707, To Mr. Macmillan [Caserta],
T.2134/4, 19/11/44)
History of Security Section (Record of Special Operation Executives - SOE):
HS 5/ 242, Image: 00059, (18 July 1943, SECRET).
HS 5/242, Image: 00088, (Memorandum)
HS 5/242, Image: 000091, (Memorandum)
HS 8/899, Image Ref: 6 (S.O.E. Activities, Summary for the Prime Minister, Quarter:
January to March 1944)
4. GAK, Genika Archeia tou Kratous, (General Archives of the State), Psychiko, Athens.
K 202 [ABE 806]: Archeio tou N. Zerva (Archive of N. Zervas)
ABE 1246, File 7: “Fakelos Ekremon Aitiseon Nazismou 1961-1968” (Nazi Pending
Applications 1961-1968).
5. Distomo Massacre – Survivors’ Interviews (5):
Giannis (Distomo, 29 September 2009).
Katerina (Distomo, 29 September 2009).
Dimitris (Distomo, 29 September 2009).
Alexandra (Distomo, 29 September 2009).
Costas (Athens, 30 September 2009).
6. Greek Newspapers: (accessed by the Municipality of Distomo and the Digital Library
of National Library, Athens, Greece)
Aneksartisia, 24/10/44
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Embros, 12/6/1945
Eleftheria, 13/12/45
Akropolis, 12/6/1945
Asyrmatos, 9/6/1945
Mahi, 7/7/1944, 9/6/1946
Vima, 2/5/1944
Rizospastis, 29/10/1944, 12/10/1944, 5/11/1944
7. International Newspapers:
Der Spiegel No.40 / 1960
8. Electronic sources:
Complete Testimony of Dieter Wisliceny, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 4, Twenty-
Sixth Day, Thursday 3 January 1946, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and
Diplomacy, Yale Law School: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/01-03-46.asp
Distomo Massacre Documentary broadcasted in Greek SKAI CHANNEL:
http://folders.skai.gr/main/theme?id=97&locale=en
Excerpts from Brigadier Chris Woodhouse and Nigel Clive’s interview in the Documentary
“Greece: The Hidden War”:
http://web.archive.org/web/20080229103239/http://thematikivradia.ert.gr/details.asp?id=261
0&catid=3469.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tXb5YkQeDM&feature=related,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U3J4v4KNDQI&feature=related
On Meligala Massacre:
http://www.enetenglish.gr/?i=news.en.article&id=1474
9. A small section of the photo gallery in the Appendixes was accessed online:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/Triple_Occupation_of_Greece.png
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/69/GreeceRegionsEnglish_corrected2.pn
g
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http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/Greece_Prefectures_1941-44.png
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderkommando
http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-features/greece-finally-commemorates-
the-destruction-of-thessaloniki-s-jewish-community.premium-1.510554
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/70/Holocaustdeathtoll%25.png
http://www.tlife.gr/Article/polemos/0-77-8278.html
http://pontosandaristera.wordpress.com/2010/06/17/aris/
http://diolkos.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/blog-post_6077.html
http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/othercamps/greekjewry.html
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APPENDIX 1: THE JEWS OF GREECE
(Jews of Ioannina are been deported)
Source: http://www.serbianna.com/columns/savich/107.shtml
296
(Jewish deportation from Greek Thrace and Greek Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 15 March 1943)
Source: http://www.dipity.com/lnuzzo/WW2/
(Forced gathering in Eleftheria Square, Thessaloniki, 11 July 1943)
Source: http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-features/greece-finally-commemorates-
the-destruction-of-thessaloniki-s-jewish-community.premium-1.510554
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TABLE OF JEWISH LOSSES IN GREECE*
PERIPHERY Before expulsion After Expulsion Rate of loss
THRACE
Didymoteichon 900 33 -96%
Nea Orestiada 197 3 -98%
Alexandroupoli 140 4 -97%
Komotini 819 28 -96%
Xanthi 550 6 -99%
MACEDONIA
Kavala 2.100 42 -98%
Drama 1.200 39 -97%
Serres 600 3 -99%
Thessaloniki 56.000 1950 -96%
Veroia 460 131 -2%
Kastoria 900 35 -96%
Flonina 400 64 -84%
THESSALY
Trikala 520 360 -31%
Larisa 1120 726 -35%
Volos 870 645 -26%
CENTRAL
GREECE:
Chalkida 325 170 -48%
298
Athens 3000 4930 +64%
PELOPONNESE
Patra/Agrinio 265 152 -43%
EPIRUS
Ioannina 1850 163 -91%
Preveza 250 15 -94%
Arta 384 60 -84%
ISLANDS
Corfu 2000 187 -91%
Zakynthos 275 75 -
Chania (Crete) 350 77 -98%
Rodos/Kos 1900 200 -89%
TOTAL 77.377 10.226 -87%
*Source: Enepekidis, 1969:170-171.
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APPENDIX 2
Case Study: The Massacre of Distomo 10 June 1944
Interview Schedule (Unstructured Questions):
-How old were you at that time?
- What happened once the Germans arrived here?
-What were they looking for?
-What happened to you?
-What happened after the massacre?
-Were you at the village when the massacre occurred?
-Why do you think the massacre happened in the first place?
-Do you think it happened as an act of revenge as we hear from many locals or not?
-How did your parents and fellow locals experience the war generally?
-How many Nazis the partisans killed in Stiri?
-Can you please tell me the dynamics between the resistance groups in the villages?
-How do you perceive the differences between ELAS and EDES?
-So based on what you say, you argue that the cooperation between the two resistance groups
was breached many times?
- Although you were very young, did you have memories from the massacre of Distomo?
-How did the Nazis kill your parents?
-How did your fellow compatriots feel about the Germans after the massacre?
-Were there any political divisions in the villages?
-Do you know whether there were people who betrayed the partisans?
-Where did you go after the massacre?
(This dramatic picture
The Aftermath
was captured in the Mausoleum of Distomo, September 2009)
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(The brutal SS set the village ablaze after the massacre, picture from the Distomo Museum)
(The following pictures were donated
Distomo; Original Donator: Bennaki Museum, Athens)
to me by the Mayor Athanasios Panourgias in the
302
Municipality of
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APPENDIX 3
BRITISH ALLIED MISSION IN GREECE (SOE)
(Brigadier Eddie Myers, Chief of Command in Central Greece, British Intelligence Officer, member of SOE)
Source:
http://www.specialforcesroh.com/gallery/file3044.jpg
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PARTISANS OF EAM/ELAS
(Men of ELAS are resting in the mountains of “Free Greece”, picture exhibited in King’s College, London)
Source: http://www.kingscollections.org/exhibitions/archives/empire/cold-war-begins/greece
(Women of EAM/ELAS are voting for the first time in the Mountains of “Free Greece”)
Source: http://sindelius.wordpress.com/category/historia/page/2/
308
(Women in the resistance of EAM/ELAS)
Source:
http://www.tlife.gr/Article/polemos/0-77-8278.html
309
(Captain of ELAS, Ares Velouchiotis)
Source: http://pontosandaristera.wordpress.com/2010/06/17/aris/
310
(Napoleon Zervas, Leader of EDES)
Source: http://diolkos.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/blog-post_6077.html
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APPENDIX 4
(Caserta Agreement, source: Filippos Dragoumis, Sub-file: 62.5 “Dekemvriana 1944”, Gennadius Library,
Athens, Greece)
312
PRECIS OF OPERATIONAL ORDERS ISSUED BY G.O.C. FORCES IN GREECE*
(Attached to Caserta Agreement)
1. As far as forces operating in Greece to-day are concerned the military organisation is to be as
follows:
(a) General Zervas to continue to operate within the territorial limits of the PLAKKA Agreement
and to cooperate with General Sarafis in harassing the German withdrawal within territory
between the northern Plakka Boundary and ALBANIA.
(b) General Sarafis to continue to operate in the remainder of GREECE with the following
exceptions:
(1) ATTICA Province: All troops in this province will be commanded by General Spiliotopoulos,
acting in close cooperation with representatives of the Greek Government and assisted by
a Liaison Officer nominated by General Sarafis. To be under command Force 140.
(2) PELOPONNESE: Troops in this area to be commanded by an officer recommended by
General Sarafis in agreement with the Greek Government, assisted by a British Liaison
Mission. To be under command Force 140.
(3) At a later stage THRACE (incl. SALONIKA) to be under command of an officer nominate by
the Greek Government.
2. Tasks
(a) Both Commanders to harass the German withdrawal and to eliminate German garrisons.
(b) As territory is evacuated both Commanders are personally responsible to Commander, force
140, for:
(1) Maintenance of law and order in the territories where their forces are operating.
(2) Prevention of civil war and the killing of Greeks by Greeks.
(3) Prevention of infliction of any penalty what so ever and of justifiable arrest.
(4) Assistance in the establishment of the legal civil authority and the distribution of relief
3. A map showing the operational boundaries has been issued to both commanders.
Signed H. MAITLAND WILSON, G.PAPANDREOU
Prime Minister of Greece
General Supreme Allied Commander, S.SARAFIS.
Mediterranean Theatre N. ZERVAS.
H.M. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister, AFHQ
26TH September, 1944
In addition to the above signatures there were present:
Lieut. General R.M SCOBIE. M.SVOLOS and M. ZEVGOS.
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*(Operational orders attached to Caserta, source: Filippos Dragoumis, Sub-file: 62.5 “Dekemvriana 1944”,
Gennadius Library, Athens, Greece).
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(Letter of Churchill to Scobie, 5th December 1944, FO 954/11B, Image Ref: 154, source Public Record Office).
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AIDE MEMOIRE*
“The unforeseen bloodshed among the people of Athens, of which we were witness on the 13th Dec
and subsequent days, is the result of inflexible insistence by the reactionary right on the unilateral
disbandment of ELAS forces with the object of imposing after it, a Fascist Dictatorship. General
SCOBIE in contravention to the formal agreement of CASERTA, and the proclaimed objects of the
Allied war efforts, has unfortunately become heir to this effort on the part of the right and has
crudely involved himself in the internal affairs of an Allied country. One result of this misdirected
activity has been the regrettable fact that Allied peoples still struggling against the common enemy
have entered armed strife, and lament casualties in thousands, in particular amongst the non-
combatants, against whom have been turned the aeroplanes, guns and tanks of Great Britain.
Despite these painful events, we always abide by the smooth and democratic development
of our country and propose the following terms in answer to those submitted to us through
Comrade PORPHYROGENNIS.
1. Until a definite solution of the whole military question by the Government of National
Unity to be formed in the future, we agree to withdraw temporarily ELAS formations
from the cities of ATHENS/PIRAEUS to the general line laid down in HQ 3 Corps” memo
of 3RD December, 1944.
2. Simultaneously the Greek Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Squadron to be similarly
withdrawn temporarily from ATHENS/PIRAEUS to an area to be defined by mutual
agreement.
3. The whole force of Gendarmerie after been disarmed, to be placed on the Reserve and
its men dismissed to their homes. The officers and men of the former Rallis Battalions to
be disarmed and confined effectively in prison until tried by the Judiciary.
4. The British Forces in Greece to be employed exclusively in the execution of the Missions
defined under the Caserta Agreement, which do not envisage their employment in the
internal affairs of Greece.
5. The political world of the country to be left uninfluenced in the formation as speedily as
possible of a Government of real National Unity. This will resolve by democratic means
the whole political and military problem of the nation, including the questions of
disarmament of those not entitled to bear arms”.
14 Dec 44.
The ELAS Central Committee.
(Certified true copy,
ATHENS 15/12/44 (Sd) ).
*Source: Filippos Dragoumis Sub-File 62.5 “Dekemvriana 1944” (December Events 1944), Gennadius
Library, Athens, Greece
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